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AN ABSTRACt or THE THESIS Of l('jl:C"ct. T. Hnn ...1y for the }/:aster of j-<l"LS in 
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APPROVED BY }l't::KBERS OF ThE 'HiESIS Cm'1raTTEI<;: 
-~...---.--.... -...--­
BerIl3rd V. Burke~ Chail:'I!I<ll1 
-------­
Tom :l. MOEis 
On No"\·t)~nber 26, 1945, the Al:l~;assar10r to Ch:7.tla. PatTie"!::: 3. :'fur.ley, 
.annour.ced his resignat i.en tc the Arc.erican press. In dci.ng S'.J, he lev­
elcd charges-against the: State Department and a l1Ul'lber of its Foreign. 
SenTlce offil,:ers--chlirges which ques tioned the integrity of Dany, in 
their relati8::J.s with "That Hurle.y termed the "imperialist" and communist 
nations 'in China. .Those charges r,ce::e the beginning of t~vo and one-half 
dec.ades 'Of ide.ological crusading in America by many who developed the 
theory that t::hoee men charged by Hurley had been responsible for Ar.'lI?rica T s 
-----­
H!lrley ,7<>'S s~nt to China in 1944 2S President Roose'felt r s personal 
repT(~se-::1taciw~ t·) Chiang Kai-she~. His directive was to promote efficient 
and harmonious relstions b~tHei.!n Chiang Kai-l5hek ani General Stih-ell, 
COllmumder. of A'.!!erican Forces, Cltina Theatre. Hurley was, further, to 
- facU; t.3t:e Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese armies ,v;'!1ich, 
it was i:oped~ 'Would soon be placed under him. 
Failing in this mission, Hurley was ultimately appoir~ted to the r.:;,uk 
of Ar.:bassad(Jr after the I esii:,nat:i.oiJ vf Clc.l.re~~ce r. Gaus:::. Bu r:_cy had 
this ti.me, taken on the responsi.bHHy of pr.omoting negotiations bet~~Tcep 
the Kuomintang Government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist 
Pa:::-ty, headc:uartered in Yenan. 
~.f.ather t:hansiIP,:pl.Y offering his "good offices ll in the o.egotiatio:ls J 
Hurley became personally involved, interjecting hi.s personal, ideological 
beliefs into the proposals of each side. Through th:l.s involvement, Hur­
ley became personally committed t;.J unification on his terms, and event'.l8.1.1y 
gave the Kuo'1lintang Party and Chiang Kai·-sack the impression that the 
United State::; WaS perman..:mtlf ~cl1llaitted to suppcrt of the Central GV',;cr'n-­
ment. 
Hurley soon came into conflict with a. number of Foreign Service of­
ficers and the D.:!partment of State, below thl! level of the Secretary of 
State, OVE:r oPfosing interpretations of American policy in China. Hudey 
becaI!"!e intransigent in his overwhelming support of t.he National Government, 
while lL!embers of the State Department believed that the United States 
shol'ld remain flexible in its approach to the problems in China to avoid 
sllpporting the losing side in what was seem as an inevitable civil war. 
Hurlay cam..;; to see criticism of Chiang Kai-shek' s government and 
suggestions for alterations in policy, as personal criticism directed a~ 
him. In the face of this perceived threat to himself, he had a number of 
Foreign Service officers re-called or transferred, only to discover that 
they had been reassigned to positions which he thought were superior to 
his. 
In the face of these ("vents and rising crit:ici.sITl, in adclHion to 
eventual failure to bring thl~ t~?O Ch:ine::.;e fa.-:.:ti.onr. together al'ld impend­
ing civil war, Hurley submitted his resignation to tn", Se~n?tary of 
State, after first announcing his reasons La tile press. Experiencing 
on:;! of the fm.. failures of his life, ths man T.Jho had risen from the 
coal mines of Oklahoma to become a millionaire twice over, Secretary 
of Defense under President Hoover, and Ambassador to China under Roose­
velt, turned the blaIne for his failure to those wHh whom he hRd COlUe 
in conflict, the Department of State being the principal culprit. 
This study of Hurley's experiences in China is based Up011 sever-­
al secondary accounts of the period, recently published Department of 
State papers (.!'oreign Rel~!:J.:.ons~ t~e United States: Diplomati.c Papers), 
Hurley's several testimonials before Congres!:>ional COllUllittees, and lntcr~' 
views wi til Hr. John Stewart Service, upon whom attentiop. ~a8 focl:secl in 
numeroas loyalty investigations subsequent to Hurley's resig!!ation. 
PATRICK J. HURU,'I AND CHINA, 19l'[1-1945 
by 
ROBERT T. lIANDY 
A thesi.s sub:uit:ted fn partial fulfUlment of.th.~ 
requirements for the degree of 
It'..ASTER OF ARTS 

in 

HISTORY 

Portbmd State University 
1971 
TO TH~ OFFICE OF Gr~UATE STUDICS: 

The members of the Committee approve the thesis of 

' 
(Jim F. Hea.th 
Tom D. Herris 
APPROVED: 
History 
Hay 18, 1971 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER PAGE 

I The "Great Debatetl 1 

II China and the Roots of the Hurley Mission • 27 

III The President's Personal Representative •. 46 

IV Dixie Mission . . . . . . . . . . 69 

V Stilwell, Chiang and the Communists • 86 

VI Hurley Meets the Communists . . • . 101 

VII Toward Alienation and Isolation 121 

VIII Conflicting Vie>-;s of American t:cHcy 138 

IX The Opposition Fails . . . 
.' 159 

X The Victor Fails 174 

BIDLIOG~~HY • . • • • 203 

APPENDIX 210 

.CHAPTER I 
THE "GREAT DEBATE" 
On November 26, 1945, Patrick J. Hurley, Ambassador to China 
since November 30, 1941+, 1 tendered his resignation to Pres iden t Harry 
S Truman. On the following day, Mr. Hurley released the contents of 
2hi.s letter of resignation to the press and launched what his biograph­
er later termed the "great debate,,,3 one which, while not immediately 
fruitful, had profound impl:i.cations for a number of Americans in later 
years, and lIne from ,,-rhich echoes continue to be heard in the 1970's.4 
lease, Hu.rley offered milch mo,e than a simple resignatio~i. In a If ••• 
scathing de.nunciation of State Department sa.botage of American foreign 
policy • • . virtually unprecedented :i.n American diplor.mtj c history," 
1Department of State, Foreign Relatior.s of thE: United States: 
Diplomatic Papers (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office), 1944, VI, 200, footnote 29, (hereafter cited as ForeiJQ~.lt.":.­
lations). Hurley was confirmed as Ambassador to China by tr,e United 
States Senate on this date. 
2New Yor~im~~, November 28, 1945: Hur1ey 
' 
s resignation was 
reported in a front page story. The text of his letter to the Presi­
dent was printed on page 3 of the same issue. For official text of 
his letter of resignation see, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 72'2.. 
3Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956), 474. 
4See The Arnerasi.-9JapE:r_§..: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, 
prepared by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the 
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security La\'7S of the Committee 
on the Judiciary (Hashington: Untted States Government Printing Office., 
January 26) J. 970), (hereafter cHed as AJ'!lp.I::l.f.'ia Pe.per.1U. S~e :i.n par­
ticular, the "introduction" by Anthony Kubek, parts I, II, III, pp. 1-113. 
5 
Hurley laid the groundwork upon which he intended to build a case that 
would awaken " ..• the indignation of the American people at the mis­
conduct of foreign relations to the-point where a thorough investiga­
tion and cleansing of the Department of State would be unavoidable." 
Hurley stated initially that he had had, during h~s tenure in 
China, the full support of both Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, as well 
as their Secreta.ries of State, Cordell Hull, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 
and James F. Byrnes. But while American wartime objectives had always 
been clearly defined in the "higher echelons of our policy-making of­
6ficials," there had existed according to Hurley, a wide discrepancy 
between announced policies anc the actual conduct of international re­
lations. The United States had begun the Second World War with the 
p.rJ.nQ.J.pJ.es.....of.. the, Atlantj.c Chart.er and. democracy as its... -so.als." ex::... 
p1ained Hurley, but had finished the war in the Far East furnishing 
Lend-lease supplies and using its reputation to undermine democracy 
and bolster imperialism and Conoounism. 
Hurley went on to state that he had been directed by President 
Roosevelt, first, as the Presidentts personal representative to Chiang 
Kai-shek and then as ambassador to China, to prevent the collapse of the 
Chinese Government and to keep the Chinese Army in the war against the 
Japanese. While that had been his primary objective, Hurley continued, 
it had also been his assigned function to harmonize the relations be­
tween the American Embassy in Chungking and the Chinese Government. The 
ex-ambassador noted, however, that while all of these objectives had 
5Lohbeck, 437. 

6Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 722. 

3 
been accomplished, and although they had the support of the President 
and the Secretary of State, the American policy did not have the support 
of all the career men in the State Department. The professional foreign 
service men, he charged, sided with the Chinese Co~~unist armed party 
and imperialistic bloc of nations whose policy had been. to keep China 
divided against herself. They had openly advised the Communist armed 
party to decline unification of the Chinese Communist Army with the 
National Army unless the Chinese Communists were given control. Fur­
thermore, these career men, after having been transferred to Washington 
at Hurley's request, had been placed in the Chinese and Far Eastern Div­
isions of the State Department as his supervisors. 
In surom.arizing, Hurley argued that the United. States I World War II 
policy as represented in thE. principles of the Atla11tic Chart(;~r and the 
Iran Declaration, had been an elaboration of its First World War policy 
of making the world free for democracy. But while the United States had 
• 	 won both wars, it had failed to establish the principles for which it 
had allegedly been fighting. The war which was then in the making vTaS 
not even intended to d.efend or establish detnocratic ideals. Instead of 
putting its weight behind the Charter of the United Nations, the United 
States had definitely been supporting the imperialistic bloc. At the 
same time, according to Hurley, a considerable section of the State De­
partment was endeavoring to support Communism generally as well as 
specifically in China. 
Hurley's intent in releasing this denunciation of America's im­
plementation of policy in the Far East \11aS not simply to inform the 
President of the Ambassador's reasons for resigning. It was his hope, 
rather, to instigate an investigation by America's Congressional bodies: 
4 
• • • with his idealized concept of the American people and the 
American government, Pat Hurley relied upon the Congress--now 
that he had pointed out that path to follow--to launch a "great 
debate" on the entire foreign policy situation. 7 
It appeared at first, that Hurley would get his great debate. Al­
though the response to his publicized resignation was slight in the House 
of Representatives, a debate was not long in beginning on the floor of 
the United States Senate. On November 28, Senator Kenneth Wherry of Neb­
raska, addressing himself at first to impending legislation for implemen­
tation of the United Nations Charter, shifted his attention to the Hurley 
statement of resignation on the grounds that perhaps the State Department 
was an area to be examined to determine its ability to function under a 
8United Nations-oriented system. 
Hurley had not merely charged that some people were incompetent or 
inept in conducting American foreign relations in the Orient, Wherry ar­
gued, he " ••• has made charges against.at least one section of the 
State Department personnel which seems to • • • involve accusations which 
9fall very little short of treason." Offering lengthy remarks which read 
like a defense of Hurley's charges Wherry concluded: 
Mr. President, is it possible that we have fought this most 
tragic of all wars in history only to discover that the gravest 
danger and threat to America was not and is not derived from 
any foreign power or combinations of power but from an indigi­
nous conspiratorial minority of foreign agents and their dupes 
who have used the glorious freedoms of this land to work de­
struction from within?lO 
7Lohbeck, 474. 

8
U. S. Congress, ~ongressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Se~sion, 
1945, Volume 91, Part 8, 11109. 
9Ibid . 11110.
--_. , 
10Ibid., 11111. 
5 
Responding to Senator vfuerry's remarks, Senator Tom Connally of 
Texas expressed his surprise that Hherry had so hurriedly accepted the 
11
entire statement of the former Ambassador. For nearly an hour Connally 
addressed the Senate in te~ms highly critical of Hurley's behavior in 
making his resignation public. 
Mr. President, it looks to me as if it is a little ungracious 
for an Ambassador to a great country, having enjoyed these per­
iods of service allover the world by appointment of the Presi­
dent of the United States, now, because of this disagreement with 
some subordinate somewhere--what it was about I do not know, it 
never having been made clear as to what he says they did-- to re­
sign his great station in a moment of anger, or pique and under­
take to cover the foreign policy of the United States allover 
with obloquy and diplomatic slime and say that the Foreign Polic.y 
of the United States is almost approaching treason, as suggested 
by· the Senator from Nebraska. 12 
Admonished by Senator Styles Bridges for "making jest of a very ser­
iaus· matrer,"·Connally respondE;;(]: that, \lno ; the Senator from Texas is not 
trying to make jest. He is trying to show the ridiculous attitude of the 
former ambassador {sic] to China."l3 
Follo\ving this rather heated exchange, Senator l\lh.er;ry called for­
14
mally for a Senate investigation of the Hurley charges and, on December 
5, 1945, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Tom 
Connally proceeded to hear the testimony of: 
General Hurley and such other witnesses as the Committee might 
deem proper with respect to the situation :i.n the Far East, par­
llIbid. , 11112. 
12Ibid • , 11113. 
•l3Ibid . , 11114. 
14Ibid• , 11111. 
6 
ticularly China, in the light of General Hurley's resignation 
as Ambassador to China."lS 
"Mr. Chairman," Hurley began. 
I would like to state in the beginning that I did not ask 

for this hearing. I would also like to make it clear that I 

have had no meetings of any kind with the members of Congress 

on the facts that I will endeavor to present. The reason for 

this statement is that I am convinced that this Committee is 

beginning a hearing on the foreign policY of the United States. 

Such a hearing should not be partisan. I will decline to ally 

myself with any partisan group or with any minority.16 

Hurley had thus begun his attempt to point out the path for Congress 
to follow. Unfortunately, the path would be a muddy one. Hurley was not 
at all clear in his testimony about what his charges actually were. A 
close examination of the claims made in his initial statement and in re­
sponse to questions about the Committee reveal, when considered cumulative-
statement b \.' 0 ff" artlcu. atlng' Am "1's po lCY toward Cl'y 	111g11 'lCla.1s, 1 erlca ~lna. 17 
Claiming that certain people in the Foreign Service were advocating a 
different policv and telling the Communists and the A.lJlerican public that 
the policy being follm\1ed by Hurlpy in China was his ow11 and not the 
United States Government's, Hurley had wanted a public statement to 
lSU.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Investigation of Far 
Eas.!.ern Policy, Decembpr, 5. 6, 7. 10,1945 [unpublishedl, (Washington: 
National Archives), 120.1/11.3045, (hereafter cited as Investigation. Far 
East Policy), 3. 
l6 Ibi<!., 2. 
17 Ibid .. 7. Referring to Secretary of State Byrnes' public state­
, 	ment of the previous day on United States-China policy, Hurley stated, 
" . if that public announcement of American policy had been issued by 
the State Department before I returned from China, I would not have re­
turned. If that public statement had been made by the State Department 
before I rendered my resj.gnation, I would not have resigned." See, Ibid., 
5. 
7 
support his action and to lend credence to his attempts at unification of 
the Nationalist and Communi.st Chinese. 
Hurley pointed out to the Committee that while there had been state­
ments of policy made directly to him, no public statement had been made 
fI 
. since Cordell Hull made it on the 26th day of November, 1941, he-
fore we got into war."lB He had asked for a public statement for quite 
some time~Hur1ey said, but had never received instructions from the State 
19Department, only from President Rooseve1t. He stated later, however, 
that after having outlined in a letter of December 24, 1944, his concep­
tion of American policy, to the Secretary of State (Stettinius), the 
latter had sent Hurley a telegram in which he commended the Ambassador 
highly for the work he had done. This was not, however, a public state­
ment, Hurley said, and the lIlen whom he had referred to ':';'8 worlei"fl-g-·aga4.~.st 
him, had taken the position that the Secretary's commendation was not an 
endorsement of the policy the Ambassador had out1ined. 20 On or about 
January 21, 1945, Hurley said, he had called all the heads of American 
agencies in China together in his office and stated to them the policy 
of the United States. Hurley later reported to the Committee that those 
men whom he claimed to be working against him were at that meeting, but 
had expressed no hostility to the policy as announced to them at that 
time. 
IB1bid . , B. 
19Ibid . , 40A. 
20Ibi~. , 40H. 
8 
Following his announcement of policy to his agency heads, 
Hurley ·returned to l-lashington, according to his testimony, and was 
there confronted by a report to the Secretary of State from Mr. George 
Atcheson (who had been left in charge of the Embassy), in which he a1­
legedly recommended that Hurley's policy of not armin.g the Communists-­
belligerents who would fight against the government that the United 
States was upholding--be discarded and replaced with a policy of pro­
viding Lend-lease aid to the Chinese Communists. Atcheson had also 
said in his report, Hurley added, that he (Atcheson) " ••. had the 
support, the acquiescence of every official member of the American 
Embassy in Chungking. 1I2l In Hurley's opinion, Mr. Atcheson had been 
guilty of insubordination in sending this report without his prior 
Asked if he had !:esolved the issue over the Atcheson report, 
Hurley answered in the affirmative. He claimed to have contended at 
the time that if the Atcheson report constituted the policy of the 
United States it was a departure from the purpose for which he had 
been sent to China. If that were the case then Atcheson should be 
left in charge and he, Hurley, kept at home. The result, after many 
days of argument, was, Hurley asserted, " •.• that Mr. Atcheson was 
recalled, because he had shown that in my absence he had advocated a 
policy that I felt destructive t.o unification.,,22 
2lIbid., 41. Hurley had stated earlier in his testimony that it 
had been-his opinion while in China that aroing or providing Lend-lease 
to, the Chinese Communists faction would constitute the recognition of 
a belligerent. See, IhiE._' 40D. 
22Ibid.~ 49. 
9 
Atcheson's recall, however, did not satisfy the Ambassador, for as 
he stated in response to Senator LaFollette's request for a statement of 
facts, 
. 
You have it, that I made this report to Secretary Stettinius; 
he sent me a telegram whi"ch approved my conduct but did not 
make a public statement upholding the policy, and as soon as I 
left China the whole crowd got together and reversed or tried 
to reverse that telegram, The result was that Atcheson was re­
called and placed in a supervisory capacity with all the others 
over me in Washington, and that made untenable my position, I 
wanted a public statement from the State Department of our po1­
icy."23 
Asked once more, what the issue was, Hurley replied: 
What I wanted was a public statement of the American policy 
so that they could not continue in high official positions to 
say that what I upheld was not the American policy. " I think 
that is the issue, Senator. 24 
In addition to George Atcheson and the "whole crowd" at the Chung­
king Embassy, Hurley named spe~ifica1ly, one John Stewart Scrvjce, a po­
litical advisor assigned to General Joseph Stilwell's command in China 
as one of the principal saboteurs. In response to the Committee Chair-
man's question as to when these men defeated Hurley's poiicy in China, 
Hurley testified that on October 30, 1944, Mr. John S. Service submitted 
in his report number 40, " a general statement of how to let the 
government that I was sent over there to sustain fall; and that report 
was circu~ated among the communists whose support I was seeking for our 
I , 1125 po ~cy..•• Later in his testimony, Hurley reiterated that ". 
the report of Hr. John Service dated October 10, 1944, and numbered 40. 
23 Ibid • , 50. 
24 
o ~ Ibid. , 58. 
~51bid_, , 16. 
10 
was the first outward evidence I had of a plan not to uphold but to 
cause. the collapse of the Government of the Republic of China.,,26 
Although Hurley's testimony was extremely vague and rambling, it 
appears that he was finally motivated to resign by a number of occur­
rences which led him to believe that his work was being undermined. 
Having succeeded in getting Atcheson, Service and several other Foreign 
Service offi.cers recalled, Hurley then discovered that three of these 
men, Atcheson, Service and John K. Emmerson, had been appoi.nted as Ad­
visors to the Supreme Commander of the Allied forces in Asia. Although 
the appointments irritated Hurley, he was far more concerned with the 
fact that 
the papers in China, especially in Yenan [the Chinese Communist 
stronghold], and the radio, said that Atcheson and Service and 
sa.c.for.th had. won out over. me, and. that I had.. ,not haem. rep.r.esen.t:i.ng. 
the United States' policy, and the papers said they were coming 
back to China and therefore the Communists should not unite. 
Hurley fu:;;:ther stated on this point that it had been Mao Tse-tung who had 
told him that the United States was not going to follow through on its 
28
unification program that he was trying to present. 
In addition to this challenge to Hurley's authority in China, the 
ex-Ambassador testified that while he was in Washington in November, 
1945, someone had addressed a letter to President Truman in which lIurley 
was charged with making his own policy in China. Everett D~umright, 
Chief of the Department of State's China Division, prepared an answer 
to this letter, Hurley told the Committee, in which it was stated that 
26.!.bid., 89. 

27 IbJ5!. , 57. 

28.~bid. , 60. 

11 
the policy being followed in China was the United States Government's 
policy and not one formulated by Hurley. But when the letter reached 
John Carter Vincent, Hurley went on to report, the Director of the Far 
Eastern Division struck out all but an acknowledgement of its receipt. 
Drumright's defense of Hurley, in other words, never reached the ac­
cuser. On that same day Hurley charged, " the same career man's 
attack on me came out not only in papers in New York and in Chicago, 
29but on the floor of Congress." He had come home in November to re­
sign, Hurley explained, but Secretary Byrnes and President Truman had 
talked him into going back after a brief rest. He was sincere when 
he told the President and Byrnes that he would go back, said Hurley, 
"but when I was confronted by the fact that again I was left naked to 
my".eo.cmiDA.and.. the.. en.emies, of Ame,ric~l, . I de.o.ided.. I would COm1!1Cllce. fi·r-· 
ing, and I dl.d. So that is the' reason 'vhy I am here this morning. ,,30 
It is apparent from Hurley's testimony, when viewed as a whole, 
that he had felt strongly about avoiding military and mater.ial support 
of the Chinese Communists for fear chat this \-]Quld constitute recogni­
tion by the United States Government of the belligerent status of the 
Communists i.n a Chinese civil war. The recognition of an armed force 
which.was fighting to overthrow a government allied with the United 
States was.out of the question, as far as he was concerned. Foreign 
Service personnel, however, were advocating the arming of the Communists, 
and in Hurley's opinion, doing it behind his back. This apparent 
29 Ibi<!.., 63. Hurley never identified this man in his testimony. 
30Ibid .) 63. 
12 
insubordination threatened the Ambassador and was compounded by reports, 
both in China and at home, which questioned publicly his authority to 
carry out what he perceived to be his assigned duty--the unifi.cation of 
the Chinese Communist and Nationalist governments. 
Unfortunately, for Hurley, and perhaps for the American people, 
the ex-Ambassador's charges could not be substantiated. The man who, 
through Congress, was taking his case to the American public, could not 
take the evidence to them as well. Hurley had based his charges on a 
number of documents, stated 'at first to be written by himself, but ex­
panded in number as the hearings progressed, to include several written 
by John Stewart Service, George Atcheson and John Patton Davies, Jr. 
Although Hurley had testified in the beginning stages of the hearings 
that he pos:::es'sed none of the coded copies· of the-J'e ' documents j he-did 
admit to having had in his possessiun, notes of the preparation of his 
original copies. But Hurley would not reveal the contents of these doc­
uments, without the Committee being supplied paraphrases by the Depart­
ment of State. As Hurley stated, 
I know what they contain, but I will have to ask the State De­
partment to furnish me with paraphrases of these documents for 
the reason that if we should submit from the State Department 
the original documents they would have a tendency to give away 
the American secret code; and I do not want to do any irrepar­
able damage to the foreign policy of my country.3l 
After four days of hearings, in which Hurley's charges were reit­
erated, but not substantiated, the Committee moved to continue its in­
vestigation in Executive Session, where the contents of the documents 
requested by Hurley could be examined without publicity. But Hurley 
3lU~id., 3. 
13 
refused. "He would testify only in public, where the press could trans­
. h . f . f . h . .. ,,32m1t t e 1n ormat10n 0 - corrupt10n to t e ent1re CJ_t1zenry. The ideal­
ism of Patrick J. Hurley which would not allow him to disclose the con­
tents of documents vital to his case, destroyed his attempt to take "tbe 
truth" to the American people. On December 10, 1945, the Senate Foreign 
Relations Cowmittee's Investigation of Far Eastern Policy came to an end. 
For lack of a principal, the case was dropped. While Hurley had pointed 
out the path for Congress to follow, he had, at the same time, blocked 
that path with obstacles insurmountable at that time. About Senator 
Wherry's resolution to set up a five-man Committee for a "top to bottom 
investigation of the State Department," Senator Connally reported: "It 
is lying calmly on my desk. It shows no signs of life, although \ole 
. 33 
have not put a pulmotor on it." 
Having instigated, but by his own action ended, an investigation 
of the State Department, Hurley, in 1946~ decided to take his case di­
rectly to the people. But to do so, he needed a" ••. nationwide forum 
from which to proclaim his charges against the pro-Communist and pro-im­
34perialist elements within the government." That forum, as Hurley saw 
it, would be the United States' Senate for which he campaigned as the 
Republican nominee from Ne'l1 Nexico in 1946. In a letter to an Ok13.homa 
newspaper editor who had charged that Hurley changed his residence froffi 
32Lohbeck, 446. 

33
Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and 

the Creation of Conununist China, .1941-1949 (Chicago, 1963), 313. 

34Lchbeck, 453. 
14 
Oklahoma to New Mexico to pick up an easy Senate seat, Hurley wrote: 
I ran for the Senate from New Mexico after I had resigned as 
Ambassador to China. • .• I decided to go to the Senate to 
obtain for myself a forum through which to speak to the American 
people and by which I believed I could prevent the loss of our 
great ally, China. 35 
Losing to the incumbent, Senator Dennis Chavez, who according to 
Hurley's biographer, Don Lohbeck, It ••• controlled the large Spanish-
speaking vote in New Mexico••. ,n Hurley again attempted election in 
1948, running this time against the former Secretary of Agriculture, 
Clinton P. Anderson. In the 1948 campaign which Lohbeck describes as 
similar to the one in 1946: 
·Hur1ey spoke of the betrayal of America's honor and integrIty 
through the secret betrayal of our ally in the Far East, and of 
the dangers of corrupting America's traditional support of po­
litical independence and territorial integrity through the policy 
of'upholding imperialist greed and a.ggression .•• 36 
Where Hurley had lost by' only 4000 votes in 1946, he lost by 
26,000 in the 1948 election. In both cases, Lohbeck reported Hurley's 
losses in such a way that Hurley appeared once again, the victim of 
machinations against him. Where it was reported that Hurley had been 
accused of moving to New Hexico to pick up an easy seat in the 1946 
election, Hr. Lohbeck wrote that in 1948 Hurley's opponents were again 
campaigning on a personal level. 
The'smear commentators were brought to New Mexico to accuse 
Pat Hurley of cowardice in the first World War, brutality dur­
ing the bonus march, and of having recommended during the de­
pression years that 'the poor be fed the scrapings from the 
rich men's plates. ,37 
35Ibid:.... , 504. 

36Ib2-~" 454. 

37 IbJd., 38. 
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In 1949, the "China white-paper" was released by the State De­
partment. Entitled, Unite? St!ltes Relations HUh China,38 this publi­
cation was released following the Corr~unist takeover in China and was 
intended to be an explanation of American policy toward China since 
1941, but with emphasis on the five yea'rs vreceding the Communist vic­
tory over the Nationalist government. In Hurley's eyes, however, it was 
• a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who 
have engineered the overthrow of our ally, the National Government of 
the Republic of China, and aided in the Communist conquest of China.,,39 
Critical of the "white paper" for numerol.!S reasons, Hurley's pri­
mary complaints centered around the reporting of the Yalta agreement) 
and the failure of the State Department to reveal to the American people, 
tIm dO'cunrents which he could not present in 1945, wh:l:ch, Hurley claimed , 
had obviously been quoted from in the "white paper.,,40 
It was Hurley's opinion, that contrary to the justifica.tion pre­
sented in the "white paper," the secret Yalta agreement which brought 
Russia into the Pacific War approximately three months after the defeat 
of Germany, was not necessary. 
The import of the "white paper" to the effect that we were com­
pelled to meet these demands of Russia because we were afraid of 
what Russia would do about our war with Japan, is not a satisfactory 
reason for our entering into the secret agreements of Yalta. At 
38Department of State, United States Relations With Ch::'na: With 
Special_Reference~t~ ~~eperiod.194~9 (Washington~ 1949), (Hereafter 
cited as United States Relations with China). 
39Quoted in Lohbeck, 457. 
40 Ibid ., 458. 
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that time the United States had on land, on the seas, and in 
the air, the greatest military power ever assembled on this 
earth. America's military power at the time of Yalta was in­
vincible. The United States did not need Russia. Russia 
dared not oppose the United States. Japan was already defeated 
before Russia reached the Japanese front. td 
Once again, in 1950, as reported by Hurley's biographer, the ex-
Ambassador to China made a martyred appeal to the American people. In 
a radio forum of that year, moderated by Eleanor Roosevelt, Hurley, 
" • •• expresslllg the weariness of years of shouting a warning from the 
housetops while few paused to listen," stated in answer to Mrs. Roose­
velt's question if everything had been published on the China incident, 
"Well, no, Mrs. Roosevelt. .Everytime I try to tell it, somebody tries 
42 to stop_~." (Emphasis is Lohbeck' s). 
But ironically, in that same year, 1950, Patrick Hurley denied 
himself an opportunity to tell again what he saw as the cause of America's 
failure in China. Invited to testify' before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committeets hearings on State Department employee loyalty investigations, 
better known as the Tydings sub-committee, Hurley refused because the 
documents requested by him in 1945 would not yet be made available to 
him. 
He IMi11ard E. Tydings) advised me that they would not be, 

that they were secret documents. I said then that it would 

be futile for me to appear because I could not use the docu­

ments, even those which are my own which have been encoded, 

until they are decoded and made available to me through the 

State Department. 43 

4;tlbid. , 458. 
42 Ibid . , 458. 
43Ibid • , 460. 
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In 1951, however, Patrick Hurley found himself with another chance 
to tell his story fully, when he was invited to testify before the joint 
hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations and Senate Armed Services Com­
44
mittees, on the military situation in the Far East. In his testimony, 
to which there is no reference in his biography, Hurley made many of the 
same points that he had in 1945, but added many more, since the long-
asked-for documents were available to him, and the secret Yalta agree­
ments had become public knowledge. 
American diplomats, Hurley began, had surrendered the territorial 
llltegrity and the political independence of China in the secret agreement 
at Yalta. That secret agreement, he said, marked the beginning of a 
change in America's foreign policy toward China, from support of the prin­
ciples of the Atlanti~ Charter to a policy basec on concessions to Com­
munism, imperialisre and fear of Russia. The provision in the At!~ 
£hart~ agreeing to no territorial or other form of aggrandizement by 
the signatories during the war, was intended, said Hurler, " .•• to hold 
Russia and Communism within the national boundaries of Russia.,,45 The 
Yalta agreement, Hurley testified, released Russia from this bind. Fur­
thermore, the A~lantic Cha~ provision guaranteeing respect for the 
right of all peoples to choose their own form of government had to be 
repealed, claimed Hurley, " ••• in order to give the colonial imperial­
ists the right to resubjugate their colonial and mandated people ••.46 
44U. S• Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Hearin s on the Militar- Situation in the Far East (Washington, 
1951), (hereafter cited as Mi itarZ Situation Far East). 
45 Ibid ., 2832. 
46Ibid • 
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The Atlantic Charter had been a consistent reference for Hurley 
beginning with his letter of resignation in 1945, and now, finally, six 
years later, his attachment to that document was revealed. He had 
• 47been instrumental in drafting the Iran Declaration at the Teheran Con­
ference in 1943, Hurley pointed out in his testimony. Although this 
declaration had been presented by Secretary of State, Cordell Hul~ to 
the Russians earlier in Moscow, and rejected, it was accepted by the 
powers at Teheran, according to Hurley, after he had included the fol­
lowing additional phrase: 
They {the signatories] count upon the participation of Iran 
together with all peace-loving nations, in the establishment of 
international peace, security, and prosperity after the war in 
accordance with the principles of t::le Atlantic Charter to which 
all four nations have s 1 bscribed.48 
Hurley identified himself with the Irar, Declaration, therefore, 
and this identification was carried over to the principles of the 
Atlantic Charter which, in his mind, had been reaffirmed by the three 
principal powers when they signed the Iran Declaration. Having charged 
in his 1951 testimony that after the United States had entered the war, 
the Communists and Imperialists had tried to discount the Atlantic 
49 l" h . b' d' . HItCh -c a1m1ng t at 1t was not a 1n l.ng agreement--l.t was ur ey s~te:r 
contention that because the Iran Declaration had included a reference 
47See : Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 
1943 (Washington, 1961), 377. See also: Military Situation Far East, 
2834; and Lohbeck, Chapter 4, 202. 
48Military Sityation F,!lr East, 2834. 
49 Ibid ., 50. 
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to the Atlantic Charter, and because the former had been signed by the 
Unl.ted States, Great Britaj.n and the Soviet Union, it \oTaS as binding 

50 

an international agreement as any treaty • 
. 
Having thus testified to the binding legality of the Atlantic 
'~harter, Hurley proceeded to show how the United States had surrendered 
the principles of that agreement at Yalta. The National Government of 
the Republic of China was our ally, Hurley repeated, and the secret 
agreement at Yalta gave away her property without her being represented. 
This was, in effect, a violation of the Atlantic Charter guarantees of 
the territorial integrity of sovereign nations. Furthermore, General 
S1Marsha11 who had been sent to China as Hurley's replacement, had been 
ordered, according to Hurley, to force the Nationalists into a coalition 
with the Chinese Communists. This was not in keeping with the UoHed 
States· policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign 
52
states, he pointed out. 
President Roosevelt was a sick man at Yalta, Hurl~y claimed, and 
53did not know what was happening. Hurley had learned that an agreement 
had been made at Yalta in reference to China while he was still in 
China, and when he came home in March, 1945, he confronted the President, 
50Ibid_., 2842. 
51General of the Army, George C. Marshall, was appointed by Truman 
as the President's special envoy to China with the personal rank of 
Ambassador, on November 27, 1945. See ,Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 276. 
52M'l' Si . F E 28381 1t~ry- ~uat1o~ 'ar ast, . 
531, . d ~., 2888. 
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first with a demand to see the ag:reements made at Yalta, and then, after 
having seen them, with the. contention that the secret portion was a 
violation of the territorial integrity of China. Hurley did not reveal 
his actual conversations with Roosevelt in his testimony, only that 
Roosevelt, subsequently, and as a result of Hurley's urgings, felt that 
there was some possible dangers of infringements on China's territory 
if the Yalta provisions were carried out. 
Agreeing that there was some justification for Hurley's fears, 
Roosevelt, according to Hurley's testimony, sent the ambassador immedi­
ately to London and Moscow to ameliorate the agreements related to 
China. Once again, Hurley failed to reveal the substance of his conver­
sations with Churchill and Stalin, stating only that he 'vas able to an­
nounce to the press upon his return tv China, that the three governments 
concerned had agreed that they would respect the territorial integrity 
and the political independence of China and that they would support the 
efforts of the Chinese people to establish self-government. On the day 
following his announcement to the press, Hurley testified, the British 
54Prime Minister under question in Parliaruent affirmed the correctness 
of Hurley's announcement. 
Hurley concluded his testimony, however, stating that: 
. . . the next thing I had was a cable from the State Depart­
ment in which they say that they are irrevocably committed to 
the agreement signed at Yalta; in other words, I was making a 
little dE'.nt on Britain and Russia, but I could not move the 
American State Department; and that, my friends, I think, 
brings you to what I consider the saddest defeat that I suf­
fered....55 
55 Ibid . 
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Once again, Hurley had been given an opportunity to tell his 
story but, as in 1945, he was extremely vague in reference to a number 
of points, the most vital being the actual substance of his conversations 
with Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. He did reveal, however, his very 
close attachment to the Atlantic Charter and to its reaffirmation in the 
Iran Declaration of 1943. This personal attachment suggests a tendency 
to become personally committed to the diplomatic work assigned to him, a 
characteristic which deprived him of needed flexibility. 
Roosevelt, who was in Hurley's opinion, a sick man at Yalta, was 
a victim of the same machinations that had been working to defeat the 
ambassador in his attempts to stabilize and sustain the Natjona1ist 
Chinese government in the war effort. Hurley revealed in his testimony, 
fight a.gainst Japan, and that this was known prior to Yalta. Referring 
to the allegation in the "China white-paper," that American policy 
mskers feared there would be upwards of 1,000,000 casualties in an in­
vasion of Japan, Hurley stated: 
If we believe this ••• we must also believe that the final 
conquest of a broken and beaten Japan would cost more in 
American casualties than all the battles of the Pacific, all 
the battles of the islands, all the battles of Burma and 
China, all the battles of the Atlantic, all the battles of 
Africa, all tIle battles of the Mediterranean, all the battles 
of England, all the battles of France, all the battles of 
Bolland, all the battles of Belgium, and all the battles of 
Germany. America had less than 1,000,000 casuslties in all 
of those battles. 56 
It was easy, therefore, for Hurley to view the unnecessary Yalta 
agreeffient to bring Russia into the Pacific war, as another of the State 
~epartment~s attempts to let China go to the Communists. lbe United 
56Ibid ., 2839. 
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States did not need Russia's help in fighting the Japanese. This was 
known at Yalta, according to Hurley, by all perhaps but Roosevelt. The 
conclusion was obvious: The only reason Russia was brought into the 
Pacific war was to aid the Communists in gaining a foothold in North 
China and Manchuria, the resulting effect being aid to the Chinese 
Communists in their fight to control all of China. And it was all done 
by a key group of career State Department personnel. 
In 1952, Patrick Hurley again ran for the Senate from New Mexico. 
Once again, he lost, victimized this time, his supporters alleged, by 
bi-partisan alignments, the " ••• communist-dominated Mine, Mill and 
Smelter Worker's Union" and, " ••• the long arm of Zionist political 
57 pressure. 11 
Betrayed by the leaders of his own party, smeared by pro­
Communist labor groups, opposed by those who sought to revenge 
themselves against his anti-imperialism, Pat Hurley--when the 
ballots were counted--appeared to h~ve been defeated by 5,071 
votes out of a total of 239,971 ballots cast,58 
But not only was Hurley the victim of a smear campaign in this) 
his final bid for a Senate seat, the election, he complained, was rigged. 
Two years after the election a sub-committee of the Senate Committee on 
Rules and Administration, which had investigated the New Mexico election 
in response to Hurley's petition, recommended, based on its findings, 
II that no member of the Senate was elected from the State of New 
Nexico in the 1952 general election,II59 In response to Senator William 
57Lohbeck, 462. 
58}bid., 463. 
59Ibid ., 467. 
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Jenner's resolution of March 16, 1954, calling for Senate concurrence 
in the committee's recon~endation (S. Res. 220) the Senate voted, 53 
to 36 against setting aside the election of Dennis Chavez in 1952. 
Hurley faced another defeat. In his biographer's words: 
Once again he was denied the national forum from which to 
carryon his fight against the perversion of America's world 
mission into an appeasement of Communist aggression and a de­
fense of imperialist exploitation. 60 
But the Hurley story did not end with his defeat in 1952, nor has 
it ended yet today. In 1956 his biography, authored by Don Lohbeck and 
referred to previously in this account, presented the Hurley story in 
glittering terms. Lohbeck pictured Hurley as a great American martyr, 
who 
• • • had left the coal towns before the turn of the century-­
and'in-thfr'ma~'yeal's since -had trtrveltd· li1C"'\o;'or-ld com!ltt'lting 
with Presidents, admonishing Prime Ministers, consoling Gen­
erali.sSimos debating with'Dictators l and giving advice to 
K' • •6i ~ngs. 
but who " • himself suggested that the story of his life should be 
62titled: 'The Story of a Failure. 111 
Bu't in spite of Hurley's view of himself as a failure, Lohbeck 
wrote, ". • • it is now becoming increasingly evident that he has not 
e il d ,,63 
.La e. Quoting John Foster Dulles' 1955 statement that: 
62 Ibid ., 480, 
63Ibid . 
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What we need to do is to recapture to some extent the kind 

of crusading spirit of the nation's early days when we were 

darn sure that what we had was a lot better than what anybody 

else had. lie kney' the rest of t:he world wanted it, and needed 

it, and that we were going to carry it around the world•••64 

Lohbeck concludes his biography of Hurley with, "That is precisely the 
kind of f~ericanism that Patrick J. Hurley has lived and taught through­
out his long and active life.,,65 
As the public reaction to the post-l-1orld l-1ar II events, partic­
ularly to the so-called "loss of China" and the Korean lVar, diE'd down 
in the late 1950's and 1960's, little was heard of Patrick J. Hurley 
and the charged he leveled at the State Department. Most assuredly, 
academicians studied and wrote about the China incident, and none could 
ignore Patrick J. Hurley's role in the episode. But publicly, Hurley 
disappeared from view, though the charges he made, such as 'lIthe sick 
man at Yalta" and Communist infiltration of the State Department, re­
mained as highly controversial themes through the two decades following 
the Second World War, though without acknowledgment of their source. 
Then, in 19.70, twenty-five years after Hurley tried to show 
Congress the path, the issues were raised again by a Subcon~ittee of 
the United States Senate. On January 26, 1970, this subcommittee re­
leased, in two volumes, The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe 
of China,66 an edited collection of documents which had been seized in 
a raid on the office of Amerasia Hagazine in 1945. Among these documents, 
64 Ibid ., 481. 
65Ibid . 

66
See fn. 4. 
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most of which were stolen from the United States Governme.nt, were the 
papers which Hurley had so adamantly requested be revealed to the American 
people to substantiate his case sincE 1945. 
The Amerasia collection was edited and introduced by Anthony Kubek, 
Professor of History at the University of Dallas and author of !low the 
Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 
1941-1949 (Chicago, 1963). In his introduction, entitled "Historical 
Survey of Kuomintang...-<::ommunist Relations," the thesis presented is that 
which was developed by Hurley so many years earlier: America's China 
policy was sabotaged by the "old China. hands," John Stewart Service 
being the principle culprit. 
The main thrust of Kubek's introduction of which there are three 
them, WEre found among those confiscated from the offices of Amerasia 
lI.¥gaz:i.:.ne in 1945. Implicating Service in the scandal that was the 
"Amerasia Case," Kubek all but convicts the me.n of treason on the grounds 
that his papers were with those found in the Amerasia office. Although 
Kubek eventually reveals that the Service papers found at Amerasia were 
stolen from the State Department and not provided by Service, he persists 
in making the following observations: 
(11 During the years of \<lorld War II an aggressively pro­
Communist magazine office in New York, populated by individuals 
whose connection with international Communism was old and deep, 
furtively obtained and copied many highly classified documents 
of the United States Government; and (2) the official policy of 
the United States Government in support of Chiang Kai-shek's 
Nationalist regime in China was actively opposed and subverted 
during World War II by a few junior American career diplomats 
on station in China, John Stewart Service conspicuous among 
them. 67 
67 .AmeraSl.a 112. 
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In concluding from the above that "connected inextricably, these 
twin facts contain a special relevance today for the people of the United 
States••. ,,68 Mr. Kubek is, perhaps, more to the point than even he 
had imagined. At a time when the People's Republic of China is gaining 
prestige and recognition throughout the world and when the United States 
government is being drawn closer to recognition of the Chinese COIlullunis '.: 
government, it becomes ever more necessary to re-examine a story of con­
spiracy and duplicity that has stood in the face of many challenges for 
far too many years. This is all the more important lyhen the present 
conflict in Indo-China rages, and a Subcommittee of the United States 
Senate publishes material which holds that: 
the terrible wars in Korea and Vietnanl have resulted directly 
from the Com.lllunist selzure of the Asiatic heartland, and all 
tha-"bre.,y.ing di.{ficu1tier:l c,].s-ewhl;H;e in the"Far"EaM" over-the' 
past two decades have had the cancer of China at their root. 69 
The task remains, therefore, to examine from the beginning, Patrick 
J. Hurley's role in China and a story which has been perpetuated over a 
period of two and a half decades. 
CHAPTER II 
CHINA AND THE ROOTS OF THE HURLEY MISSION 1943-44 
The story of Patrick J. Hurley in China is, to a great degree, the 
story of wartime Ch:i.na itself. Sent to the China Theatre in 1944 as 
President Roosevelt's personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek, Major 
Generel Hurley's principal mission was to reconcile the differences be­
tween Lt. General Joseph Stilwell and Chi.ang Kai-shek. Stilwell had been 
assigned to China as Chief of Staff and commander of American forces in 
1942. But when Hurley arrived in China it was immediately obvious, if it 
haclnot been so prior to his dL!lJarture from' the Un±tcd·· St"ates, that there 
were more deeply rooted problems in China than those between Stih-,el1 and 
Chiang--problems which had their origins in America's traditional view of 
its role, vis-l-vis the Chinese, and in President Roosevelt's view of 
China's place in the post-war world. 
Nilitarily, China's role in the world war was to be a minor one. 
In terms of grand strategy, the Pacific Theatre was third in line behind 
England and Russia for military aid, and China placed a poor fourth. The 
Chinese were vie\'led as capable of resisting the Japanese advance on the 
Asian continent until the Germans could be defeated and until the United 
States could rebuild he,r fleet, after which China would ultimately 
become the la,nnching pad for the final air and sea assault against 
the Japanese home-islands. In other words, the Chinese were to fight 
a holding action. Their primary function in thE: 'War would be to somehow 
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stay in the war and on the slde of the Allies. 
Politically, however, China loomed large in the minds of American 
policy formulators, particularly Roosevelt's, as a future Great Power. 
Always present in the President's mind, from the earliest days of the 
war, was the belief that the world would never be free ~rom war as long 
as imperialism, particularly British imperialism, was allowed to con­
tinue. In his conception of the future post-war world stood a free and 
independent Asia, with a strong and unified China as its pillar of 
strength against future imperialist incursions. Such a China would, 
Roosevelt envisioned, take its place in a future world system which 
would be policed by the four Great Powers: the United States, Great 
2Britain, the Sovi.et Union, and China. 
In' sp.:iw-o{ the fact thAt· China '.s irmnediate. miJ HaJ;¥ and....fut.ur.e._. 
world political roles 'vere not compatible, the United States intended 
to give the Chinese its full moral support during the war, plus all the 
supplies and equipment it could possibly spare. The assumption was 
that this moral and, albeit minor, military support, when combined with 
what were believed to be strong traditional ties between the United 
States and China since the days of the open-door, would result not only 
in a great power role for China, but a China which would lean politically 
and diplomatically toward the United States as well. 3 
lGaddis Smith, AmericCli:1 Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941­
1945 (Ne~v York, 1967), 7; Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: the American 
Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (New York, 1965), 
14; Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission to China 
(Washington, D.C., 1953) 64; James MacGregor Burns, -Roosevelt: The Soldier 
of Fr~j_om, 19l,0-1945 (Nev1 York, 1970), 242. 
') 
~Smith, A~erican Diplc~acy, 81-98. 
3Ibi~., 7. 
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Though illusory, this view prevailed. and Roosevelt made policy 
from the beginning with the idea in mind that when the war was over, 
colonialism would be over as well. 4 Even prior to the United States' 
formal entry into the war," Roosevelt had begun to put his post-war plans 
into effect. At Argentia, Newfoundland, in August, 1941, Roosevelt 
committed himself and the United States to the principles of self-de­
termination and non-aggrandizement when he signed, with the British 
Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, the Atlantic Charter. S These prin­
ciples, the first of ~l1hich was new, in \-lord at least, to American dip­
lomacy were applied to China by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, on 
November 26, 191~1. In what was to be the final formai policy statement 
on China made by the United States until 1945, Hull informed the Jap­
anoes&' tha-t the- United Sta,tas,· \-,IB&,·,co:rrlUi tted to "the....,principle ,.of inviol­
ability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations" 
and to "the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of 
6
other countries."
At the ARCADIA conference in Washington, D.C., called shortly af­
ter the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt and Churchill, meeting to 
plan their grand strategy, agreed to establish a separate China Theatre, 
under the command of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Operating under the 
belief that Chiang would never consent to being placed under foreign 
command, he was made responsible to none other than himself, rather than 
to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the unified command structure which was 
4Ibid., 81. 
SWilli[lm L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared Hat:., 
.!,9 l}Q-194!. (NCvl York, 1953), 687. 
6Foreign Relations L 1941, II, 766. 
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7
also created at ARCADIA. This separate command reflected a sensitivity 
on the part of Churchill and Roosevelt, to the century of foreign inter­
ference in China's internal affairs by the West. Keeping in mind past 
European intervention in China and the American policy statement of Nov­
ember 26, 1944, to say nothing of the fact that the Allies were now in­
vo1ved in the Far East in opposition to Japanese imperialism in Asia, 
the two Western leaders were very cautious not to appear to be inter­
fering in China. It would, furthermore, be extremely difficult to sub­
ordinate Chiang Kai-shek to the Combined Chiefs. While he was, in fact, 
Generalissimo of the Chinese Army, he was, as well, 'head of state. Unlike 
the American wartime command structure, the Chinese structure did not 
provide for a military Chief of Staff, subordinate to the Political Chief. 
Chi~vMt heed of' state, COInl.'1e!tntiler-i.n-Gbie£· and~·Cbi·ef o£uStat'f, a11in 
one. It would not have been politic to make him subordinate to the Com­
bined Chiefs in one role and equal to Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin in 
the other. 
Involved as well, in these early planning stages, were Roosevelt's 
hopes for an Asia free, in the future, of imperialism. Chiang Kai-shek 
had become an ally of Roosevelt's in the latter's anti-imperialism cam­
paign, the two uniting early in the war, against Churchill, on that ques­
tion. Chiang believed, as did Roosevelt, that the existence of colonial­
ism in Asia provided Japan with considerable propaganda material to be 
used in influencing the Chinese people. Chiang had spoken out strongly 
against the British position in India and in support of Gandhi, and 
Roosevelt had offered his encouragement. Roosevelt had realized the 
7Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Nission, 61-62. 
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futility of his own advancements toward Churchill on the subject. As 
early as the Argentia meeting, ChurchjJ.l had announced that he had not 
8taken office to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. 
Roosevelt, therefore, had turned to China, hoping to make that nation 
strong enough to resist the colonial pressures of Great Britaj.n and 
others, throughout Asia. To avoid being associated with the imperial 
powers, whose presence Roosevelt so opposed, it was necessary to avoid 
direct American involvement in China. 9 
Chiang Kai-shekts nearly autonomous role in the China Theatre 
'Was not., as the war developed, to his liking, as was evidenced by de­
velopments in August, 1943, when Roosevelt and Churchill were meeting 
at Quebec. Just as that conference was beginning, T. V. Soong, the 
Clrli.~Fot:'eign }iini'seer,' uPPToached· Cordell Hull ui:than· ur.gent plea 
to make the unity of the four pmvers a reality by j.nc1uding China jn 
the major planning conferences. The letter handed to Hull 
• • • remarked that the Chinese government had not even 
been asked to present opinions and plans in regard to mat­
ters of utmost concern to China; and that even when given 
a hearing by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Chinese spokesman 
had net been allowed to share in the arguments and the mak-­
ing of decisions. The Chinese government ••• wanted to be 
included on a footing of equality in all existing joint and 
\. d . 10
. COlmane agencl.es. • • • 
Although the Chinese were not granted their request at Quebec, 
they were soon diverted from that ccurse, when, on September 2, 1943, 
8Smith, Am~rifan,Diplo}T1acy, 82. 

9Ibic'~., 91. 
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Hull revealed to Soong a declaration of principles for a United Nations 
organization prepared by the State Department and agreed to in prin­
ciple by Roosevelt and Churchill at-Quebec. The Declaration was placed 
before the delegates of the Foreign ~finister's Conference at Moscow and 
formalized as the Moscow Declaration of October 30, 194~. Confirmed 
at Cairo the same year, it became thE' foundation for the principles 
outlined in the United Nations Charter. As soon as the Declaration had 
been agreed upon by the three Foreign Secretaries at HOSCo\l1, it was 
sent directly to Chiang, who signed it immediately. With the signing of 
that document, China became, formally, one of the big-four that were to 
llpolice the world at war's end. 
Of particular interest to the Chinese was the sixth and final 
pai.'\B~~ of th&·11oscovl De.-cla:.:a t-ion. Throllghou t th~"\o1a~ par"ii:ot!·, the, 
Chinese Nationalists had been more concerned with the activities of the 
Communist faction, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, than with the 
Japanese. Although Chiang felt that his forces could easily handle the 
Communist threat after the war, one of his greatest fears was that the 
Soviet Union was secretly cooperating with Mao and would aid the Chinese 
Communists onc,,! peace had been made tvith Japan. If this should be the 
case, -thought Chiang, there would be little hope of bringing the Commu­
nist-controlled areas back under control of the Central Government. 12 
But the sixth paragraph of the Moscow Declaration seemed to offer some 
hope that Russia would not become involved in what by 1943 was clearly 
seen by outside observers as a civil war in the making. In that 
llIbid., 91, 99. 
12 Ibi<!. J 95. 
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paragraph, the Soviet Union, along with the United States, Great Britain 
and China, had pledged: 
That after the termination of hostilities they will not 

employ their military forces within the territories of other 

states except for the purposes invisaged in this declara­

tion and after joint consultation. l3 

There occurred one other important event at Moscow, however, one 
which carried profound implications relative to China. At the closing 
banquet, which formally ended the }!oscow Conference, Hull found himself 
sitting next to Joseph Stalin, who, half-way through the dinner, leaned 
to Hull and announced matter-of-factly that Russia would enter the 
14Pacific war shortly after the defeat of Germany. Although the United 
States had been anxiously awaiting such a development and welcomed it 
for the promises Soviet entry held for a speedier defeat of Japan, the 
prospect of such an event meant that a settlement of Sino-Soviet relations 
was all the more important. When Russia entered the Pacific war) she 
would e than likely do so through Manchuria. This meant she might 
enter th China and come in contact with the Communist forces of 
Mao Tse-tung in that area. With Russian entry quite probable, it was 
more ur ent than ever for the United"States to impress Chiang with the 
importance of establishing more cooperative relations with the forces 
15
of Mao Tse-tung. 
Aware of repeated statements from both the Nati.onalist and Commu­
nist leaders to the effect that both sides were united, at least in 
l3Ibid • , 99. 

l4 Ibid . , 100. 

l5Ibid . , 102. 
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their desire to remove the Japanese from Chinese soil, Americans at 
the higher diplomatic levels probably believed that the two would be 
just as opposed to future incursions into Chinese territory by the 
Russians. If, however, the two competing factions were still close 
to civil war when the Soviets made their appearance in the north, there 
were good chances that the Chinese Co~~unists would take a more prag­
matic course and enlist the aid of their "ideological" brethren to 
16further their own ends. 
In November, 1943, President Roosevelt traveled to Cairo and 
Teheran to meet, for the first time, all three of the other powers, 
though his meeting with Chiang Kai-shek would be a separate one. Aware 
of Chiang's fears of Soviet 8£sistance to the Chinese Communists, 
Rcoseve'!t hope-d to gain a reassertiO!t· of the- HoscOW' Declarat'ion"and' to'­
come t.o an agreement with Churchill and Stalin about some major conces­
, 17
sions he hoped could be made to the Chinese. Roosevelt was also aware 
of a number of rumors of recent origin which held that Chiang might 
possibly arrive at a separate peace with the Japanese. Although the 
rumors were groundless. Roosevelt saw it necessary once more to give 
the Chinese a morale boost, particularly in view of the fact that the 
18Pacific strategy was in the process of change. Allied military 
l6 Ibid • 
l7Roosevelt succeeded at Teheran in arriving at an agreement with 
Stalin and Churchill which provided for the return to China of Manchuria, 
Formosa and the Pescadores, and for a temporary trusteeship for Korea 
following the defeat of Japan. See, Ibid., 106-107. 
l8Ibid ., 105; Romanus ~nd Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems 

(Washington, D.C., 1955), 53. 
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planners were fast moving to the conclusion that the best route to Japan 
would be across the Central Pacific and up from the Southeast Pacific, in 
19
what came to be known as the island-hopping strategy. China was moving 
out of the military vision as the final launching-·pad for the assault on 
Japan. The fact remained, however, that China \lould still be a necessary, 
if not vital factor in that final assault. It was believed that the main­
land Japanese forces might attempt to pull back to the home-islands for 
defensive pur~oses, making itnecessary for the Chinese to keep those 
forces tied down on the continent. There was the other possibility as 
well, that those Japanese forces might entrench themselves in China, 
prolonging the war and making it necessary to launch an allied invasion 
there, a prospect which was undesirable for the military difficulties 
• 
Roosevelt gained his desired reassertion of the Hoscou Declaration, 
and he arrived at an acceptable agreement which made far-reaching ter­
ritorial concessions to the Chinese,2l concessions, it was believed, which 
would convince Chiang that the Soviets were not interested in reestablish­
ing their influence over areas which were historically Chinese. But the 
President's efforts were for naught, for by late spring-eB:rly summer, 1944, 
the situation in China showed little, if any, improvement. 
Wllile Roosevelt had been adhering to the principle of a strong 
China, the reality of the situation was being expressed in other circles, 
191bid • 
2°F .e1S, China Ta~e, 169. 

211, 
'.l ~., 107. 
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a reality grasped by China-based observers, military, political and 
diplomatic. The most vehement of these observers, and one who ex­
pressed himself in no uncertain terms, was General "Vinegar" Joe Sti1­
well. Despatched to China in 1942 " ••. to increase the effective­
ness of the United States aid to the Chinese government for the prosecu­
tion of the war and to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese 
Army, ,,22 Stilwell had, by 1943-44, met with little success. A1­
though caused in part by Stilwell's own lack of tact in dealing with 
Chiang, his failures were attributable to a far greater degree, to 
other priorities for American aid, the refusal of Chiang and the 
Kuoumintang to make economic, social and military reforms conducive 
to the creation of an effective fighting force, and the conflict be­
tween the Nationalist government and the Communist faction in thp. 
North. Stilwell had consistently relayed his objections to these condi­
tions to the War and State Departments, and many members of the latter 
had just as consistently supported his asse5sments. His criticism 
was heard in the Wnite House as well, but with reserve. The Presi-
dent felt it more essential at the time to preserve a basically 
friendly attitude toward the Chinese government, rather than pressure 
them into making the changes necessary for active Chinese prosecution 
23
of the war. 
22Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Mission, 74. Stilwell was 
assigned to the China Theatre with a'number of specific tasks: "To su­
pervise and control all United States defense-aid affairs for China; 
under the Generalissimo to command all United States forces in China and 
such Chinese forces as may be assigned to him; to represent the United 
States on any international war council in China and act as the Chief of 
Staff for the Generalissimo; to improve, maintain, and control the Burma 
Road in China. 1I Ibid., 73. It was the long-term objective of Stilwell's 
mission, to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. Ibid., 75. 
23Feis , China Tangle, 37. 
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By early 1944, as reports from both the State Department and mil­
itary personnel clearly indicate, the political and military situation 
was becoming critical. The Nationalist forces under Chiang were not 
fighting, the Japan.ese were gaining considerable ground, the economy was 
in a chaotic state, increased friction was developing b~tween Chiang's 
government and the Soviet Union, and the personality gap was ever widen­
ing between Stily,Tel1 and Chiang. 24 
Although concessions had been made at Cairo and Teheran with 
Soviet acquiescence, Chiang's worries about the Soviet Union were not 
satisfactorily dispelled. By early summer, 1944, he was still ex­
tremely dubious about the possibilities of the Soviet Union maintaining 
a hands-off policy t01:.,rard China. In the face of extreme problems in 
m~~i-nt!" populap. support of" the5.r own people and,wcoMinue.g·,detR@$aJ.i-· 
zation of their armies, the Chinese leaders were increasingly fearful 
that the Soviets yrere maintaining close out secret ties with the 
Chinese Communists. Furthermore, Soviet aircraft had, in ~~rch, fired 
upon and killed Chinese troops who were reportedly pursuing Chinese 
rebels near the border of Outer Mongolia. The Soviets had claimed that 
the troops crossed the border, a claim the Nationalist government 
denied. ~~atever the facts may have been, the Chinese reported that 
the Soviet attitude had been hostile and that this hostility was evi­
dence of a more general attitude 011 the part of the Russlans tmvard 
the Nationalists, and not isolated to the immediate episode. This in­
cident, combined with the signing of the Russo-Japanese Sakhalin 
fishing agreement of the same month, and a feeling on the part of the 
24Foreisn Relat~, 1944, VI, 41, 54-56) 58, 59, 69,' 77. 
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Chinese that their inability to arrive at an acceptable agreement with 
the Chinese Communists was a result of Soviet support of the Communists, 
led to apprehensions about the reality and sincerity of the Soviet 
25policy. 
President Roosevelt and the State Department put little stock 
in Chiang's contentions of Soviet hostility. They agreed with the 
knbassador in China, Clarence Gauss, that Chiang was merelv attem~ting 
to elicit greater help and more active support for his central govern­
ment from the United States. But they had. nevertheless, exerted a 
great amount of energv attempting to pacify the Generalissimo, drilling 
into him the need for getting along with both the Communist Chinese 
and the Soviets for the sake of the whole war effort. But in spite 
of theircff'vt'"t"S', Chiang' remained ill fcar of future So'\ri:et" 8UPP'Ol:t­
of the Chinese Communists, and 'the former's extension of influence over 
26the frontier regions--Inner Mongolia. Sinkiang and Manchuria. 
Roosevelt maintained that there \'las little fundamental opposi­
tion between China and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, he \\Tas suffi­
ciently worried about Chiang's appeals, to send another mission to 
China·--an attempt once again to calm the Chinese leader and to urge 
an agreement between the Nationalists and Communists. and thus. a re­
duction of' Chinese fears of Soviet incursions. Roosevelt's choice for 
the mission was his Vice-president, Henry Wallace. 27 
25 Ibid • 

26 • 

Feis. China Tang~~, 139. 

27 Ibid , 140. 
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WRllace arrived in Chungking, the wartime Nationalist capitol, 
with instructions from Roosevelt to 
• • • explain to the Generalissimo that China had been 

recognized as one of the four Great Powers primarily because 

of the insistence of Secretary Hull at the Moscow Conference 

and to elaborate on this by expressing the hope that the Gen­

eralissimo must realize this and could not let America down 

after America had pinned such faith and hope on China as a 

World Power. 28 

In a cabinet meeting around the middle of May, Roosevelt had explained 
that 'he was greatly concerned about the situation in China, and that 
• he was apprehensive for the first time as to China holding to­" 
29gether for the duration of the war." In his testimony before the Sen­
ate Internal Security Committee in 1951, Wallace pointed out that Roose­
velt had told him to do what he could to get the Chinese Nationalists 
ane-Co:m.tm!lli:sts to stop-fighting. 30 :Roosevelt' s cy.plan~-·an&·" 
Wallace's testimony indicate that the President was at that time less 
worried about the possibility of Soviet incursions into the Northern 
regions after the war than he was about Chinese internal problems 
which might frustrate the whole war effort against Japan. 
China was becoming a problem of prestige as well, particularly 
for Roosevelt and Hull, who had fought long and hard to gain great 
power status for China. While the idea of "loss of face" has tradi­
tionally been applied to the Oriental races, these two American leaders 
stood to lose their full share if the Chinese proved unworthy of the 
status which had been won for them. 
28Edward Stettinius, Under Secretary of State, to Joseph C. Grew, 
Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 230. 
29 Ibid . 

30
Feis, Ch~Ta~~le, 145. 
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In the four days spent with Chiang, Wallace discussed topics cov­
ering the full range of Sino-American relations. The Vice-president had 
not been instructed to arrive at any specific agreements with Chiang, but 
rather, had been referred to by Roosevelt as a "messenger," well suited 
to bring back a valuable first-hand report on the situa,tion in China. 31 
And messenger he was, for at one point in his conversations, 
Mr. Wallace told Pres. Chiang of Pres. Roosevelt's comment 
that the British did not consider China a great power; that 
Pres. Roosevelt wanted China to be a great power in fact as 
well as in theory; that at Cairo the British were opposed 
to giving any reality to China's position as one of the "Big 
Four," and that at Teheran the Russians were cool regarding 
China. Mr. Wallace then quoted to Pres. Chiang the follmving 
statement made by Pres. Roosevelt: "Churchill is old. A new 
Britisll 'Government will give Hong Kong to China and the next 
day China will make it a free port."32 
This was the message Roosevelt most wanted to be stated explicitly. 
The United States was intent upon making China a great power in the post­
war world. But: implied in the message was that Chiang need not \vorry 
about the Soviets. Instead, he should be working to prove the Chinese 
were worthy of the role Roosevelt had envisioned for them. Wallace's 
mission was,for the most part, one of goodwill. The Chinese it was be­
lieved, needed yet another morale boost. It was with that goal in mind 
that the not"so-subtle promise of a return of Hong Kong after a century 
of British control, was intended. 
There appear to have been no concrete commitments made, at least 
on the part of the United States. One of Wallace's more specific tasks 
31president Roosevelt's public annOl1ncement of the Wallace mission 
to Chtna. Foreign Re~tions, 1944, VI, 228. 
32summary of notes of conversati.on between Wallace and Chiang. 

Ibid., 232. 
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had been that of discussing ,vi th the Chinese the possibilities of send­
ing an American observer group to Yenan, the Communist stronghold in North 
China, to gather information on Communist Chinp-se activities there. Such 
a mission had often been recommended by a number of Foreign ServicE' offi­
cers in China since 1943. Little had been done to implement their recom­
mendations, until a strong1y~worded memorandu~written in January, 1944 
by John Patton Davies, reached the hands of the President. Evidently 
impressed by Davies' plea for such a mission, Roosevelt brought it to 
the attention of General Marshall and directed that appropriate action 
33be taken .on the proposal • 
. Wallace had obviously been instructed to discuss stich a mission 
with Chiang ·whi1e in Chungking, for, on June 22nd, the subject was 
following day and agreed in principle to the despatch of an observer 
34 group to the North. It was this observer group, soon to be called 
the Dixie MiGsion,35 that would carry John Stewart Service and others 
to the Communist capital. As fate would have it they would come into 
conflict with the President's personal representative to Chiang and 
later Ambassador in China, Patrick J. Hurley. 
It was, in fact, one result of the Wallace m~ssion that Hurley 
went to China in 1944. At the last meeting of Wallace and Chiang, the 
GeneraU.ssi.rllo had suggested to the Vice-president that Roosevelt send 
33David D. Barrett, D::I.xie Mission: The United States Army Obser­
ver Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley, 1970),23.
- . ." 
35Ibid ., 13. 
42 
to China, a personal representative. Chiang desired closer cooperation 
with the President. There being too many channels through the State De­
partment which made communication difficult, would it be possible, 
Chiang inquired of Wallace, to have a personal representative such as 
Carton de Wiart, Churchill's representative ", , , who handles polit­
ical and military matters?,,36 
Wallace, in his report to the President of June 28, 1944, relayed 
this request for a personal representative, while at the same time pre­
senting to Roosevelt an extremely pessimistic account of conditions in 
China. Claiming that "the fact in China at present is the strong prob­
37ability that East China will be lost to the Japanese in the near future," 
Wallace went on to suggest that the situation was far from hopeless and 
could possibly t.e turned to bOt!l political and military advantage. 
With the right man to do the job, it should be possihle to 
induce the Generalissimo to reform his regime and to establish 
at least the semblance of a united front, which are necessary 
to the restoration of Chinese morale; and to proceed there­
after to organizing the new offensive effort for which re­
stored morale will provide a foundation. 38 
But Wallace did not have in mind a new representative. He urged, 
rather, a replacement for Stilwell. Such a replacement, Wallace ar­
gued, should be placed in closer contact with Chiang and be given author­
ity over both military and political matters. Stilwell would not do, in 
part because of his involvement in Burma, but even more because Chiang 
36United States Relations With China, 559.
. ­
37Wallace to Roosevelt, ~1an Relations, 1944, VI, 235. 
38 .Fe1S, China Tangl~, 156. 
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had expressed dissatisfaction \vith and a lack of c.onfidence in the 
39
sharp-tongued General. 
But neither the President nor the War Department was of the 
same mind, and ultimately, in the face of strong Japanese advances 
which threatened the American air-bases in East China, ~oosevelt sug­
gested not that Stilwell be recalled but that Chiang place him in 
40
command of all Chinese forces. Responding to the President's sug­
gestion, Chiang agreed that in principle, it was a good idea, but 
that this would take some time to accomplish, given the present po­
1itica1 situation in China and the length of time it took Chinese 
troops to adapt to new leadership. In the meantime, Chiang added, 
it would be well that a personal representative be sent to China 
" .•. to>-constant1y co 11 ahOJ:lil to· with me and •.• ad.jus.t. the,.. re.la­
tions between me and General Stilwell •• 
In the face of Chiang's tactful denial to place Stilwell in 
such a position of power, Roosevelt, agreeing with Chiang's asser­
tions that some form of political and military liaison should be es­
tablished,42 informed the Chinese leader on August 19, 1944, that he 
was sending to China, Major General Patrick J. Hurley. General Hurley, 
Roosevelt informed Chiang, 
• is to be my personal representative on military mat­
ters. His principle mission is to coordinate the 
whole military picture under you as Military Commander-in­
Chief-··your being, of course, the Commander-in-Chief of the 
39T.' . 
.r elS, Chinfl Tangle, 156 • 

40Ibid ., 170. 

41Chiang to Roosevelt. For~!g~ Relations, 1944, VI, 120. 
42Feis , Chin~ Ta~&~~., 172. 
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whole area--to help to iron out any problems between you and 

General·Stilwell who, of course, has problems of his own re­

garding the Burma campaign and is necessarily in close touch 

\-7ith Admiral }-Iountbatten. 43 

The climate in China on the eve of Hurley's departure was there­
fore stormy. The United States was, as it had been since the beginning 
of the war, committed to the support of the Nationalist government in 
word and in deed. Roosevelt had gone to great lengLhs to force China 
upon Britain and the U.S.S.R. as·a Great Power. But militarily, as well 
as politically, Chiang's government was not living up to the role being 
handed her. Rosevelt's post-war dream depended on China's strength 
for fulfillment, and he was not anxious to see that dream shattered--for 
reasons of prestige as well as utility. Militarily, China was not as 
important as she had once. been, but she was still important nevertheless. 
Victory in Europe was just over the horizon. The main theatre would 
soon shift to Asia. If, when it shifted, there existed no stable gov­
ernment in China, the vacuum might in fact be filled, not by the Chinese 
Communists but by Russia, a prospect Roosevelt finally realized but did 
not desire for reasons related not only to his dream of an Asia free of 
outside interference, but to fears of a world power structure imbalanced 
:i.n favor of the Soviet Union as well. 
The Japanese had attacked the American fleet at Pearl Harbor to 
protect thell1selves from a threat to their further encroachments in Asia. 
The United States had attempted to block the Japanese movements diplo­
matically, but by the time war began it was clear that America was 
involved in Asia in opposition to Japanese aggression in China which 
began with the incident at the Mukden in 1931. The United 
43Roosevelt to Chiang. Fo~~i~Re~at5~~_, 1944, VI, 249. 
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States had clearly stated its opposition to Japanese incursions at that 
time and once vlar began in 1941 it was understood that it was a war to 
remove the Japanese from the Asian continent. With that view of the 
wa~Rooseve1t surely had misgivings about the possibilities of another 
power or powers, gaining control once again inside China. If, at war's 
end, there was not a strong Chinese government clearly in control of 
all China, foreign intervention was highly probable. 
Americans had been slow to go to war in the first place, and 
did so finally, when the reasons appeared clear and unquestionable. 
If that war should end with China weak and o'lerpowered once more, 
albeit by other than the Japanese, the American public would not take 
kindly to having fought a worthless war. There can be no doubt that 
this was a paramount consideration for Frankl,in D. R<1ostW'elt. 
Chinese internal problems must be solved, but in a manner that was 
in keeping with the statement issued by Cordell Hull in 1941--that 
the United States was committed to "the principles of non-interference 
in the internal affairs of other countries." Although not the inten­
tion of the President initially, Patrick J. Hurley would be the man to 
attempt the resolution of those internal problems while trying to keep 
within the bounds of the principles set down by Hull in 1941 • 
• 

CHAPTER III 
THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
General Hurley was not lacking in experience nor was he unfamiliar 
to Roosevelt when in 1944 the President decided to send a personal rep­
resentative to China. A self-made man, a millionaire two times over, 
secretary of War under President Herbert Hoover, successful attorney 
and investor,l Hurley had volunteered his services to the nation 
1Hurley was born in Lehigh, Choctaw Indian Territory (now Oklahoma), 
on January 8, 1883. The son of Irish Immigrants, Hurley was forced to go 
to work at the age of 11 after his father vIas injured in a fall from a 
horse and his mother died. He tended trap-door in a shaft or the Atoka 
Coal and Mining Company near Lehigh for 25¢ per hour. Hurley received 
some schooling when he was 14 years of age, attending night classes taught 
by an itinerant school teacher by the name of Golightly. When his school­
ing was cut off by a strike in the mines, the young man turned to "cow­
punching." Following an abortive attempt to join Theodore Roosevelt's 
Roughriders in 1898, Hurley entered the Baptist Indian University, now 
Bacone College near Muskogee, Oklahoma. He received his "Bachelor of 
Arts degree in 1905 and in 1908 received his Bachelor of Law degree from 
the National University in Washington, D.C. He opened a law office in 
Tulsa, Oklahoma, where he was an immediate success and where he began to 
accumulate his fortune. One of his early fees was a large tract of land 
on the outskirts of Tulsa, land which very soon was engulfed by the rapidly 
expanding city. Elected President of the Tulsa Bar Association in 1910, 
Hurley was admitted to the bar of the United States Supreme Court in 1912. 
Shortly t~ereafter he was appointed attorney for the Choctaw Nation, a 
position whic~while not lucrative, provided him with considerable pres­
tige and the foundation upon which to build his fortune. Following his 
World War I experience, Hurley became involved through his law practice, 
in banking and oil operations. As receiver from the Gilliland Oil Company, 
he managed the company's affairs so well he 'vas able to sell it to 
Standard Oil for a profit of over three million dollars, for which he 
received a handsome fee. Campaigning for Herbert Hoover in the election 
of 1928, Hurley was rewarded with an appointment to the position of 
Assistant Secretary of War. When Secretary Good died nine months later, 
Hurley became Hoover's Secretary of War, and the first Oklahoman ever to 
sit on a Presidential Cabinet. Losing most of his fortune in the 
47 
immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although he had 
been quite outspoken against the New Deal administration of Franklin 
Roosevelt since 1932, Hurley was a strong supporter of the President's for­
. 

eign policies in the years immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. He had 
urged repeal of the Neutrality Act and America's active participation 
in the European struggle, despite the centralization of government which 
would result, and which he so despised. "The Ne.utrality Act," Hurley had 
stated in 1941, "is a covlardly surrender of the freedom of the seas. • 
The United States is in no position to maintain its traditional policy on 
2freedom of the seas until the Neutrality Act has been repealed." 
·With great faith in his nation's ability to win and a strong be­
lief in action ov~r words, Hurley wired President Roosevelt shortly after 
the Pearl Harbor attack, requesting a command aasignmen-t) He'hatt"pre­
viously been informed by the War Department that he was "on the Eligible 
IDepression years, Hurley returned to his law practice after Hoover's de­
feat, rebuilding his assets quickly, again ~hrough some very successful 
oil dealings, inves~ments, and real estate transactions. In 1940, he be­
came involved in the Mexican-American oil expropriation dispute as counsel 
for the Sinclair oil interests. Through individual action and negotiations 
with the Mexican government, Hurley arrived at an acceptable agreement where 
others had failed. For his services, Hurley received from the Sinclair com­
panies a reported one million dollars, and from the Mexican government, 
that nation's highest honor, the Order of the Aztec Eagle. He was on a bus",:, 
i.ness trip to Venezuela when the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941. See: Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956); George Milburn, 
"Mr. Hoover's Stalking-Horse," The American Merc~ XXVI, No. 103 (July, 
1932),257; Who Was Who in America, (Chicago, 1968), IV [1961-1968], 477; 
Anna Roth, ed., "P-atrick J. Hurley," Current Biography: Who's Ne"tvs and Why: 
1944 (New York, 1945), 319; Parker La Moore, Pat Hurley: The Story of an 
American (New York, 1932). -
2Lohbeck, 156. 
3Ibid ., 158. 
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List for appointment in case of emergency as Brigadier General of the 
4Line, Reserve." TIle emergency had obviously arisen, and now Hurley 
wanted to serve, more it might be ventured, for his own glorification 
than for what he could offer to his country in military expertise. 
Not lacking in vanity, Hurley held himself in hig~ regard, and 
consistently resisted, throughout the wartime period, assignments which 
kept him awa.y from the theatres of action. But this was not the first 
war in which he sought military glories. When he enlisted in the Army 
j.n 1916, he was assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office in Wash­
ington D.C. An experienced attorney, his skills had been utilized where 
they were mos·t needed. But he was highly dissatisfied, and following 
numerous requests for transfer to the battle zones, Hurley was sent with 
belt behind the lines, in the battles of Aisne-Marne, Heuse-Argonne and 
St. Mihiel. But even this did not satisfy Lt. Colonel Hurley. 
Although assigned to a staff position far behind the lines, 
Hurley was determined to be decorated for valor. He arranged 
to carry a message from one artillery command post to another, 
and, as a result, the Army awarded Hurley the Silver Star. S 
When President Roosevelt received Hurley's request for assignment, 
he turned it over to General Marshall, who informed Hurley that the Army 
was looking for younger men to take command posts and that his servic.es 
6
would not be needed. A few days later, however, Hurley was summoned to 
4Ibid ., 156. 
5Robert Thomas Smith, "Alone in China: Patrick J. Hurley's Attempt 
to Unify China," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Oklahoma 
1966), 9. 
6Lohbeck, 158. 
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the White House where the President offered him the post of Minister to 
New Zealand, a post which had not previously existed. The President was, 
without doubt, aware that Hurley was an influential Republican who had 
supported his foreign but not his domestic policies. It would have been 
impolitic to refuse to allow such a man the opportunity. to serve his country_ 
But Hurley insisted upon a more militarily-oriented role, and was 
sent finally to General Marshallts office, where he noticed a message 
from General Douglas MacArthur, appealing for assistance at Corregidor. 7 
Hurley and MacArthur had been long-standing friends, Hurley having been 
responsible for MacArthur's appointment as Army Chief of Staff over the 
8
strong objections of General John J. Pershing, in 1930. Expressing an 
9immediate desire to " •.. just help Doug,fI Marshall responded just as 
quickly to Hurley I s desires uy offering him the job of acquiring- ships 
and crews in Australia to run the Japanese blockade of Corregidor and get 
supplies through to MacArthur. Once this mission was accomplished, Hur­
10ley was to take up his post in New Zealand. 
Accepting this assignment, Hurley was sent directly to the War 
Plans Division, and Marshall, fllest the ebullient Hurley talk too much," 
telephoned to tell them Hurley was coming and to keep him there and take 
11him to the plane and not let him out of the Department. On this note, 
Hurley's World War II service to his country began. 
7Forrest C. Pogue, Ge?rge C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope, 1939-1942 

(New York, 1966), 243. 

8Lohbeck, 101. 
9Pogue, 244. 
lOIbid. 
llIbid. 
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Failing to make a significant break in the Japanese blockade, 
Hurley went on to New Zealand and was sworn in as American Minister on 
April 1, 1942. In July of the same year, dissatisfied with his non'~ 
military role, he requested and was granted permission to travel with 
Peter Frazer, Prime Minis ter of New Zealand, to ~lashington to discuss 
12Pacific military strategy. 
Although Hurley was supposed to return, eventually, to New Zealand, 
he did not. Following his discussions wi.th Roosevelt, he was sent in 
the opposite directi.on--to the Middle Eas t, Iraq and Iran--and then on to 
Russia. The President had sent him on this side-mission, allegedly to 
discuss the Europe First strategy with Stalin, after which he was to 
return to New Zealand and Australia and explain to the governments there 
tire'-neeessi-ty' for major oFerntiotls' in Europe as OPP&se-d:-to--th~Paci:fi'c. 13 
But by all appearances, Hurley f'S journey t.:> Russia was intended to reas­
sure the Soviet government of America's desire for a second European 
Front as well. 
In Hurley's letter of introduction, Roosevelt informed Stalin that 
he was sending the General to Mosco'i; so that 
• • • as a result of his personal experience [he would] 

• • • be able to assure the Government of Australia that the 

most effective manner in which the United States can join in 

defeating Hitler was through the rendering of all possible 

assistance to the gallant Russian armies, who have so bril­

liantly withstood the attacks of Hitler's armies. 

The President went on to state: 
12Lohbeck, 171. 
l31bid • 
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As you know, the Governments of Australia and New Zealand have 
been inclined to believe that it was imperative than an immed­
iate and all-out attack should be made by the United Nations 
against Japan. What I wish General Hurley to be able to say to 
these two Governments after his' visit to the Soviet Union is 
that the best strategy for the United Nations to pursue is for 
them first to join in making possible the defeat of Hitler and 
that this is the best and surest way of insuring the defeat of 
Japa.n. 14 • 
It is unlikely that Stalin could have given Hurley any better rea­
sons than Roosevelt for a Europe First strategy, or that anything the 
Soviet leader had to say would have had any more influence on the gov­
ernments of Australia and New Zealand than would the words of Roosevelt.15 
That Hurley's mission to Russia was intended to pacify Stalin is 
further evidenced by the fact that the General never did return to New 
Zealand or Australia. Following two months of "barnstorm:ing" through 
Russia, he moved on to Teheran, 1raO"", arri.v-ing there·on-Naw..Y.e.ar·' s .Day, 
1943. He very quickly uncovered R. situation ~ihich, as he wired Roosevelt, 
'd' 16~larranted averba1 report to t he Pres~ ent. Apparently Roosevelt was 
not greatly concerned about relaying Stalin's attitudes to the New 
Zealanders and Australians, for he called Hurley home to Washington to 
hear his report, and on Harch 3, 1943, designated the General as his 
personal representative to act as an observer and to report under condi­
l4Ibid ., 173. 
15Ibid • It appears to be the case that Hurley's mission to Moscow 
in the fall of 1942 was more related to problems the United States and 
Great Britain were having trying to convince Stalin that they were doing 
all they could, both to supply the Russians and to arrange for a second 
front in Europe, than to laying the groundwork for pacifying the govern­
ments of New Zealand and Australia. See Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roose­
vel~a~Utal}n: . The '~r Th~aged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, 
Ne\v Jersey, 1967), 67--68. 
l6Smith, "Alone in China," 23. 
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tions in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, the Arab States, 
l7including Saudi Arabia, and Karachi. Hurley never returned to his 
post as Minister to New 
Despite the fact 
Zealand • 
. 
that Hurley was instructed by Roosevelt to assume 
no responsibility for conduct of foreign policy or military and naval 
operations,18 he did, by his mere presence, interfere with the normal 
diplomatic and military activities in the areas he visited. Taking what 
has been described as little more than " •.• a V.I.P. tour of each 
country through which he passed," Hurley's activities caused a great 
deal of resentment on the part of the regular State Department and mil­
19itarypersonnel in the area. 
Untrained as a diplomat, and with very little actual military 
experience, Hurley believed he could accomplish much by- virtue of 'his 
personality alone. A handsome, striking individual, and one who was 
not lacking in confidence, Hurley believed in the straight-forward ap­
proach and disdained subtleties. Such behavior did not appeal to the 
foreign service men who observed his activities in the Middle East, and 
who looked upon the General as little more than a "bumptious amateur." 20 
17Roosevelt to Hurley, March 3, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, 
Hyde Park, New York), Presi.dent's Personal File 6533. 
l8 Ibid . 
19Smith, "Alone in China," 23. 
20Ibid ., 24. Follo't.;ing Hurley's visit to the Soviet Union, he wrote 
voluminous reports on vlhat he ·saw there. Referring to those reports, 
George F. Kennan, a noted diplomat and Russian specialist, stated: "I 
don't think•.• [Hurley] knew what he was talking about when he reported 
on the vievls of the Soviet leaders. On the other hand, there was ample 
advice available to him which he shewed no desire to tap on these subjects. 
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Quite aware of such attitudes tmvard him, Hurley reacted to them 
by way of his reports to the President. 
Hurley's reports from the Middle East had charged that ele­

ments in the State Department were either pro-British or pro­

Communist in their sentiments. He said'that some members of 

the State Department were intent upon using the war against 

Germany and Japan as a means for strengthening the British 

Empire's hold over weaker nations of Europe, the Middle East, 

and Asia. Others, he continued, were determined to assist the
2lCommunist conspiracy for world domination by the Soviet Union. 
The seeds of Hurley's discontent with the State Department were 
planted, therefore, early in his relatively short diplomatic career. 
This early conflict would not be forgotten by them or by Hurley, when the 
time came for the General to move on to China. 
Although Hurley had visited China during his tenure as Secretary 
22
of War under Hoover, his first visit there under Roosevelt was in 1943. 
201 mean, it was not surpr1s1ng to me that Hurley didn't know that he was 
being given the usual run-around and the usual patter by Stalin and Molo­
tov, but I think that if he had been a wiser and more thoughtful man, he 
would have asked some people who would be familiar with those conditions 
for some years to comment on those." Ibid., 22. Although Kennan's remarks 
did not relate directly to Hurley's activities in the Middle East, they are 
representative of the attitudes held by regular career Foreign Service men 
toward him and his movements in circles for which they felt he was not 
trained. See also: William D. Leahy, I Was There: the Personal Story of 
the Chief of Staff to President's Roosevelt and Truman (New York, 1950), 123. 
2lSmith, IIAlone in China," 24. 
22Lohbeck, 94. Hurley happened to be in Shanghai enroute to the 
United States from an inspection trip to the Philippines on September 18, 
1931, the day of the Mukden incident which preceded the Japanese takeover 
of that year in Manchuria. Hurley, upon his return to the United States, 
hotly opposed the subsequent "Stimpson non-recognition doctrine," whereby 
the United States addressed "notes'1 to the Government of Japan," ••• an­
nouncing the United States policy of refusing to recognize territorial 
changes brought about by force of arms. 1I Ibid., 95. It was Hurley's opin-
II •••ion that 'the Japanese was going to seize Manchuria anyhow' unless 
stopped by force." Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson: A Study in State­
craft (New Brunswick, 1954), 81, " ..• opposing further notes and protestsand 
deprecating nonrecognition, [Hurley] argued that we should put up or 
'shut up, should either use our fleet (along with the British) t.o restrain 
Japan or else say and do nothing." Ibid., 94. Hurley used this experi­
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The President was making preparations for his conference with Stalin, 
Churchill and Chiang Ka.i-shek at Caire and Teheran, and wanted Hurley 
to sound out the Generalissimo on the arrangements and vario1ls problems 
which might arise at the upcom:f.ng Cairo meeting. In addition, Hurley 
was to review with Chiang the developing plans for the Pacific Island­
. 23hopp1ng strategy. 

After meeting with Chiang for three days (November 7-10, 1943), 

Hurley flew on to Cairo and Teheran where his presence had been requested 
'd 24by t he PreS1 ent. On November 5, 1943, Acting Secretary of State 

Stettinius had written Hurley instructing him to go to Teheran on a 

special missfon as the President's "personal Representative with the 

25Rank of Ambassador." He was not to assume actual charge of the 
Dip1.0111lrth: Hi8~ion in Iran, bue was, rather, to co~rd4.t:wH~e the v<'vr.ious 
agencies of the American government there and the activities of those 
agencies with the British and Soviet Russians, while the regular Min­
ister to Iran, Louis Dreyfus, was on leave of absence. Although at 
first glance, such a mission might appear to have been one of high 
regard, Hurley was actually being sent to Teheran to make arrangements 
22ience in later years as evidence that he was not unfamiliar with China 
when he went there in 1944 as Roosevelt's Personal Representative. 
Military Situation ~East, 2852. 
23Roosevelt to Hurley, October 12, 1943 (Franklin D. Roosevelt 

Library). Presidentts Personal File 6533. See also: Smith, "Alone 

in China,1I 25. 

24 Ibid ., 26. 
26Lohbeck, 208. 
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26for the President's accommodations there. 
Although he was not to play a major role in the diplomatic negotia­
tions at Teheran, Hurley did perform at least one vital function. He 
was instrumental in urging upon the President the need for a tri-partite 
declaration on the status of Iran, and drafted the document (The Iran 
Declaration) which was subsequently signed by the three major powers, 
the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. 
In early May, 1943, Hurley had written to to the President about 
thQ situation in Iran, urging Roosevelt to 
• • • assume at least that degree of leadership that t<lill 
justify the confidence of the officials and the people of Iran 
in America's capacity to uphold the princi.ples of the Atlantic 
Charter~ and to assure the continued existence of Iran as a iree 
nation. 7 
It"a:T\'had: bt:!eu c:xperi'encing difficulties as an o~eup-i~.j.'Cr)\mtTY, havin!; 
not yet declared war against any nation or block of nations. Serving 
essentially as a military base, the country had been occupied by the 
Soviets in the north and Great Britain in the south. American forces 
were present there as well, but only to operate the rail transport 
system that ran from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet frontier, an es­
28
sentlal route of supply for the Red Army. It was assumed that the 
Iranian Government was pro-Axis and, according to Hurley, "the Government 
29
of Iran had been rendered impotent by the occupying forces." The 
26 Ibid ., 210. 
27Military Situation Far East, 2843. 
28Feis , Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, 266. 
29Military Situation Far East, 2844. 
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Shah of Iran was becoming increasingly distressed by the situation, 
claiming 11 ••• that he and his people were not in fact pro-Axis; they 
30 
were pro-United Nations."
Urging the Shah to prove his alignments by declaring war on the 
~~is powers, Hurley proceeded to convince President Roosevelt that there 
was need to assure the Iranian government that the United States at 
least, insisted upon the principles of the AtlaD:~!c_S~~..!, and that 
those principles be applied to Iran; that Iran should be admitted to the 
United Nations by virtue of her declaration of war against the Axis pow­
ers; that the American and British legations should be raised irr~ediately 
to the status of Embassies, and that American and British Ambassadors 
compatible to one another and capable of understanding and promoting 
31Brlrlsh-Amcric'an-Rnssiarr-coopera-t:±onshould be appoint'cd to ITan; , 
The British had been aware of the problema, in Iran and had taken 
the initiative to assure the Iranians that wartime occupation ,wuld not 
lead to any permanent impairment of her independence. At the Moscow 
Conference, Great Britain had raised the subject in an agenda item en­
titled the "Common Policy in Iran." She had urged that " •.• the 
three countries whose forces were in Iran should join in a public dec­
laration stating that when the war was over these would be withdrawn."32 
But both the United States and the Soviet Union had expressed res­
ervations at Moscow, the United States because American troops were in 
30Ibid . 
3lIbid • 
32F .el.s. Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, 267. 
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Iran in a different capacity than the Russian and British forces, and 
because Hull had hesitated to become involved in Iranian domestic poli-
tics. The Soviet Union h8sitated because the Soviet-Anglo-Iranian Treaty 
of 1942 provided for the presence of an Iranian representative whenever 
questions relating to that country were discussed. The. subject was 
avoided, therefore, to be dealt with when the three heads of state met 
33T .at eneran. 
In his discussion with Roosevelt at Cairo in November, Hurley re­
vealed to the President his belief that the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain were disregarding the pledges made in the Atlantic Charte~ now 
34that the United States was fully committed to the wa.r. Roosevelt, 
susceptible to such ideas as a result of his own experiences with 
Br-i'tishc tnt'f"al1l&i-gence on quest·l.'ons of Asian ColonialisTl'l'r agt'eed with 
Hurley's feelings and suggested that Hurley find a place and a proce­
dure at Teheran appropriate for insisting that Churchill and Stalin 
reaffirm their Atlant'ic' Charter commitments. 35 
Secretary of State Hull had suggested at Moscow that each of the 
Big Three make separate statements of intention to Iran and had pre­
sented on behalf of the United States, a Declaration Regarding Iran as 
an example of the kind of statement he thought each should make. Roose­
velt and Hurley agreed that Hull's Declaration should be the appropriate 
vehicle through which to gain a reaffirmation by Stalin and Churchill 
33Ibid • 

34
Lohbeck, 214. 
35Ibid.• , 215. 
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36
of the ~ntic Charter. 
While Roosevelt was meeting with Churchill and Stalin at Teheran, 
Hurley and J. D. Jernegan of the State Department drew up the proposed 
Declaration, and, following discussions with 11olotov and Eden who 
37
approved the proposal, a final draft was made. Presented at the last 
Teheran meeting, the draft was accepted with but a few minor changes 
being made by Winston Churchill. 38 The document was essentially that 
which had been prepared and presented by Hull at Hoscow. It was merely 
rewritten to include a reference to all three major powers and to the 
Atlantic Charter. The final paragraph read as follows: 
The Government of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the 
United Kingdom are at one with the Governments of Iran in their 
desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial i~tegrity of Iran. They count upon the participa·­
tion-of Iran, together with- all other peace-l(n~in8nations, in 
the establishment of international peace, security and prosper­
ity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the 39 
Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed. 
On December 1, 1943, the Declaration on Iran was initialled for the 
Iranian government by Foreign Minister, Mohammad Saed,40 and with that 
Patrick Hurley became personally committed to the document, believing it 
to have constituted a reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter. Unfortun­
ately, the 'tvards ". . • in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic 
36 Ibid . 
3J Ibid. 
38Ibid ., 216. 
39M'l' S' . F E 28341 ltary .. 1t~~-.t.lon ~r ast, • 

40

.Lohbeck, 217. 
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Charter .•. ," left a great deal of leeway for interpretation by the 
powers. According to Hurley's mm charges, the Russians and the British 
had already chosen to interpret the. Char~ to fit their own purposes. 
Yet he failed to recogn'ize that if what he said was true, Churchill and 
Stalin would no doubt see the Declaration on Iran in terms of their own 
individual interpretations of the Atlantic Charter. 
~~en Hurley claimed in later years that the Delcaration on Iran was 
a reaffirmation of the Atlantic Charter, he was quite correct, for it 
was. Unfortunately, he equated reaffirmation with clarification. There 
was no clarification of the Atlantic Charter at Teheran. 
Follm-1ing the Teheran Conference, Hurley remained in Iran, having 
been requested by Roosevelt, who had by this time established consider­
~conliden.ce 5.n the General, to coordinate the acitivities of the 
41
various agencies in that country. The career Foreign Service officers, 
however, had even less faith by this time in the President's assignee and 
Hurley succeeded in alienating them even further by his overly-gregarious 
42
nature and u.npredictable behavior. 
Nor was Hurley particularly fond of the officials stationed in Iran. 
He soon came to believe that State Department personnel were attemptl.ng 
'" 43to sabotage h15 mlSS10n. On December 21, 1943, Hurley had submitted 
to the President a full report with recommendations for an American 
policy in Iran. 44 On January 12, 1944, Roosevelt for~arded this 
4lSmith, "Alone in China," 27. 
42 Ibid • 
43Ibid . 
44~M'l' S'ltuatlon F East, 2846ltary . ar • 
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report to the Secretary of State indicating his strong agreement with the 
45
recommendations made by Hurley. In March, Roosevelt corresponded with 
Hurley directly, and again indicated his favorable response to the pro­
· D 46, hIdposa1s made ~n ecember. But w en Bur ey returne to Washington in 
March for consultation with the President, he happened upon a memorandum 
in the State Department which had been written by Eugene Rostow and ini­
tialled by the Assistant Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. The memoran­
dum referred to Hurley's proposals on Iran as "hysterical, messianic 
47globalony." Attributing this statement to himself, Acheson, reporting 
the incident years later, explained that the phrase referred to the 
charges Hurley had made in his report to the President--that the British 
were misusing Lend-lease goods in Iran, and that Russia and Great Britain 
hsQ..imfJer--iaiHsti:c designs fOT the Miadle Ea.st~-not to tl-re-- report per_ se. 48 
But Hurley apparently took this' as confirming evidence of his prior sus­
picions that his whole mission in Iran was being sabotaged by the State 
Department. In a September, 1944, letter to the President, Hurley re­
viewed the incident and added: 
My report which you sent to the State Department was circula­
ted in other departments of the Government. It carried with it 
the "messianic global boloney" memorandum and was also verbally 
attacked by men in the State Department to such an extent that 
the report was discredited. It finally reaC:hed the press through 
a keyhole columnist in discreditable form. So, the basic work 
46 Ibid • 
47 Ibid., 2847. 
48Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation~!lY Years in the State 
Department (New York, 1969)~ 134. 
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of destroying your Iranian plan 'vas accomplished in Washington. 49 
Furthermore, Hurley added, those who opposed the Iranian plan in 
Washington, also opposed the Atlantic Charter, particularly those arti­
cles dealing with free trade and self-determination. 
These are men in the State Department who are upholding im­
perialism, monopoly and exploitation as opposed to the prin­
ciples stated in the Atlantic Charter. That is one of the deep­
seated reasons for the failure of the Iranian plan. 50 
Hurley did not return to Iran following his Narch meeting with the 

President, for he refused to. serve any longer in positions which would 

5l
place him in the State Department chain of command. For the remainder 

of the spring and summer of 1944, he stayed in Washington, where, in 

. July, he began to hear rumors of the developing crisis which in August 
would take him, again as the President's personal representative, to 
China. 
During the summer of 194!f, the Japanese had been making considerable 
advances in China proper, threatening the American air bases at Liuchow 
and Kweilin. If those bases were to fall, the next Japanese move would 
most likely be toward Kunming and Chungking. Kunming was vital to the 
• 

w~r effort in China as the terminus of the air supply route from India 

and the nerve center of American air attacks on the Japanese in China. 

As Herbert Feis pointed out in The China T.mgle" "if that was lost, the 

whole tremendous Allied effort to move supplies into China and maintain 

52

effective air bases and equipment would be canceled." 
49Military Situation Far East, 2847. 

50Ibid . 

51Smith, IlAlone in China," 28. 

52Feis , China Tangle, 166. 
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Although in July Roosevelt had accepted HacArthur's plan for 
moving into the Philippines instead of Formosa and the China mainland, 
thus putting campaigns in China in the background, it was still felt 
essential to enable the Chinese to fight more effectively.53 Chiang 
Kai-shek~s forces had been meeting with little success on the battle­
field, and American observers were fast becoming convinced that the 
Chinese were waiting for the United States and Great Britain to win 
the war, after which the Chinese would reap the benefits of American 
54benevolence in particular. In addition, there was still the Communist 
threat which Chiang believed must be met after the war, and for which he 
was preserving his best troops. According to a r.eport from the Military 
Intelligence Division of the War Department, submitted in July, 1945, 
but -refC!'rril1g to the If,iHtury situation in summer, 19M!, the-Chungking 
government was adhering to a policy of conserving its military strength 
by keeping its best armies away from the fronts in East China. Many of 
the troops which were on the front lines were military units comprised 
of troops loyal to local war-lords who had formerly opposed Chiang Kai­
shek, and were not eager to do the Generalissimo's bidding except as it 
might benefit their own political and milHary position. 55 In short, 
the Chinese Nationalists were, as usual, fighting only among themselves. 
By midsummer, 1944, the United States began, in spite of changes 
in strategic planning, a concerted effort to get the Chinese into the 
53Ibid • , 168. 
54I~id. , 167. 
55 IEid . , 166. 
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war on an active footing. Vice-president Hallace had conferred with 
Chiang in June and had recommended to the President, upon returning to 
the United States, that General Stilt,ell be replaced with a personal 
representatble to Chiang Kai-shele, who could handle both military and 
political affairs. Men in the War Department, however,. felt Stilwell 
had been judged unfairly.56 But the British were suggesting Stilwell's 
recall as well, and in the face of strong pressures, thoughts in Wash­
ington turned to the possibility of transferring Stilwell from Burma to 
China where he might salvage the situation if given a command assign­
57
ment. Stilwell had been queried on his attitude toward such an as­
signment and ·reportedly answered that the Generalissimo might give him 
a command job if the President pressed the issue, but for such a com­
matnl to be effective he would have tu- be t;iven cOlil.p·leteauthority- over 
Ch ' . 58t.eh ~nese arm~es. Pressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Roosevelt 
informed Chiang on July 6, 1944, that Stilwell had been made a full gen-· 
era1, and urged the Generalissimo to recall Stih~e1l from Burma and 
confer u~on him " ••. the power to coordinate all Allied military re­
sources in China, including the Communist forces.,,59 Chiang had hedged, 
agreeing in principle, but had placed obstacles in the path of an im­
mediate takeover by Stilwell. 
In the meantime, Roosevelt had traveled to Hawaii where he met 
with the Pacific Theatre Commanders and made the finc.l decision to move 
56lbid . > 169. 
5]Ibid. 
58Ibid , 
59Ibid• , 170. 
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against the Japanese in the Philippines rather than on Formosa and the 
60China Mainland. As these decisions were being made, the President was 
also searching for the appropriateiuan to :represent him in Chungking. 
Patrick J. Hurley, meanwhile, was still in Washington searching for a 
new assignment. 
On August 3, 1944, Secretary of War Stimson had remarked to Gen­
era1 Marshall that he was still trying to find an adequate job for 
Hurley. It had been suggested that Hurley be sent back to the Middle 
East, but the Foreign Economic Admini.stration had objected, and Hurley 
61 
was still seeking a military assignment. Marshall, who had originally 
held reservat·ions about sending a personal representative, found himself 
faced with the need to send someone friendly to Stilwell, before others 
with presid"en'tia1 influence had an vpportunity tc suggest a candidate 
friendly to General Clair Chennault with whom Stilvlell had been having 
. 62 
a long-standing dispute over China strategy. Hurley, having estab­
1ished very cordial relations with Stilwell on their meeting just prior 
to the Cairo Conference in 1943, was suggested to l-u.rsha11 by Stimson 
and Marsh 11 aounf 1m to be accepta e f or t e JO, a deC1S10n hd h ' b1 h' b 63 .. e 
made more from a sense of urgency perhaps, than of a careful weighing 
of Hurley's ability to do the job. 
62Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 
1911-45 (New York, 1970), 47'8', 
63 Ibid ., 479. 
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Hurley \Jas soundecd out about the mission on the same day that 
64Stimson raised his name. Following his discussion with Marshall, 
Hurley immediately contacted Stettillius, inquiring about the possibility 
of his being made Ambassador. Informed by the Undersecretary that there 
was little chance of any changes being made in China at. any time in the 
llear future, Hurley pressed Stettinius to discuss the matter with Hull, 
\Jhich Stettinius did on that same day. Hurley, it appears was not as much 
against serving within the State Department chain of command as he had 
, 
led some to believe~as long as his link was somewhere tmvard the top of 
· 65t h.at cha1n. 
By August 9, 1944, the President and General Marshall had agreed up­
on Hurley as the man to go to Chungking,66 and on August 18th the Pres'­
ident, after receiving word frumChiangthat Hurl-eywol,:ll.d be"acce~able, 
talked briefly with his new appointee and issued him a brief letter of 
. 67i nstruct10ns. In t\JO short paragraphs"Roosevelt designated Hurley as 
64 Ibid • 
65Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 247. Hurley's biographer claimed 
that the General initially turned down the President's request that he 
go to China because 11e did not want another diplomatic post. But when 
Roosevelt told him that he could go in the capacity of an Army officer, 
Hurley readily agreed: Hurley's inquiries about the possibility of his 
being sent as Ambassacor, seem to contradict such findings. See Lohbeck, 
279. 
66 .Fe1S, China Tan~le, 178. 
67According to Forei&n.~~13t~ons, 1944, VI, 250, Hurley's letter 
of instructions was never located in State Department files. Hurley 
merely reported the contents of that letter to the Department on August 
22. 1944. Ibid. According to Robert Smith "Alone in China," 48, there 
was such a letter in Hurley's Personal Papers from which Smith did the 
proportionate amount of his research. No such letter has been located, 
however, in the Roosevelt collection at Ryde Park. 
66 

his personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek and outlined his principle 
mission as that of promoting efficient and harmonious relations between 
the Generalissimo and General Stilwell. Hurley was, further, to 
facilitate Stilwell's exercise of command over the Chinese armies,which, 
it was hoped, itJe:te soon to be placed under him. Although Hurley was 
instructed to report directly to the President, he was also directed to 
coordinate all his activities with the Ambassador in China, Clarence 
68Gauss. 
Following seven days of briefings with military, diplomatic and 
Presidential advisors on the China situation, Hurley met again with the 
. 69President on August 24. It was during this meeting that Hurley 
gained the impression that one of his primary functions in China ,;ould 
be to uphold and sustain the Government of Chiang- K::li~ ...;J1Ck·, 
Meeting for less than an hour in the late afternoon the two 
men discussed corruption in the Chinese government and the po­
litical alternatives to Chiang Kai-sllek. The Presider:.t char­
acterized Mao Tse-tung as "probably a competent man, but un­
tried in the larger responsibility of governing China." Roose­
velt felt that the lack of Chinese leaders forced the United 
States to depend on Chiang; therefore, the policy of the Am­
erican government was to support the Generalissimo. 70 
The existing American policy to'.ard China, the P"i·esident further 
explained, made recognition of any other political factions in China im­
possible. Secretary of State Hull had clearly explained this in his note 
to the Japanese knbassador before the outbreak of war in 1941. Suggestions 
68Smith, "Alone in China," 48. 
69 Ibid ., 49. 
70Ihid • 
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which were being made to the effect that there were other leaders in China 
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more capable than Chiang, were, therefore, rejected by Roosevelt. 
In the same meeting, Roosevelt and Hurley discussed proposals which 
had been made to arm the Communist forces in China. Although such pro­
posals had been intended not to threaten Chiang's position, but rather, to 
put into the war military forces which had evidenced a sincere desire and 
the ability to successfully fight the Japanese in China, Hurley and the 
President agreed that because of 	Chiang's II . well known apathy tm"ard 
72the idea," it should be rejected. 
73On August 25, 1970, General Hurley, in the company of Donald Nelson 
and two aides', departed for Chungking, China, flying first to Moscow to 
converse with the Soviet leaders to " • •. acquaint them with the purposes 
and objc'C1:"ivc-s of his trip to China.,,74 But Hurley's purposes and objec­
tives would change soon after his arrival in Chungking, and in spite of 
his seven days of briefing on the situation in China, he was unprepared 
for the task which awaited him there. Without any real military or dip­
lomatic experience, Hurley relied upon confidence in his own personality, 
believing as did Roosevelt in himself, that 'I . .. his power to make 
73Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 252. Donald Nelson, Chairman of the 
War Production Board'was sent to China with Hurley "specifically ••• to 
look into the problem of civilian supply to China 'over the hump' and in­
to the related problems of production and distribution in China." Ibid., 
Hull to Gauss, August 23, 1944, 251. -­
74Ibid ., Deputy Director of Office of European Affairs, H. Freeman 
Matthews--U;--the Secretary of State, August 24, 19l14, 252. 
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friends was so irresistible that all opposition could be charmed out of 
existence. ,,75 
When the President sent Hurley to China. • • he knew full well 
the kind of man he had selected. Roosevelt realized that Hurley 
had no special diplomatic training. Furthermore, Hurley's past 
history had demonstrated him to be a poor team worker and a flam­
boyant dandy.76 
Hurley" •• delighted in wearing his General's uniform,,,77 but 
had relatively little training as a soldier. His past experiences, in 
many parts of the world, had provided him with little in the ~lay of dip­
lomatic expertise as far as the Department of State and the Foreign Ser­
vice personnel were concerned. In later years he would level charges at 
members of the latter, which related to the situation that developed 
in China. But the contempt he held for the Department of State did not 
sprout:- in--China. He took it with- hini and it hindered himirr the role 
he was to play. Hurley went to China with little in his favor, aside 
perhaps, from the fact that he was a prominent Republican who supported 
a Democratic President's foreign policy, and had gained the President's 
confidence. There was a great deal working against him, not the least 
of which was his own personality. "Nevertheless, Hurley held the con­
fidence of President Roosevelt and that qualification overrode any of 
Hurley's deficiencies.,,78 
75 
Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy, 9. 
76 Ibid ., 252. 
77Smith, "Alone in China," 28. 
78Ibid . 
CHAPTER IV 
nIXIE MISSION 
While the President and his advisors were attempting to arrive at 
feasible soluttons to the problems in China during the summer months of 
1944, at least one operation was moving forward with success. In June, 
Vice-president Wallace had managed to convince Chiang Kai-shek of the 
utility of an observer mission to the Chinese Communist stronghold in 
the north. Such a mission had been proposed to General Stilwell early 
in 1943 by John Patton Davies, a Foreign Service officer attached to 
Sti1:wel'1' she-adq1:mrters as, apolitical advisOl:. Stilwa.ll, pre-oeeupied, 
by other troubles, not the least of which were his relatioILs with Chiang, 
paid little attention to his early proposal. Then, on June 24, 1943, 
Davies again put his arguments in 't'lrit:tng and addn,ssed them to both 
Stilwell and the Department of State. Davies pointed out that,only one 
official United States observer had ever visited Yenan, and that had 
been in 1938. The largest concentration of Japanese troops and the 
second largest Japanese industrial base were in North China, he noted, 
and the Chinese Communists constituted the most cohesive, disciplined 
and aggressive anti-Japanese group in the country. This was the area 
which Russia would probably enter when she attacked Japan, Davies pointed 
out, and the Chinese Communists there were in a position to become the 
lfoundation of a new rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. 
" 23IBarret t, D"l.Xl.e M""l.8Sl.0n J • 
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Once again 	in January, 1944, Davies memorialized Stilwell and the 
2State Department, and this time his urgings were brought to the atten­
ti.on of the President, who in February, pressed upon Chiang the need for 
information on the strength of the Japanese forces in North China. 
Information at present regarding the enemy in North China and 
Manchuria is exceedingly meagre. To increase the flow of such 
information and to survey the possibilities of future opera­
tions, both ground and air, it appears to be of very great ad­
visability that an American observers' mission be immediately 
dispatched to North Shensi and Shansi Provinces and such other 
parts of North China as may be necessary.3 
In answer to the President's suggestion, Chiang wrote on February 
22 that he would be glad to send an American observer mission " ..• to 
gain more accurate information regarding the troop concentration of our 
common enemy in North China and Manchuria. ,A He had already issued in­
struetions"to the Hini"stry of War, Chiang reported, to' contact Ccn:(~I!.'al 
Stilwell's 	headquarters for the purpose of mapping out a prospective itin­
erary for a mission to " ••• all areas where the political authority of 
the National Government extends Cind wherever our Army is stationed."S 
But the political authority of the National Government did not ex­
tend into the area to which the President wished the mission to go, nor 
was the Kuomintang Army stationed there. By June, however, ..."..hen Vice-
president Wallace discussed the proposal with Chiang, that condition was 
no longer evident. Chiang only required that the mission come under the 
auspices of the National Military Council, a condition ,,,hich was clarified 
3Roosevelt to Chiang, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 329. 

4Chiang to Roosevelt, Ibid., 349. 
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on June 23, to mean that the mission would be "sponsored" by the National 
Military Council. As far as the Communist areas were concerned, Chiang 
simply denied responsibility for the mission if it desired to travel there. 
The Generalissimo returned to the subject of his attitude to­
ward the project by emphasizing again that he desired it to have 
the completest freedom, and being merely under the, nominal spon­
sorship of the National Military Council. He went on to say, 
however, that while he could promise full freedom in Kuomintang 
territory he could make no promises for the treatment and free­
dom given by the Communists, and that we would have to arrange 
that with the Communists ourselves. 6 
On July 22, 1944, the first group of L\merican military observers 
left for Yenan, a second group departing about August 5. Commanded by 
Colonel David D. Barrett of the General Staff Corps, the observer group, 
known by its code name "Dixie", included sixteen military observers and 
two Foreign Service men who were assigned as polj.tical observers. 7 
These two, John Stewart Service and Raymond P. Ludden, had been 
assigned to the Army mission because, as one Department of State official 
put it, " ••• for sometime to come the only way the Department can get 
its political observers into the growing1y important Communist area is 
by detailing them to the Army."S Ambassador Gauss also wrote to the 
Secretary of State on July 8, that 
as understanding reached with ChineseGovernment was 
that this group should be a military group for purpose of ob­
taining military intelligence, care must be exercised in at­
taching Foreign Service officers to it. So far as Chinese 
Government is concerned they should appear as lan§uage offi­
cers and not as diplomatic or political officers. 
6Ibid ., report of conversation between Wallace and Chiang Kai-shek, 
462. 
7Barrett, Dixie Mission, 13. 
8John Pattoll Davies, as sent to Hull by Officer ir. Charge, New 
Delhi (Nerrill), Foreisn Relations, 1944, VI, 113. 
9Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 119. 
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Commander of the Dixie Mission, Colonel Barrett, had been ordered 
to Chungking in March, 1944, where he had been informed by Service that 
10he was to be in command. But final approval for the mission had not 
come in }1arch, and Barrett was sent back to Kweilin to resume his duties 
there. Ordered once more to Chungking in July, he was finally informed 
officially that he would command the mission. 11 
But oddly enough, Barrett was never issued official orders relating 
to his specific duties in the north. 
It is amusing now to look back on the busy days just before 
our departure, and recall that with all the talk there had been 
about the necessity for sending the mission and the valuable 
work we hoped to accomplish, up to the last minute no one seems 
to have thought about giving us any definite orders. On the 
21st day of July, with everything set for us to take off the 
next day, it suddenly occurred to me I had received no instructions 
in black and white. 12 
With this realization, Barrett contacted a Headquarters IIC-2", who 
gave him a typed sheet listing the topics on which the mission was to 
obtain information. "These orders were unsigned, and without authenti­
cation of any kind," and in the form of a "Memorandum to Colonel David 
G. Barrett, GSC,,,13 which told the Colonel that "in connection with the 
despatch of an Ob~ervation Section to area under control of the Chinese 
Communists, information is particularly deSired on the following subjects: 
10Barrett, Dixie Mission, 24. 
11Ibid., 25. 
12Ibi~., 27. 
13Ibid . 
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Enemy Order of Battle 
Enemy Air Order of Battle 
Puppet Order of Battle 
Strength, composition, disposition, equipment, training, and combat 
efficiency of the Communist Forces. 
Utilization and expansion of Communist intelligence agencies in 
enemy and occupied territory. 
Complete list of Communist officials (Who's Who) 

Enemy air fields and air defense in North China. 

Target intelligence 

Bomb damage 

. Weather 
Economic intelligence 
Operat'.ions of Communist forces. 
Enemy operations 
Evaluation of present contribution of Communists to the v!ar effort 
Present extent of areas under Communist control (with maps) 
Most effective means of ass.isting Communists to increase the value 
of their war effort 
Naval intelligence 
Order of Battle of Communist forces 
"14Evaluation of potential contribution of Communists to the war effort. 
"No other instructions of any kind, oral or written, secret or non­
secret," Barrett wrote, "were ever given me. "IS But whether the orders were 
officially given or not, it was perfectly clear to the men who traveled to 
Yenan, exactly what it was thay were expected to do. That expectation had 
- 28. 

ISIbid. 

14Tb ~ ' d., 
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been indicated in the last item on Barrett's list of subjects, that is 
to evaluate the potential contribution of the Communists to the war ef­
fort against the Japanese. 
If Service and Ludden were given specific written' instructions, 
they have either been lost, or no record of them was ever kept. More 
likely than not, the two Foreign Service officers were well aware of the 
intent of the Mission, and functioned without specific instructions in 
the same manner as they had previously--as observers reporting on the 
political situation where and when they believed such reports would be 
of interest to their superiors. Although they were still Foreign Service 
officers, they were directly responsible to General Stilwell prior to 
their assignment to the Dixie M:Lssion, after which they came under the 
command of Colonel Barrett ~ Tl~i.r' rep-arts went7'firs't"to Barrett \'lho 
approved them for transmission to Headquarters, China-Burma-India the­
16
atre. From there they were transmitted wherever the commander-in-chief 
of that Theatre, General Stilwell, chose to send thern. 
John Stewart Service was considered by many to be a highly compe­
tent political observer in China. He was born and spent part of his early 
life in Szechuan, where he learned the language, and, according to Barrett, 
fI 
• was accustomed to what I considered the barbarous dialect of that 
province and the local accents of other areas.,,17 But Service went to 
Yenan with strong Ilegative feelings toward the Government of Chiang Kai­
shek and held a critical opinion of the manner by which the United States 
had previously dealt with that Government. In a March, 1944 memorandum 
16Ibid ., 45. 
17Ibid., 47. 
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which was transmitted to the Department of State by the Ambassador in 
China, Service wrote that China was in a mess. "No military action on a 
significant scale is in sight. The economic crisis continues to drift 
and worsen. Internal unrest is acti.ve and growing. Relations with all 
18her allies are estranged." Admitting that the United States was par­
tially to blame for adding to China's economic difficulties, Service as­
serted that Chiang and only Chiang was responsible for the sorry situa­
tion in China at the time. The answer to the enigma, Service contended, 
would be found in Chiang's background and limitations, and in the United 
States' failings in dealing with him. The words of the Ambassador, he 
wrote, carried little weight'~ . • because the state Department has not 
taken a strong policy and because it doer. not, in any event, speak for 
the White House. ,,19 Chiang had no fear of Gen",ral Stilwell, Service con­
tended, because the General could not demonstrate the unqualified backing 
of the War Department or the w~ite House. 
Chiang will cooperate if the United States, upon which he is 
dependent, makes up its mind exactly what it wants fr'om him 
and then gets hard-boiled about it. Until the President deter­
mines our policy, decides our requirements, and makes these 
clearly and unoistakably known to Chiang, Chiang will continue 
in his present ways.20 
The President could make his policy known, Service urged, by Stil­
well and the Ambassador working in close concert. Although such action 
might mean taking an active part in Chinese affairs, Service argued, ". 
unless we do it, China will not be much use as an ally. II In tal·dng an 
l8Service to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Foreign Relations, 
1944, VI, 38. 
19Ibid., 39. 
20Ibid . 
76 
2l
active part, he closed, " ••. we may save China."
In March, Service had also written, tn a memorandum relating to 
the possible unification of anti-Central Government elements, that civil 
war in China was likely to occur following the war. Out of such a civil 
war, he wrote, "there can be expected to emerge either a more progressive 
Kuomintang Government or a communist state, probably of the present modi­
fied Chinese communist type.,,22 Inasmuch as this memorandum was written 
prior to the one in which Service proposed a stronger, clearer diplomatic 
position on the part of the United States with the objective of gaining 
a greater commitment from Chiang, he d~d not advocate Chiang's removal, 
nor, to touch here on a subject which later will be dealt with at length, 
did he have in mjnd the overthrmv or destruction of the Government that 
t1re-Untted-Sta:tes was pledged to uphold. He- was simply registering a 
warning~ prophetic as i.t was, that if the United States did not take a 
stronger position with Chiang, the chances of civil war following Japan's 
defeat were good, and the possibility existed of a "modified Chinese 
communist type," of government coming to power if it did. 
On July 28, Service wrote the first of many reports on his obser­
vations of the political, social and cultural conditions in Yenan. Ad­
mitting in this report that he had only been in Yenan for six days, 
Service explained that he felt it necessary, given the availability of 
mail facilities and their future uncertainty, to record a few general 
first impressions of the Communist Region. "My own experiences," Service 
reported, "is that one enters an area like this, concerning which one has 
21Ibid . 

22As reported by Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 378. 
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heard so many entirely good but sec.ond-hand reports, with a conscious 
23determination not to be swept off one 1 s feet." 
It is interesting, therefore; that my own first impressions-­
and those of the rest of our Observer Group--have been extremely 
favorable. The same is true of the foreign correspondents, at 
least two of whom ••• could not, by any stretching of the term, 
have been called "pro-Communist" before their arriv.al. The spell 
of the Chinese Communists still seems to work. 24 
Greatly impressed by the openness and cordiality of the Communists, 
Service found their leaders to be very competent, political and military 
men. Mao Tse-tung, Service reported, was far more warm and magnetic than 
had been anticipated. And the general feeling of the military men was 
25 
one of calm, self-confidence and self-respect, Service wrote. 
Summing up this rather lengthy initial report, Service added: 
I think now. that further study and observation will confirm 
that' what is scen- at· Yenan is a \vell integrated fi1crv~ment, with 
a political and economic program, which it is successfully 
carrying out under competent leaders. 
And that while the Kuomintang has iost its early revolution­
ary character and with that loss, disintegrated, the Communist 
Party, because of the struggle it has had to continue, has kept 
its revolutionary character, but has grown to a healthy and 
moderate maturity. 
One cannot help coming to feel that this movement is strong 
and successful, and that it has such drive behind it and has 
tied itself so closely to the people that it will not easily 
be killed. 26 
23Service, Report No.1, Ibid., 518. 
24Ibid • 
25"'b'd ~., 520. 
26 Ibid . 
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Colonel Barrett, over whose signature all of Service's reports 
from Yenan were submitted wrote in 1970, that " ... I saw at once [that 
Service's reports] were strongly in favor of the Communists and ~dversely 
critical of the Generalissimo and the Kuomintang. I spoke to Jack and 
told him I was concerned lest the reports get him into trouble with ul­
tra-conservatives in United States Government circles.,,27 Service's 
response, Barrett claimed, was "Dave, I'm a Foreign Service Officer. 
What I have y,'ritten in these reports and the recommendation I have made 
are my observations and carefully considered opinions. If they don't 
28like them in Washington, they can throw them out." 
Service was true to his words, for the stream of 'reports which 
flowed from Yenan were neither brief, nor were they, for the most part, 
critical of the Communists'~ On' September II, t'VJO da')·s-- before-- HU1::"ley- ar­
rived in Chungking, Service submitted his 21st report from Yenan, en­
titled "Gener':-ll Impression of the Chinese Conununist Leaders. ,,29 In the 
report, Service lauded the Communist leaders, finding them with very few 
negative traits--at worst they demonstrated voluntary effacement of in­
dividuality, a noticeable uniformity in their thinking and expressions, 
and a lack of humor among them. In conclusion, Service added: 
The general impression one gets of the Chinese Communist 
leaders is that they are a unified group of vigorous, mature 
and practical men, unselfishly devoted to high principles, 
and having great ability and strong qualities of leadership. 
27Barrett, Dixie M~ssion, 45. 
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This impression-and, I suggest, their record--places them 
above any other contemporary group in China. It is not sur­
prising that they have favorably impressed most or all of the 
Americans who have met them during the last seven years: 
their manners, habits of thought, and direct handUng of prob­
lems seem more American than oriental. 30 
Earlier on August 3, Servtce had submitted report No.5, entitled 
3l
"The Communist Policy Toward the Kuomintang," in which he suggested 
that " ••. the policies of the Chinese Communist Party will not run 
counter to the interests of the United States in China in the foreseeable 
future, and that the Party m~rits, so far as possible, a sympathetic and 
32friendly attitude on our part. 1I He arrived at this conclusion through 
an extensive analysis of the Cotffillunist's attitude toward Chiang and the 
Kuomintang, attitudes which were held by the political though not the 
military leaders. The political leaders, Service noted, appeared to 
have complete control of the military leadc.~rs in policy matters, and 
the policy of the former continued to be " . adherence to the United 
Front; full mobilization to fight Japan; abandonment of any purely Com­
munist program; and recognition of the Central Government and the 
leadership of the Generalissimo.,,33 
It might seem strange, Service suggested, that a party which was 
striving for political power, and was theoretically at least, revolutionary 
in nature, would not be taking advantage of the deteriorating control of 
30Ibid . , 556. 
3lIbi<!. , 562. 
32 Ibid.• , 567. 
33 Ib · 1 ~., 562. 
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the Kuomintang throughout China. v7hy, Service asked rhetorically, would 
the Communists still be adhering to the United Front when the political 
and military situation in China was to their advantage? "The question 
therefore presents itself: 1I he wrote, "are the Communists sincere in 
this pOlicy?,,34 
The indications, Service offered, were that the Communists were 
sincere. 
Except for the months from July to September, 1943 when they 
seriously thought they were in danger of attack by the Kuomintang, 
they have not talked of violent opposition to the Kuomintang. The 
Communists steadfastly stick to the line that civil war would be a 
tragedy which must be avoided at any cost--although some observers 
believe that it would be difficult if not impossible for the Kuom­
intang to defeat them. They will not permit any suggestion that 
China should be divided or that they should hold one section of 
it, such as North China, more or less independently. Propaganda. 
wall slogans in Yenan (long antedating our arrival) call for both 
p81!'t-iesto unite to resist Japan. 35 
Service went on to offer two explanations of Communist policy, one 
based on theoretical grounds as given by the Party leaders, the other a­
rising out of practical considerations. The second, he suggested, may be 
too cynical, and it would be rejected by the Party leaders. Nevertheless, 
they both made some sense, he added, "and both would seem to show that 
the party is under far-sighted, careful leadership and strong discipline.,,36 
As a theoretical explanation, Service pointed out that the Chinese 
Communist Party claimed to be Marxist. "By this the Communists mean that 
their ideology, their philosophical approach, and their dialectical methods 
34Ibid . , 563. 
35Ibid . 
36Ibid . , 564. 
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war: 
But at the 
' '1' ,,37are based on Marxl.S t mate:H! 'STIl. M~rxi~m waR, therefore, an at~itude 
and an a~proach to problems, according to Service. "It is a long-term 
vijw of political and economic development to which all short-term con­
si erations of temporary advantage or premature power are ruthlessly sub­
or~inated.,,38 
••• 'although the Chinese Communist Party aims at eventual 
socialism, it hopes to arrive at this, not through a violent rev­
olution, but through a long and orderly process of democracy and 
controlled economic development. This democracy will be of a 
progressive--or what would generally be called radical--type. 
The economic development tVill be partly socialistic, partly pri.­
vate. The first is essential to the second: the desired eco­
nomic development can come about only under democracy.39 
The long-term approach, Service commented, determined for the Com­
mu ists their policy toward the Kuomintang. Because they believed in 
de ocracy, they advocated multi-party participation in politics. In 
ke ping with this approach, they sought compromises v7ith the Kuomintang 
in the hope that the progressive elements in the Kuomintang would rise 
to the occasion and make such compromises possible. Thus the Communists 
re~used to exploit what appeared to be an excellent opportunity to over-
the Nationalist government. "And for this reason they seek to avoid 
even if they win after a long struggle, the country's devel­
be set back by loss of time and destruction of resources.,,40 
same time, the Communists would not sacrifice the gains 
thus far if that would be the prerequ::l,site to a compromise with the 
37 Ibid • 

38Ibid • 

39 Ibid ., 565. 

40Ibid . 
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Kuomintang. They would accept provocation and abuse, Service noted, but 
they would make no concessions of principle, " ••• because to make such 
concessions would be a violation of' their long-·term policy and a turning 
back 1n· t he pursu1t. 0 f th'e1r ul't1mate 0b"Ject1ves. 1141 
By this view the Communist Party becomes a party $eeking order­
ly democratic growth toward socialism--as it is being attained, 
for instance, in a country like England--rather than a party fo­
menting an immediate and violent revolution. It becomes a party 
which is not seeking an early monopoly of political power but 
pursuing what it considers the long-term interests of China. 42 
But Service was not the naive observer that some would claim he was 
in later years, for his second explanation held forth the possibility 
that the Chinese Communists were simply well-versed in Machiavellian pol­
itics. Their support of the war could be giving them time to mobilize, 
organize, and indoctrinate the people and to train and equip an effi.cient 
army. Their operation behind the Japanese lines could be providing them 
with relative freedom from Kuomintang harassment. Land refor.m programs 
might be designed merely to gain the support of the people in the areas 
of Communist operations, while at the same time their espousal of dem­
ocracy acted as an appeal to the majority of the Chinese people and as 
a good club for beating the Kuomintang. Their democratic claims, Service 
further noted, along with their engagement in guerilla warfare behind 
enemy lines, and their proclamation of liberal economic policies based 
as they were on private property, were also useful as an appeal to foreign 
sympathies to the point of winning the foreign support necessary for the 
rebuilding of China following the war. 
41Ibid • 
42Ibid . 
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With the conditions as bad as they appeared to be throughout Chi.na, 
the Communists grew stronger, Service revealed, and with this fact in 
mind, it was unnecessary for them to take active steps toward the defeat 
of the Kuomintang. "If things continue as they are now going, time will 
bring the collapse of the Kuomintang, leaving the Commupists the strongest 
force in China.,,43 
It was difficult, Service wrote, to make a clear-cut determination 
of whether the first or second explanation of the Communist Chinese 
policy was appropriate. It was probable, he speculated, that a portion 
of both entered into the actual formulation of Communist strategy. The 
bellicosity of the Communist generals tended to draw him toward the sec­
ond explanation. 
But' on--the other hand, the apparently genuin'€, atte~s~of the" 
Communists to avoid any civil "Nar now or after the present war 
are hard to fit into the second E::xplanation. And the impressive 
personal qualities of the Coro.D1unist leaders, their seeming sin­
cerity, anc the coherence and logical nature of their program 
leads me, at least, toward general acceptance of the first ex­
planatlon--that the Communists base their policy toward the 
Kuomintang on a real desire for growth through a stage of pri­
vate enterprise to eventual socialism without the need of vio­
lent upheaval and revolution. 44 
. Thus did Service arrive at his conclusion that the Chinese Communist 
policies did not run counter to the interests of the United States. AI-
though he was not advocating the arming of the Communists at this early 
date, he did press strongly his belief that the United States should ap­
proach the Communists with a friendly attitude. 
Ambassador Gauss transmitted Service's report No.5 to the Secretary 
431, . d 566.~-., 
441bid., 567. 
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45
of State on Septereber 8. Admitting in his prefacing remarks that the 
Chinese Con~unists had moderated their policies since about 1937, Gauss 
took the position that this haa come about, in all probability, for rea­
sons of self-preservation and the obvious need for unity in the face of 
Japanese aggressions. "It was only by following such a policy that the 
Communists could hope to participate actively in the war in its early 
stages and command support from the Chinese public.,,46 In Gauss' opin­
ion, the changes in the Chinese Communists' policies were measures of 
expediency, and were intended to give the Communists time for the 
strengthening of their position vis-a-vis the Kuomintang. 
The attitude of the several foreign pmv-ers with interests in China, 
the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in particular, 
would, more likely than not, contribute to the eVului.ion of Kuomint.ang-· 
Communist relations in Cl1ina, Gauss pointed out, and could, perhaps, be 
decisive. 
For this reason, the position of the foreign powers is ob­
viously one of great responsibility in dealing with this prob­
lem. A decision, for example, of one or more of the great 
Powers to arm the Communists to assist in the conflict against 
Japan might in the end produce far-reaching internal repercus­
sions; indeed, it is almost certain to do so. Independent or 
unilateral foreign support of the Chinese Communists under 
present conditions would in all probability be a serious blow 
to the Kuomintang and the National Government and might even 
bring about their early collapse. 47 
But Service had not yet suggested that the United States arm the 
Communists. He soon would, however, and others already had. For that 
45Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 559. 
46 Ibid .• 561. 
47 Ibid . 
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it is necessary to turn to the arrival of Patrick J. Hurley, who, on 
September 6, 1944, conferred with Chiang Kai-shek for the first time 
since their meeting in 1943. 
CHAPTER V 
STILWELL, CHIANG AND THE CO~lliUNISTS 
Although President Roosevelt and Hurley had agreed in their discus­
sions of August 24, 1944 that the idea of arming the Communists should be 
rejected, the fact remains that the President, having accepted the propos­
a1 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to put General Stilwell in command of all 
Chinese forces, 1 radioed Chiang Kai-shek to that effect on July 6, and 
added: 
The extremely serious sj tuation which results from Japanese a.d­
vances in Cent;ral China, which threaten not only your Government 
buc~all that the U . S. Anny- has been· building up'·'in China, leads· 
me to the conclusion that drastic measures mu~t be taken immedi­
ately if the situation is to be saved. The critical situation 
which now exists, in my opinion calls for the delegation to one 
individual of the power to coordinate' all Allied L'1ilitarv resources 
in China, inc:..ludin~~he Co.,mmunist forces. [emphasis added] 2 
On August 23, 1944, the day before Hurley I s 1a::>t meeting vlith the 
President, General Hearn, Stilwell's chief of staff, preseuted to Chiang 
another message from Roosevelt, urging again that positive steps be 
immediately taken to place General Stilwell in command of the Chinese 
forces. In that message, Roosevelt also pointed out that, 
I do not think the forces to come under General Stilwell's 
conmand should be limited except by their availability to de­
fend C!1ina and fight the Japanese. When the enemy is pressing 
1Romanus and Sunderland, Stihve11' s Command Problems, 382. 
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us toward possible disaster, it appears unsound to refuse the 

aid of anyone who will kill Japanese. 3 

The President had in mind, when he sent these messages to Chiang, 
the unification of all Chinese forces, who would then launch a combin.ed 
effort under Stilwellts command to defeat the Japanese forces in China. 
There are no indications that he intended the Communists to be armed 
independently by the United States. 
But when Hurley arrived in Chungking he discovered that the ques­
tion of the use of Communist forces was still very much a point of con­
tention between Chiang and Stilwell in their attempts to arrive at an ac­
ceptable arrangement for Stilwellts cownand takeover. In his first 
meeting with Chiang on September 6, Hurley was informed by the Generalis­
simo that if Stilwell wished to use the Communists, those forces would 
have to acknowledge the authority of the National Militnry Council. Fur­
thermore, the Generalissimo informed Hurley, any Communiots serving 
under Stilwell would have to submit to Chiang t s control. 4 
On September 8, Hurley took up his formal role as negotiator, 
meeting with Chiang and T.V. Soong to hear the Chinese conditions for 
Stilwellts command takeover. Hurley took emphatic objection to these 
conditions whereupon the Generalissimo suggested that agendas be pre­
pared by Hurley and Stilwell for the remainder of the negotiations. 
Chiang then proposed that the Communist troop issue be met by incorporat­
ing the 	Communists into the Chinese Army if they would submit to his 
S
command. 
3Ibid. , 417. 

4Ibid . , 423. 

SIbid. , 425. 
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On September 12, Hurley presented his ten-point Agenda to Chiang: 
1. 	 The paramount objective of Chinese-American collaboration 

is to bring about the unification of all military forces 

in China for the immediate defeat of Japan and the libera­

tion of China. 

2. 	 To cooperate with China in bringing about closer relations 

and harmony with Russia and Britain for the support of the 

Chinese objectives. 

3. 	 The unification of all resources in China for war purposes. 
4. 	 The marshalling of all resources in China for war purposes. 
5. 	 Support efforts of Generalissimo for political unification 

of China on a democratic basis. 

6. 	 Submit present and postwar economic plans for China. 
7. 	 Definition of the pmvcrs of General Stilwell as Field Com­

mander. 

8. 	 Definition of General Stilwell's powers as Chief of Staff to 

the- Generalissimo'. 

9. 	 Prepare for presentation a diagram of command. 
10. Discuss future control of Lend~·lease in China. 6 
Taking objection to the words "on a democratic basis," Soong asked 
that this phrase be struck from point 5. Chiang, agreeing to the "objec­
tives" outlined in the first six points, stated, upon reaching the points 
relating to Stihvell's assumption of command, that his powers would have 
7to be defined by an international agreement. 
Stilwell took this to mean that the Generalissimo had agreed to 
give him command so he and Hurley proceeded, following the meeting, to draft 
6Ibid . See also, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 259. 
7Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 426. Soong's 
objections to lion a democratic basis," arose, no doubt, out of his idea 
of the political philosophy of Sun Yat-sen which called for a period of 
one-·party tutelage prior to the creation of a democratic system. China, 
he probably believed was still under the one-party system. 
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outlines of Stilwell's new powers for the purpose of presenting to Chiang 
the type of agreement he desired. Among the many suggestions made by 
Stilwell relating to his command over the Chinese Armies, was that "all 
8the Chinese Armed Forces, air as well as ground," were to be included 
in his command. He also pointed out to Hurley that his' conception of 
arrangements with the Chinese Communists was that they should be purely 
military in nature and limited to the present crisis. 
The 18th Group Army (Reds) will be used. There must be no 
misunderstanding on this point. They can be brought to bear 
where there will be no conflict with Central Government troops, 9 
but they must be accepted as part of the team during the crisis. 
Nothing was exnlicitly stated about the use of the Communist force~ 
10in the two papers presented to Chiang around September 14. But bv this 
time Chiang was well aware of the desires of President Roosevel::., the 
War Department and Stilwell, that the Con~unisl forces be included in 
Stilwell's command. 
Furthermore, the War Deuartment had, a fe'N weeks earlier, told 
Stilwell that it was contemulating giving Lend-lease aid to a Chinese 
11Army that might include Communist as well as Nationalist troops. At 
about the same time that Stilwell received this information, he received 
. 12 
as well, John Stewart Service's report No. 16 from YenaII., in which 
9Ibid ., 429. 

10 '.
Hurley presented to Chiang a draft of Stilwell's order of appoint­
ment and a proposed directive from the Generalissimo to Stilwell. Ibid. 
llIbid., 420. 
l2Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 618. 
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Service suggested that the United States should begin furnishing desper­
ately needed basic military supplies to the Communists. Not only should 
the Communists be supplied, Service' argued, but those supplies 
• • • should be supported by training in the effective use 

of these supplies. It should be planned to lead, as the war 

in China develops into its late stages, to actual tactical 13 

cooperation of Communists with air and other ground forces. 

Earlier, on July 28, Service had informed Stilwell that in a con­
versation with Chou En-lai, the then Communist representative to Chungking 
had said that the Communists would welcome an American Allied Supreme 
Commander such as that which Chu Teh, the Communist commander_in_chief, 
had earlier suggested to an American newsman. Chou had pointed out also 
that the Communists would welcome collaboration with the Nationalists, 
but that this would only occur if there had been a radical change in the 
4Central Government's earlier opposition.1
On September 13, just prior to Sti~well's departure for Kweilin and 
East China where Japanese movements were causing him some worry, he was 
visited by Communist emissaries. According to Romanus and Sunderland's 
Stilwell's Command Problems, 
All that is recorded of the meeting in his diary is that 

Stilwell told them he would go to Yenan, that he would meet 

again with them after he returned from Kweilin, and that 

they were much pleased. In the light of events, this sug­

gests that after Stilwell's position had been settled to the 

mutual satisfaction of the Generalissimo and himself he would 

go to Yenan for the bargaining sessions that would precede 

any exercise of command over Communist forces. 15 

13Ibid ., 619. 
14Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 431. 
l5 Ibid ., 432. 
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While there is no evidence to indicate that Stilwell had proposed 
a political settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang--that, 
after all, was not his responsibility--there is ample evidence that pol­
icy makers in Washington were urging just that. On September 4, Gauss 
reported to the Secretary of State on the Communist problem in China, in­
forming him that Chiang was 
as adamant as, if not more adamant than, before in his 
attitude which is one that no compromise is possible and that 
the only acceptable solution would be capitulation by the Chi-­
nese Communists to the demands and wishes of the Government, 16 
i.e. 	of himself and the present leaders of the national party. 
In response, Hull told Gauss in a September 9, telegram that he and 
the President had taken note of Chiang's suggestions that the Communists 
should be told to settle with the Government, and in view of similar sug­
gestions made to Vice-president Wallace, it appeared that there had been 
" ••. a discouraging lack of progress in Chiang's thinking, in view of 
his own professed desire to reach a settiement with the Communists.,,17 
Hull went on to suggest to Gauss that if he considered the step advisable, 
he could tell Chiang that if he would arrange a meeting with the Commu­
nist representative in Chungking . 
• you will point out to the Communist representative that 
unity in China in prosecuting the war and in preparing for the 
peace is urgently necessary, that a spirit of tolerance and good 
will-of give and take--is essential in achieving such unity; 
that Chinese of every shade of political thinking should cooper­
ate nm" to defeat the Japanese; and that differences can be set­
tled if the maj9r objective of victory is kept in mind. illS 
I 
16 IGauss to Hu~l, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 544. 
l7Hull to Gauss, Jbid., 567. 
I 
l8 Ibid ., 568. 
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Furthermore, Hull informed Gauss, he should tell Chiang that he 
and the President were concerned about the absence of a settlement with 
the Chinese Communists. Chiang should also be informed, Hull indicated, 
that he and the President were not interested in the Chinese Communists 
as such, but that they were anxious on behalf of the United States and 
the United Nations, as well as on the behalf of China, for the Chinese 
people to merge and settle their factional differences by intelligent 
conciliation and cooperation. Their hope, Hull pointed out, was for the 
19
establishment, following the war, of a durable, democratic peace. 
In concluding, Hull instructed Gauss to inform General Stilwell, 
Hurley and Nelson, of the matter, and, if he considered it useful, to 
invite one or more of them to accompany him when he called on Chiang. 
Gauss. so .. informad ba.th Hurley and. Nelson> though the.. tvlo.,did, ..not acc.om-::­
20pany him when he approached Chiang on the matter on September 15. 
President Roosevelt and the Secretary of State, therefore, were 
becoming impatient with Chiang for his recalcitrance on the Communist 
question, as well as over the now obvious fact that the Chinese forces 
under Chiang "Jere doing a poor job of fighting the Japanese. This im­
patience was not relieved when in September General Stilwell's situation 
report of the 15th was relayed to General Marshall who was at Quebec 
where Roosevelt and Churchill were meeting with the Combined Chiefs of 
2lStaff in the OCTAGON Conference. 
Where in the past, particularly at the Washington Conference in 1943 
and the Cairo Conference in December of that year, there had been strong 
19Ibid . 

20Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 573. 

2lRomanus and Sunderland, Stih.;re11 's Command Problems) 439. 
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disagreements bet~l1een the Joint Chiefs and the British Chiefs of Staff 
over the value of committing British resources to a major offensive in 
Burma, now, with evidence of recent defeats over the Japanese along the 
Indo-Burmese border and in north Burma, the British were in the process 
of altering their thinking. On September 1, the British Chiefs of Staff 
had suggested that an operati.on be launched by air and by sea against the 
city of Rangoon. To the Americans this was immediately acceptable as it 
would minimize jungle fi.ghting, would cut the Japanese line of comlIlunica­
tions to Burma, and would be a step toward reopening prewar lines of 
communications from Rangoon north. For the British, such an operation, 
if successful, would offer them the hope for the much-desired advance­
" 22ment tml1'ard S1ngapore. 
It...was, .. ill..this.. at.mQ~he.f\e of relief over a fin"cd compromise on 
Burma that Stihlell's report was placed, a report ""hich told of Chiang 
Kai-shek's desire to withdraw Chinese troops from Burma to be used in 
the defense of Kunroing. This action would, if carried out, end the cam­
paign in Burma and upset completely the Combined Chiefs of Staff's strat­
23 
egy for Burma. On September 16, the problem was formally presented to 
MO 0 0t he CCS, t he PreS1Odent and t he Pr1me 1n1ster. 24 The outcome of the dis­
cussions would be the first step, or perhaps the final step, leading to 
Stilwell's recall from China and the end of Hurley's first duty as the 
President's personal representative to Chiang Kai-shek. 
22Ibido 
23Ibid ., 440. 
24 Ibid . , 441. 
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After reviewing Stilwell's report, Y~rshall presented to Roosevelt, a 
600-word telegram which had been drafted by l"~rshall' s staff at Quebec 
and upon which Marshall had written his endorseIbent. "I recommend that 
you send the proposed attached message to the Generalissimo,,,25 Marshall 
had written, and Roosevelt complied. Because the telegram was perhaps 
the most controversial one ever sent by Roosevelt to Chiang, it is 
quoted here in its full length. 
After reading the last reports on the situation in China my 
Chiefs of Staff and I are convinced that you are faced in the 
near future with the disaster I have feared. The men of your 
"y" forces crossing the Salween have fought with great courage 
and rendered i.nvaluable assistance to the ce.mpaign in North 
Burma. But we feel that unless they are reinforced and St,p­
ported with your every c-3.T'ficlty you cannot expect to reap any 
fruits from their sacrifices, which will be valueless unless 
they go on to assist in opening the Burma Road. Furthermore, 
any pause in your attack across the Sahveen or suggestion of 
wlchtlraua'l is exactly '''hat the Jap hC:t::'~ bee11' striving to cause. 
you to do by his operations in Eastern China. He knows that 
if you continue to attack, cooperating with Mountbatten's com­
ing offensive, the land line to China will be opened in early 
1945 and the continued resistance of China and maintenance of 
your control will be assured. On the other hand, if you do 
not provide Uli'lnpOv7er for your divisions in North Burma and, 
if you fail to send reinforcements to the Salween forces and 
withdraw these armies, we will lose all chance of opening land 
communications with China and immediately je.opardize the air 
route over the hump. For this you must yourself be prepared 
to accept the consequences and assume the personal responsibility. 
I have urged time and again in recent months that you take 
drastic action to resist the disaster which has been moving 
closer to China and to you. Now, when you have not yet placed 
Genera.! Stilwell in command of all forces in China, we are faced 
with the loss of a critical area in east China with possible 
catastrophic consequences. The Japanese capture of Kweilin 
will place the Kunming air terminal under the menace of constant 
air attack, reduce the hump tonnage and possible severing of 
the air route. 
Even though we are rolling the enemy back in defeat allover 
the world this will not. help the situation in China for a con­
siderable time. The advance of our forces across the Pacific 
is swift. But this advance will be too late for China unless 
you act now and vigoro~sly. Only drastic and iwnediate action 
25Tuchman, 492. 
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on your part alone can be in time to preserve the fruits of your 
long years of struggle and the effortl:l we have been able to make 
to support you. Otherwise political and military considerations 
alike are going to be swallowed in military disaster. 
The Prime Minister and I have just decided at Quebec to press 
vigorously the operations to open the land line to China on the 
assumption that you would continue an unremitting attack from 
the Salween side. I am certain that the only things you can now 
do in an attempt to prevent the Jap from achieving his objec­
tives in China is to reinforce your Salween armies immediately 
and press their offensive, while at once placing General Stilwell 
in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am ask­
ing you to take will fortify us.in our decision and in the con­
tinued efforts the United States proposes to ta.ke to maintain and 
increase our aid to you. This we are doing when we are fighting 
two other great campaigns in Europe and across the Pacific. I 
trust that your farsighted vision, which has guided and inspired 
your people in this war, will realize the necessity for iwnediate 
action. In this message I have expressed my thoughts with com­
plete frankness because it appears plainly evident to all of us 
here that all your and our efforts to save China are to be lost 
by further delays.26 
. Although Roosevelt's message to Chiang was very nearly an ultimatum, 
it probably would not have been considered as such by the Generalissimo 
had it not been delivered to him by G:;neral Sti.h:ell. Stilwell had re­
ceived the message on the morning of September 19, and realized its pos­
sible impact on Chiang. Because of the strength of Roosevelt's words, 
Stilwell had doubts as to whether or not he should deliver the message to 
Chiang himself, and sought the council of his chief-of-staff, General 
Hearn. Hearn told Stilwell he did not see how the General could stop a 
message from the President. Stilwell was cognizant of the fact, further­
more, that Roosevelt had ordered in 'Hay, that his messages were to be 
delivered to Chiang by the General. Stilwell was not one to disobey 
orders from the President. He decided, therefore, that he himself must 
27deliver the message. 
26Roosevelt to Chiang, Foreign Relatic:)Us, 194£1, VI, 157. 
27Romanns and Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems, 444. 
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Stihlell went immed:i.ately to Chiang's residence where Hurley was in 
conference with the Generalissimo and other Chinese, including T.V. Soong. 
On the table around which the group was seated, were a draft of Stilwell's 
commission, a draft of his directive, and a draft diagram of command chan­
nels. It was Hurley's opinion that the Generalissimo was about to place 
his. chop on each of the documents, an act which would have placed Stilwell 
28in complete command of the Chinese forces. 
When Stilwell arrived, he called Hurley out of the room and showed 
him Roosevelt's message. Hurley read it and remarked that in effect H 
was an ultimatum. He suggested to Stilwell that the General let him para­
phra.se the message, but Stilwell, after a brief discussion, told Hurley 
that he was under orders to deliver the message himself. ·With this the 
twg..,-moveQ.··baak into the room vlh(H'e Stilwell announce{l that. he-had a mes­
sage for the Generalissitlo from President Roosevelt. He handed the mes­
sage to General Chu Shih-ming to read to Chiang, but Hurley, realizing 
the embarrassment Chiang would suffer if others in the room heard the 
message at the same time., took the note from General Chu and handed the 
Chinese portion to the Generalissimo, saying that it would save time 
if Chiang read it himself. Chiang read the message, stated quietly, "I 
understan,d an c ose t e meetlng." dId h . 29 
Chiang apparently found it difficult to believe that Roosevelt, whom 
he considered to be his close and devoted friend, would have sent such a 
harsh message. He therefore thought, it appears, that Stilwell had drafted 
the message himself, and had sent it to Washington, arranging to have it 
28 Ibid . 
29Ibid ., 445. 
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30
sent back to Chiang as though it had come from the president. vlliat­
ever his thoughts may have been relating to the origins of the telegram, 
his response was one of indignation and bitterness. Shortly after 
reading the telegram, he reportedly called in T.V. Soong and told him 
that Roosevelt's message forced him to cancel his promise to give Stil­
31
well command. 
But negotiations continued, though haltingly, for a few more days, 
and on September 23, Stilwell handed Hurley a new agenda, designed, he 
hoped, to get the talks moving. "I propose that we go to the GMO," wrote 
Stilwell, "and take up the following items for his considerations." 
1. That I be sent to Yenan to make the following proposi-· 

tions to the Reds: 

a. The Reds to acknm,r1edge the suprem~ authority of the GHO, 
and to accept command through'me. 
b. The Red Forces to be employed north of the Yellow River, 

out of contact with the Central Government Troops. 

c. Equipment and ammunition to be furnished five divisions 

with supporting artillery. 

d. Keep these Red Divisions at full strength at all times. 
e. Both the KllT [Kuomintang] and the Reds to drop discussion 
of political matters until the Japanese are beaten. 32 
In spite of Hurley's understanding with President Roosevelt on 
August 24, he " .•• accepted [Stilwell's agenda] with characteristic 
gusto and the remark, tThis will knock the persimmons off the trees!,,33 
30Ibid • , 447. 
31Ibid . 
32 Ibid . , 451. 
33Ibid . , 452. 
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But when Hurley took Stihvell's agenda to Chiang on September 24, 
he learned that Chiang had already arrived at a decision--Stilwell must 
go. Further discussion took place between Hurley and Chiang on this 
matter, but the Generalissimo's decision stood, and on September 25, 
Hurley transmitted to Washington for Chiang an aide-memoire in which the 
Generalissimo informed the Presiden.t that Stilwell would n.o longer be 
acceptable as Field Commander of the Chinese Armies. 34 
With this, Patrick J. Hurley's first assignment ended, and in 
failure. He had not been able to bring about harmony between Stilwell 
end Chiang becaus'e, as he later wrote, the two men were incompatible. 
By all indications, however, Hurley's failure was not really his own, 
but rather was the result of the mis-handling of a very deljcate situa­
tion, by nearly all involved, including the President. In a first draft 
of Chiang's aide-memoire, Chiang had written that his position was being 
35taken because Stilwell had handed him Roosevelt's September 19 message. 
The nature of that message, and the fact that Stilwell had delivered it, 
made Chiang appear to be Stilwell's subordlnate, the Chinese leader wrote. 
With that kind of relationship and "were Stilwell appointed, the Chinese 
Army might mutiny,,,36 Chiang informed the President. Although Hurley con­
vinced Chiang that such a response would be inappropriate, and that the 
first draft should be rewritten without that charge, Hurley did, in his 
own prefacing remarks, make it quite clear that the method of delivery 
had been a cause of Chiang's reaction. 37 
34 Ibid . 
35 Ibid • 
36Ibid • 
· 137 Ib1.0, 
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Had that September 19, message been delivered to Chiang in a dif­
ferent manner and by someone other than Stilwell, it might not have ap­
peared quite so harsh and Chiang might not have been quite so taken aback 
by it. In a September 28, draft message to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Marshall offered an explanation and an apology for the poor handling of 
the Presidentts message: 
• • • The delivery of my message by Stilwell personally was 
a routine procedure which had been in effect for more than a 
year due to difficulties encountered in the past in securing 
prompt deliveries and in at least one instance of some evidence 
that the phrasing of my messages to you had been tampered with. 
You have my apology for the procedure in the present instance 
and I much regret that the transmitting agencies in the War De­
partment did not think to give instructions for the message to 
be presented by General Hurley.38 
Although this message was never sent to Chiang, for whom it was 
originally intended by Marshall, it does point out Marshall's impression 
of what was at least partially, the cause of the final breakdown between 
Stilwell and Chiang. But whatever the reason, President Roosevelt in­
formed Chiang Kai-shek on October 18, 1944, that Stilwell was being re­
called from the China Theatre. 39 
Hurley's role as negotiator had been of little consequence in the 
dispute between Chiang and Stilwell, but the episode has been dealt with 
here to emphasize the fact that in the early period of Hurley's tenure 
in China, he revealed little aversion to using or to arming the Chinese 
Communists, in the \\'ar against Japan. Hurley had stopped in l1oscow on 
his way to Chungking in late August, where he and Nelson had talked with 
38Ibid., 454. 
39Roosevelt to Chiang, Foreign }\elations, 1944, VI, 165. 
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V.M. Molotov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, about the Soviet atti­
tude toward China. Molotov had told the two that some of the people in 
parts of China who were extremely impoverished, half-starved and miser­
able, called themselves Communists. But, Molotov stressed, they had no 
relation whatever to communism. "They were merely expressing their dis­
satisfaction at their economic conditions by calling themselves Communists. 
However, once their economic conditions had improved, they would forget 
this political inclina.tion. ,AO Hurley had apparently believed this alle­
gation, as he came to refer consistently to the Yenan forces of Mao Tse­
tung, as the "so-called Communists,,,4l As late as January, 1945, three 
months after Stilwell's recall, Hurley informed the Secretary of State 
that "The Communists are not in fact Communists, they are striving for 
,,42democratic principles .• 
But his attitude would change toward the "so-called Communists." 
For by mid-February, 1945, less than a month after he had informed the 
Secretary of State that the Cow~unists were not really Communists, his 
view had changed drastically. All the arguments and all the documents 
should indicate, Hurley wrote to the Secretary on February 18, " •.• that 
the Chinese Communist Party is not democratic; that its purpose is to 
destroy the control of government by the Kuomintang.,,43 
40Asreported by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to 
Hull, Ibid., 255. 
4lHurley to Roosevelt and Marshall, Ibid., 154. 
42Hurley to Secretary of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 
211. 
43 Ibid ., 227. 
CHAPTER VI 
HURLEY MEETS THE COMMUNISTS 
On October 5, 1944, President Roosevelt had wired Chiang Kai-shek, 
expressing his surprise that the Generalissimo had reversed himself on 
the decision to give Stilwell command of all Chinese forces. The Pres­
ident had not yet decided to recall Stilwell, only, as he informed Chiang, 
to relieve him of his duties as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo and 
of his responsibilities in connection with Lend-lease matters. Nor 
would the President be willing to suggest another candidate for command 
of the"Chi.nese forces, he infOl'.med Chiang. The g'J':ound situation in 
China had so deteriorated, he ¥-'rote, that he was inclined to feel that 
the United States Government should not assume the responsibility in­
volved in placing an American officer in command of the ground forces 
1throughout China .. 
But Roosevelt was willing, he had informed Chiang, for Hurley to 
continue as his personal representative to the Generalissimo " ••• re­
2garding military affairs in China," and to this offer, Chiang had indi­
cated his appreciation and his hope that Hurley's assignment would be on 
a more permanent and broader basis. Chiang expressed to Roosevelt, his 
desire that Hurley's directive would be broad enough that he could cooper­
ate with the Generalissimo on the many vital questions involving China's 
lRoosevelt to Chiang, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 165. 
2Ibid • 
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relationship with the United States. 
Stating that it was his purpose to increase the Communist troops 
in the regular forces of the National Army, and indicating that this con­
stituted one of the vital ~equisites in China's war effort against Japan, 
Chiang revealed to Roosevelt that he was relying on Hurley for assistance 
in negotiations with the Chinese Communists. 
General Hurley has my complete confidence. Because of his rare 
knowledge of human nature, and his approach to the problem, he 
seems to get on well "rith the Communist leaders. As your person­
al representative, possessing my full confidence, his contribution 
in solving this hitherto insoluble problem would be of the great­
est value to our war effort. 4 
Apparently this undated response to Roosevelt's October 5, messa.ge 
was despatched sometime shortly after October 17, for in it Chiang in­
dicated that Hurley had alrEady begun to confer with the Chinese Communist 
representatives, and the ear1ie.st indicator of Hurley's contact with 
those representatives was his meeting with them on Octuber 17, 1944. 
Chiang had decided in late September that the political situation in 
China required not only changes in his own government, but a liberal 
agreement: with the Communists as well. He had not made this decision 
known publicly, however, for fear that if his intentions became kno~1, 
the Communists might increase their demands upon the Kuomintang for a 
5
sett1ement. In an Embassy c!ocum.;nt dated October 17, therefore, it 
had been suggested that General Hurley hold confidential talks with 
3Chiang to Roosevelt, Ibid., 170. 
SAs reported by Gauss to Hull, Ibid., 595. 
103 

Messrs. Lin Tzu-han and Tung Pi-wu, the t\-lO Communist members of the 
People's Political Council in Chungking, to determine if the Communists 
desired the General's good offices for bringing about a settlement with 
the government. If the Communists should favor Hurley's offer, the mem­
orandum read, he should then submit a draft proposal fo"!, settlement to 
6both the Communist and the Central Government representatives. 
Thus, on October 17, 1944, Patrick J. Hurley, meeting with the 
two Communist representatives, took on a new role. His original in­
structions had not directed him to act as a negotiator between the 
Kuomintang and the Cow~unists, but those instructions were broad enough 
to allow such activity, and Roosevelt did not oppose Chiang's suggestion 
that Hurley should involve himself in such negotiations. On October 23, 
Hu-tiey,in,fc1"med Roosevelt that "wi.th the i:clvi.ce.and conseaL of the. Gissimo 
we are having conferences with the leaders of the Communist Party and the 
7Communist troops." Because there was again, no response to this announce­
ment, from either Roosevelt or the Department of State, it can be assumed 
that Hurley's new role \,Tas acceptable to them. 
Hurley was quite elated follo\-ling his first meetings with the 
Communist representatives on October 17 and 18, learning, as he did, 
6Embassy Memorandum, Ibid., 650. 
7Hurley to Roosevelt, Ibid., 177. According to R.T. Smith, there 
was evidence in the Hurley papers that the General had written to Roose­
velt on October 19, 1944, informing the President that he had entered 
into negotiations with the Communists, a feat which, he wrotf:!, many con­
sidered impossible. This report was optimistic, Hurley claiming he had 
advanced a formula for unification which would put Chiang in unquestionable 
command of all forces in China. Perhaps Hurley decided not to send this 
message, for there appears to be no record of it in the printed diplomatic 
papers. This is all the more apparent in view of Hurley's October 23, mes­
sage, which seems to ce informing the President for the first time, of the 
conferences which were occurring with the Communists. See Smith, "Alone 
in China," 73. 
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that the Communists favored unification of China under a government which 
would allow what they called democratic principles to evolve. For the 
present, the two representatives told Hurley, they were willing, for pur­
poses of fighting the Japanese, to submit to the leadership of Chiang 
Kai-shek. Asking the Communists to put their proposals, in writing, Hurley 
then met with Wang Shih-chieh and Chang Chih-chung, the Kuomintang rep­
S
resentatives, on October 19, to make a similar request. 
But after both sides had submitted their proposals, Hurley found 
little about which he could be excited. The Kuomintang nine-point pro­
posal which came to Hurley on October 21, demanded, for military unifica­
tion, that the Communist forces be formed into twelve units which would 
be placed in the front lines. Under complete control of the Generalissimo, 
th&&lilr,.unitsc w~lld be· tr~ated· in the- snme manner aq othe.r unl ts of the 
Nationalist Army. The Communists would be thrown into the heaviest fight­
ing, without the proper equipment, merely to be destroyed by the Japanese. 
As far as political concessions were concerned, the Kuomintang merely of­
fered the Communists an unspecified role in a government dominated by 
· 9t he Kuoml.ntang. 
The Communist proposals, handed to Hurley on October 23, offered 
little more toward a reasonable compromise than had those submitted by 
the Kuomintang. In addition to the four pledges of the Communist Party 
made on September 22, 1937 and a listing of the "Main Demands" of the 
Communists made during earlier negotiations in June, 1944, the document 
8Ibid,., 74. 
lOS 
which Hurley received presented the "l'resent Political Notions of the 
Chinese Communist Party." 
Because there are so many defects in the policy, structure 
and personnel of the National Government, the Chinese Commu­
nist Party thinks, in order that China may coordinate the 
coming counter-offensive of the Allies to defeat the Japanese, 
the following steps must be taken: 
1. Changes must be quickly made in the policy, structure and 
personnel of the Government. 
2. The Kuomintang must immediately end its one-party rule. 
3. The national government must iwmediately call a national 
Emergency Conference of all the anti-Japanese political par­
ties, armies, local governments and public bodies, to reorganize 
the Government into a coalition gcvernment. 
4. The present military High Command must be reorganized in­
to a joint High Command. lU 
The Communist demands for immediate changes in governmental struc­
ture and philosophy surely must have appeared just. as absurd to the Kuom-­
intang as did the Kuomintang military prC!posals appear to the Couu!!unists. 
The two factions were not even close to any reasonable compromising posi­
tion, a fact which would have appeared impossible to alter to anyone less 
optimistic and confident than Hurley. In spite of the obvious distance 
between the two positions, Hurley wired the President that "the Communist 
. 11
military forces can be united with the National Army." Hurley was de­
termined to bring that unity about. 
Hurley's preconceptions of the "democratic" orientation of both 
the Nationalists and Communists in China were deffionstrated when, on 
November 7, he journeyed to the Communist headquarters at Yenan to 
10Lin Tsu-han and Tung Pi-wu to Hurley, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 
655. 
llIbi'!., 177. 
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confer with Mao and the Conununist military leaders. On October 27, he 
had received a telegram from Davies urging him to go to Yenan from 
where, Davies wrote, the General could " •.• take significant informa­
tion and proposals back to the President vitally affecting the war and 
the future balance of power in Asia and the Pacific.,,12 
At the same time that Hurley received this message from Davies, he 
13 
was in the process of drafting a five-point "Basis for Agreement" to 
present to the Kuomintang, and, as was finally decided, to the Cornnunists 
at Yenan rather than to their representatives in Chungking. On November 
3, Hurley presented his draft to Wang and Chang, and then proceeded to 
make preparations for his trip to Yenan. But just prior to his departure, 
the Kuomintang presented Hurley with a revised draft of his "Basis for 
Ag~atM!!len't," in~vh'ich they propo.soo that the Communists should observe 
and carry out the orders of the Central Government and its National Mil­
itary Council, rather than, as Hurley's draft had read, " ••. acknowledge 
Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Chinese Republic and Generalissimo of 
all the military forces of China.,,14 
This alteration of Hurley's draft was in keeping with the Kuomintang's 
privately announced decision, made through Chiang in September, to make 
. 15 
important military and civilian changes in the Central Government. It 
was no doubt in view of the possibility of such changes, as well as the 
fact that Chiang would surely, someday, step down from his position of 
l2Davies to Hurley, Ibid., 659. 
l3"Basis for Agreement," Ibid. 
l41!Revised Draft by Chinese Government Representatives," Ibid., 666. 
15As reported by Gauss to Hull, Jbid., 595. 
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rule, that the Kuomintang draft established the Central Government as 
the ultimate source of authority rather than placing that authority in 
one individual. 
To Hurley neither the reasons for such a change nor the change it­
self were of much c.oncern. More important to him was the fact that with 
the exception of this one slight change, the Kuomintang had accepted his 
basis for an agreement, providing him with something concrete to present 
to the Communists when he journeyed to Yenan. 
On November 7, Hurley wired the President, informing Roosevelt that 
he was about to depart for Communist tf'.rritory. His intent, Hurley wrote, 
would be to confer with the political leaders of the "so-called Communist 
Party," and with the military leaders of the Communist troops. "This will 
be," Hurley iltd±cated, "a short" preliminary survey for the:· purpose of 
finding a basis of agree:t:lent between the National Government and the Com­
munist Party for the unification of all military forces in China."l6 
Meanwhile, as Hurley was making his preparations, John Patton 
DaVles, W 0 a gone to t e ommunlst aplta a ew wee sear ler, was · h h d h C . C . 1 f k I' 17 
busily writing memoranda on his observations of the Communist leaders. 
Although there is no indication of who received Davies' reports other 
than Stilwell's headquarters, where all such material was sent from 
Yenan, his perceptions are worthy of examination as indicators of the 
strength of the Communists' negotiating position just prior to Hurley's 
arrival. 
16Hurley to Roosevelt, Ibid., 666. 

17
As reported by Gauss to Hull) Ib}A., 663. 
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Davies wrote three repo~ts on November 7, the first of which he en­
titled tithe Chinese Coomunists and the Great Powers. tll8 In his opinion, 
the Communists were at that time, confident of their own strength and no 
. 
longer felt that their survival or extinction depended upon foreign aid 
or foreign attack. They differed in that respect from the Nationalists 
and Chiang, realizing, however, that acceleration toward their ultimate 
goals could be affected drastically by actions which might or might not 
be taken by the powers. 
Although the Communists were uncommunicative about Soviet ass is­
tance it was Davies' opinion that if the Soviets were to offer aid, the 
Communists .,ould gladly accept it. They hac! no fear of Soviet dominance 
over them as a result of possible Russian movement through Manchuria and 
Horttt'Cltina when the Soviets entered the Pacific war. The Conununists 
maintained that the Soviet Government had no expansionist intentions 
toward China, Davies reported, believing as they did, that even Outer 
Moneolia would be absorbed after the war, into the Chinese federation. 
Britain, however, was believed to be playing its old imperial game 
of dividing China into spheres of influence. The Communists suspected 
an Anglo-American deal which would give the British a free hand west of 
the Philippines and Formosa. They feared, furthermore, that a marriage 
of convenience would transpire between the British and Chiang, whereby 
Chiang would gain British support in exchange for special concessions 
in South China. Such a relationship would not harm the Communists per 
se, it was felt, but a side effect of such a relationship would be 
greater freedom for Chiang to wage war against the Communists making 
18Ibid ., 667. 
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civil war that much more costly for the northern faction. For that 
reason, Davies wrote, the Communists were highly suspicious of the 
British. 
The United States, Davies contended, was" • the greatest'hope 
and the greatest fear of the Chj.nese Communists. ,,19 They realized, he 
said, that if the United States was to provide them with aid equal to 
that being supplied Chiang, they would quickly establish control over 
most if not all, of China, and more likely than not, without civil war. 
Most of Chiang's bureaucrats were opportunists, the Communists believed, 
and would desert to the North if it appeared the Communists were gaining 
the upper hand over the Central Government. 
The United States was the greatest fear of the Communists, howe.ver, 
becaus1!~.... the more aid given tu Chia.."<S,as opposed. to an.. equaLdisrribu­
tion between the two factions; the more able Chiang would be to wage war 
against the Communists. If that were to occur, Davies indicated, uni­
fication of China would simply take longer and be more costly to the 
Communists. According to a reading of Davies report, although he did 
not explicitly make the point, the Communists appear to have been quite 
confident that they would eventually win the struggle. 
In conclusion, Davies wrote: 
So "the Chinese Communists watch us with mixed feelings. If 
we continue to reject them and support an unreconstructed Chiang, 
they see us becoming their enemy. But they would prefer to be 
friends. Not only because of the help we can give them but also 
because they recognize that our strategic aims of a strong, in­
dependent and democratic China can jibe with their nationalist 
objectives. 20 
• 
19Ibid ., 668. 
20Ibid ., 669. 
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In his second memorandum, Davies questioned the degree to which the 
Chfn~se Communists were really Communists. liThe Chinese Communists are 
backsliders, ,,21 he began. They s till acclaimed the i.nfa1libility of 
. 
Marxian dogma and called themselves Communists, but" • they have be­
come indulgent of human frailty and confess that China's corr~unist sa1­
vation can be attained only through prolonged evolutionary rather than 
d · ,,22ut10nary converS10n. several 
the moderation of the Communists, Davies suggested. First, they were 
Chinese, and being so they were inc1ine~ in spite of their early excesses, 
toward compromise and harmony in their human relationships. Secondly, 
they were realists. They recognized that 90% of the Chinese masses were 
peasants and that they stil1 lived in semi-feudaliflIl1.Not until China 
had developed through several generations would it be ready for Communism. 
The immediate program, they believed, according to Davies, fl ••• must 
therefore be elementary agrarian reform and the introduction of political 
democracy."23 
Furthermore. Davies pointed out, the Chinese in Yenan were more 
nationalist than Communist. Their primary emotional and intellectual 
emphasis had shifted after seven years of fighting from internal revo­
lution to nationalism. And now that the Communists were beginning to 
come into power, Davies added, they were, as had many revolutionary 
i mme 1ate revol' . There were reasons for 
2lIbid . 
23Ibid ., 670. 
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, groups before them, moderating and becoming sobered by their realization 
'b'l't 24o f respons1 1 1 y. 
In his third memorandum, Davies asked rhetorically, "Will the Com­
mUI1.fsts... Take Over Ch.fna?,,25 H"1S anS\ler an . 1 es. "The
. ... was unequ1lToca, Y 
26Communists are. in China to stay," he wrote. China's destiny was not 
Chiang's but the Communists'. The Communists were so strong between the 
Great Wall and the Yangtze River, he contended, they could look forward 
to the postwar control of at least North China. The chances were good 
that they would also control many areas in Central and South China, 
though not through the use of force, he implied. "The COll1Illunists have 
fallen heir to these new areas by a process which has been operating for 
seve.n years, Yihereby Chiang Kai-shek loses his cities and principal lines 
of communication to the Japanese and the co:mtryside to the Conununh;ts. ,,27 
Chiang could crush the Conununist mOlTement only if he were able to enlist 
foreign aid and intervention on a scale equal to the Japanese invasion of 
China. More likely than not, Chiang \vould plunge China into civil \lar, 
but he would not succeed, Davies argued, " ... where the Japanese in 
more than seven years of determined striving have failed. The Communif;ts 
are 2.lready. too strong for him, ,,28 Davies concluded. 
24 Ibid . 
25Ibi~. , 671. 
26 Ibid . 
27 Ibid. , 670. 
28 Ibic!. , 671. 
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Davies undoubtedly prepared these reports in anticipation of Hurley's 
arrival. Normal procedure would surely require the Foreign Service offi­
cer on location to advise an arriving political negotiator on political 
conditions in the area, as well as the position of strength or weakness, 
from which the party to the negotiations was bargaining. It appears quite 
clear that Davies saw the Communists in a vc.ry strong bargaining position. 
It \laS his job to relay this impression to General Hurley upon his arrival 
on November 7, 1944. 
The story of Hurley's arrival at the Communist Capital is a color­
ful one, and has best been recorded by the then Co~~ander of the Dixie 
Mission, Colonel Barrett. 
The arrival of the plane from Chungking was always a big event 
in Yenan, and on the afternoon of the 7th of November, Chou En­
1 a:L,aruL J wcre_ among a lRr8~ crowd of Chinese and Americans on 
hand to greet it. After H had landed and the doors opened, 
there appeared at the top of the steps, a tall, gray haired, 
soldierly, extremely handsome man, wearing one of the most be~u·­
tifully tailored uniforms I have ever seen, and with enough rli..b­
bons on his chest to represent every \var, so it seemed to me, in 
whi.ch the United States had ever engaged except possibly Shay's 
Rebellion. It was Major General Patrick J. Hurley, •• ,29 
The exact date of Hurley's arrival had apparently not been announced 
in Yenan, for neither Barrett, nor the Chinese officials were prepared to 
find the General aboard this particular Yenan flight. Barrett was asked 
to hold Rurley there until Mao could be summoned, and shortly, the high 
Communist official arrived in the only piece of motorized equipment that 
the Communists owned, an old broken-down truck with a covered cab, which 
looked as if it should not have made it even to the landing strip. Fol­
lowing the truck, came a company of infantry, hastily mustered at a nearby 
barracks. The entourage was a humorous sight to behold, claimed Barrett, 
29Barrett, 56. 
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as it quickly lined up in guard-of-honor formation to be reviewed by the 
arriving dignitary. But even more humorous, Barrett recounted, was Hur­
ley's review of the Communist formation. 
After the General had returned the salute of the officer cOIT~and­
ing the company, he drew himself to his full impressive height, 
swelled up like a poisoned pup, and let out an Indian warwhoop. 
I shall never forget the expressions on the faces of Hao and Chou 
at this totally unexpected behavior on the part of the distin­
guished visitor. 30 
Following this display, one which the Russians had experienced as 
31
well, when Hurley was visiting the Soviet front earlier in the war, Mao 
and the General boarded the and.ent truck and with Barrett along as an 
interpreter, moved tmvard their quarters in Yenan. Barrett's remembrance 
of this journey is equally as entertaining as his report of Hurley's mil­
itary revie~v. 
This [interpreting] was a task of some difficulty, due to the 
saltiness of the General's remarks, and the unusual language in 
which he expressed himself. His discourse, in addition, was by 
no moans connected by a.ny readily discernible pattern of thought. 
Seeing country people on the road would remind him of anecdotes-­
which probably meant nothing to Mao--about old friends back in 
Oklahoma. One old farmer having trouble with a balky mule which 
had been frightened by our truck elicited a yell from the General, 
"Hit him on the other side, Charley!" These and other spontaneous 
remarks required quick thinking and free translation on my part 
in order to give the chairman and Chou En-lai some faint idea of 
what the talk was all about. 32 
Barrett was, on the other hand, impressed by General Hurley's skill 
as a negotiator, once the official meetings opened on November 8. Hurley, 
Barrett pointed out, was quite cautious and leaned over backward to be fair 
30Ibid . 
31Lohbeck, 179. 
32Barrett, 57. 
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to both the National Government and the Communists. He emphasized that 
the American interest was only in accomplishing the filial defeat of Japan as 
opposed to interference in the internal affairs of China. 
Hurley quickly presented Hao \vith a copy of what Barrett assumed to 
have been the "Revised Draft" of Hurley's "Basis for Agreement." After 
reading the draft handed him by Hurley, }lao asked the General whose ideas 
the five points of the document represented. Hurley replied that they 
represented his ideas, but that they had been worked on by the Generalis­
simo and some of his advisors as well. In Barrett IS opinion, and, as he 
told Hurley at the time, Mao actually wanted to know if the Generalissi.mo 
had agreed to all the points, a question which Barrett felt was under­
standable as the points presented to Mao were not at all in· keeping with 
the-usual vmy :i.rrwhicb· Chiang· c-xpres-sedhimselC. lJtl"rl-sY'·indac.tl.ted that 
the Generalissimo had agreed to the points. 33 
This first meeting was more for formalities, and little was ac­
complished beyond casual introductions and the presentation of the Kuom­
intang-revised draft. That afternoon, however, the group met once again, 
and this time became involved in more substantive issues. Mao opened 
the discussion with a long tirade against the National Government, claim­
ing it was Chiang's intransigence and corruption which blocked all ef­
forts by more reasonable Chinese to unify the country and fight the Jap­
anese. Defending the National Government, Chiang, and the Kuomintang, 
Hurley was met with the response that what Hao had said about Chiang 
331bi~., 58. Barrett did not see the actual document which Hurley 
gave to Mao, but based his judgment on his recollection of the wording 
as read to Hao, compared to the two documents printed in Foreign Relations, 
]944, VI, 569 and 666. 
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Kai-shek and the Kuomintang had already been said by President Roosevelt, 
Winston Churchill, Doctor Sun Fo, and Madame Sun Yat-sen. These people 
were not enemies of China, Mao indicated, bringing Hurley to task for 
the suggestion he had made that Mao's criticisms had sounded like the 
words of China's enemies. 
Hurley rallied to this challenge, and in Barrett's opinion, showed 
considerable skill as a negotiator, by simply telling Mao that he had ap­
parently misunderstood the Communist leaders remarks, and admitted that 
there was some corruption in the Chinese Nationalist Government. He then 
quickly took another tack, ack."lowledged the-sincerity of Mao's desires 
for a peaceful and united China, and turned to the Kuomintang's proposals 
as evidence of Chiang's sincere de.sire for a settlement with the C01l".ll1unists. 
Matt, however:> was not sw.::.y t!d by the NaL:rufral·· GO\"'et"11ntent.t-s so--called 
"Sincerity," for as Barrett related, Mao simply "pooh-poohed" the Nation­
alist's offer of a seat for the Communists on the National Military Coun­
cil. It meant nothing, Mao indicated, and to Hurley's suggestion that 
this would at least be a foot in the door, Mao pointed out that a foot 
in the door meant nothing if one's hands were tied behind one's back. 
Many members of that Council were denied knowledge of its action, Mao 
charged and furthermore, the body had not even met for some time. 
With this, Hurley wisely suggested that if the Communists did not 
consider the Kuomintang's terms fair enough, they should offer their mm 
terms for joining in a coalition with the National Government. This the 
Conw~unists agreed to do if given time to prepare svch terms. The meeting 
ended, thereupon) to convene once more on the following afternoon, when 
the Communists would be prepared to pre:sent their terms. 34 
34Barret ..'-, 58-·61. 
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When the group met aBain on the afternoon of November 9, Mao handed 
Hurley the Co~~unist proposals. Barrett did not read the document re­
ceived by Hurley but recalled that Hurley had read it and had stated that 
the proposals appeared to be entirely fair, but did not go far enough. 
Hurley then said, according to Barrettts account, "if Chairman Mao has no 
objections 1. would like to study them carefully and make some suggestions 
35
which I shall present tomorrow morning." According to Barrett, the Com­
munists seemed surprised that Hurley wished to broaden the scope of their 
proposals, but did not object. The meeting was adjourned then, and Hur­
ley departed for his quarters to work on the Communists' proposals. 
It is unfortunate that there was no official transcript made of 
the negotiations, other than a recording of the events by Hurley's per-· 
sonal.· sQIi;'l"etaxy; a Sergean.t: Smith, tvni-eh conflicts dra.g.,tical1y with Bax­
rettts account of the events. 36 According to Barrett, the documell~ which 
Hurley returned to Mao on the morning of November 10, evidenced very 
clearly Hurley's ideological contributions. Point two of the five-point 
35Ibid ., 62. 
36Ibid., 36. It is of significant interest that in the report 
written by Hurley
' 
s personal secretary, and printed in Foreign Relat~ons, 
1944, VI, 674, there was no mention of this action taken by Hurley. Bar­
rett made note of this fact and wrote that "It is my distinct recollection 
• • • that after the General had said he found the terms fair but not 
broad enough, he took them back to his quarters and worked them over, and 
did not offer his suggested modifications until the final meeting on the 
morning of 10th of November. 1I Barrett, 62. Sergeant Smith's report of 
the negotiations indicated that all revision took place on the afternoon 
of November 8. But there is no mention by Smith, of Hurley's alleged 
re-writing of the Communist proposals. The evidence tends to support 
Barrett's account, as a reading of Smith's report indicates that the 
negotiations had to have consumed more than a period of one day. Fur­
thermore, the final draft of the Co~~unist proposal was in fact, signed 
on November 10, 1944, yet Smith indicated that the final draft was at­
tached to his November 8, report. Because the entourage left Yenan on 
November 10, a further question arises over what occurred on November 9, 
and why Smith left that day out of his report. 
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proposal had called for the reorganization of the National Government into 
a Coalition National Government which would embrace all anti-Japanese par­
ties and non-partisan political bodies. Then, in point three, the Com­
munists proposed that "the Coalition National Government will support the 
principles of Sun Yat-sen for the establishment in China of a government 
of the people, for the people and by the people.,,37 This terminology had 
also been placed in the draft basis for agreement presented by Hurley to 
the Kuomintang and the Communists, and related to the political philosophy 
articulated by Sun so many years earlier. But in addition, point three 
stated that 
The Coalition National Government will pursue policies designed 
to promote progress and democracy and to establish justice, free­
dom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, free-­
dom of assembly and association, the right to petition the govern­
ment for the redress of grievances, the right ot writ of Habeas 
Corpus and the right of residence. The Coalition National Govern­
ment will also pursue policies intended to make effective those 
two rights defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want. 38 
It appears that at least one member of the negotiating party was 
well-versed in the provisions of the American Bill of Rights. It is 
doubtful that the above terminology was placed in the proposal by the 
Chinese. As Barrett has written: 
The fine Italian hand of General Hurley in the above terms 
is clearly apparent. If the Cowmunists present at the meeting 
had never before heard of the Bill of Rights in the Constitu­
tion of the United States, they had a good opportunity to learn 
about them on this occasion. 39 
The Chinese do not traditionally show their feelings on their faces, 
37Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 687. 
38Ibid ., 688. 
39Barrett, 63. 
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Barrett pointed out, but on this occasion it was quite evident from their 
expressions that they were extremely pleased with the document presented 
them by Hurley. They had eVery right to believe that Hurley had taken 
the document to reduce their proposals to fit those of the Kuomintang. 
But he had come back with all they had offered and more--including every 
right guaranteed Americans under the first ten Amendments of the United 
40States Constitution. 
According to Barrett's account, Hurley's presentation on th.:= morn­
ing of November 10, was followed by a "love feast" with everyone in a 
very happy mood. Both events lasting far past the lunch hour, that meal 
was bypassed and sometime after noon the group departed for the landir.g 
strip for the return flight to Yenan. But as they ,.,ere about to leave 
the-'seen."'of the meeting,. Bar.rett: recounted, Hurley turnnd to f.faoh and 
suggested that the two of them sign the document just agreed upon, to 
indicate that they both considered the terms fair and just. Mao agreed, 
and just as they were about to place their signatures (Mao signed the 
copies rather than placing his chop upon them), Hurley said to Mao, "Chair­
man Mao, you of course understand that although I consider these fair 
terms, I cannot guarantee the Generalissimo will accept them. tAl Hurley 
was obviously trying to point out to Mao that the documents being signed 
were not final agreements. Unfortunately, it would be Hurley who would 
forget this fact in later months, and charge the Communists with a breach 
of faith for not standing behind what they had solemnly agreed to at Yenan 
on November 10, 1944. 
40lbid . 
4l}bid., 64. 
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As Hurley left Yenan to return to Chungking, his confidence in him­
self, to the extent that he believed he had made giant strides toward af­
fecting a settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang, had been 
greatly bolstered. And he now believed even more that he vas dealing 
with two political factions each with democratic motives, and each willing 
to compete democratically for a voice in the ruling of the country. 
But when Hurley reached the National wartime Capital, his confidence 
ebbed somewhat. Driving straight to his villa, he met with T.V. Soong, 
the Kuomintang Foreign Minister, who looked at the Communist proposals, 
and informed Hurley that the agreement was little more than a "bill of 
goods." Greatly disappointed at Soong's immediate rejection, Hurley, al­
ready suffering from a cold contracted in the north, went to bed where he 
stayed for the better part or a wlilek, reeeiving nQ.vi.s.it.ors. and nut.. re­
turning to his work until Nov~.mber 16. 42 
When he did finally return to his desk, he found waiting. for him, a 
Kuomintang counter-draft prepared and delivered by Dr. Wang and General 
Chang on November 15. This counter-draft was couched in similar terms 
as that handed Hurley on November 7, but now called for the total sub-
o. f h C . f h 1 f h K' 43m~ss~cn 0 t e ommun~st orces to t e ru cot e uom~ntang. The 
two factions were still separated by a considerable distance, therefore, 
neither really wanting a coalition government which would give the other 
the chance of surviving as a permanent political force in China. 
But Hurley had not given up hope, and was still confident that he 
could eventually bring the two together, as he continued to promote 
42Smith, "Alone in China," 89. 
43Foreigp Relations, 1944, VI, 697. 
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negotiations between the Kuomintang and Chou En-lai, the latter having 
flown with Hurley to Chungking for just that purpose. But at the same 
time, Hurley was facing other obstacles which would soon, in his mind at 
least, become major impedi~ents to a successful settlement of the Chinese 
problem. 
CHAPTER VII 
TOWARD ALIENATION A!ID ISOLATION 
In a memorandum dated November 14, but apparently not sent until 
1
sometime after November 16, John Patton Davies reported on conversa­
tions between him and Hurley in which Hurley had evidenced "guarded op­
timism" over the negotiations which had begun between the Kuomintang 
I 
representatives and Chou En-1ai. But in additt,on to Hurley's optimism, 
I 
there was det'ected by Da,vies, a degree of sl<:epticism and distrust in 
Hurley's view of other personnel around him" HUI1ey had indicated to 
Da¥1r&&that any bi-eekdown, in the, negotiatiolts,wus-m@xeap.t: to..,.be the.. 
fault of the Government than of tIle Communists. He believed that the 
I 
Generalissimo was willing to reach an agreel)lent with the Communists but 
I 
that Chiangts wishes were being sabotaged by the Nationalist leader's 
I 
subordinates. Hurley claimed he was being ~old one thing by Chiang and 
another by the men surrounding the Genera1hfsimo. Furthermore, Hurley 
revealed to Davies, he had had a conversatiqn with Sir Horace Seymour, 
the British Ambassador to China, and Sir HOllace had attempted to convince 
I 
the General of the desirability of China remaining divided, and to dis-
I 
suade Hurley from working to bring the Gove~nment and the Communists to­
gether. 
1Davies Memorandum, "Conversation With Major General Hurley," For­
eign Relations, 194t~, VI, 692. Davies indicated that Hurley had seen the 
Kuomintang counter-draft to the Communist draft agreement brougllt back 
from Yenen. Hurley did not see this draft until November 16. Therefore, 
Davies must have started his memorandum on November 14, but not finished 
it until after November 16. 
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Davies apparently felt it wise to follow up on Hurley's contention, 
and on November 17, lunched with Mr. John Keswick, Counselor of the Brit­
2ish Embassy. From their conversat~on, Davies gathered that the British 
had little concern about the expansion of the Chinese Communists, taking 
that expansion for granted. Keswick pointed out that Chiang had proven 
himself in the past to be a wily, hard-headed politician, and that if he 
had not become inflexible and if he was still provided with accurate 1n­
formation, he might succeed in unifying China. Keswick was doubtful, 
however, that this was still the case. He felt that if a coalition were 
formed and the National Government reformed, " • •• many 'rice bowls would 
be broken,"3.meaning, according to Davies' interpretation of the remark, 
that many of Chiang's closest advisors were opposed to a coalition which 
w'o.uld. include the Communists. Keswick's overall attitl1de, Davies observed, 
was one of slightly perplexed resignation. 
I asked him what British policy wa.s. Keswick replied that it 

was to stay out of involvement in the present Chinese political 

scene. He said that the British felt that there was nothing 

they could do at this stage to help the situat:Lon; that they 

proposed to wait and see. 4 

Keswick's remarks to Davies were not quite in keeping with the atti­
tude Hurley claimed to have detected from Sir Horace, though, understandably, 
Keswick may not have been at liberty to express such to Davies at the time. 
Sometime around December 4, however, Hurley became cognizant of a report 
of an interview held by a Bri.tish Colonel '-lith a Kuomintang General in 
which the Chinese General had allegedly said that it was a mistake to 
2Davies Memorandum, "British Views on the China Situation," Ibid., 
JOO. 
3 Ibid ., 701. 

4Ibid . 
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attempt to unite the Kuomintang and the Communists. Hurley had called in 
the Chinese General to question him about the statement, and was met with 
a denial, the General claiming that'he had never made such a statement. 
Hurley, now believing the British were engaged in a conspiracy to 
frustrate his attempts at unification, called in Sir Horace, to whom he 
branded the report false and charged that it had been intended to in­
fluence the A.'1lerican Foreign Service officers against unification. The 
British Ambassador was reportedly bewildered by this attack, but never­
5theless, told Hurley that he would withdraw the report. 
Hurleyts charge that there was an attempt being made to influence 
Foreign Servi'ce officers, must surely have stemmed from several reports 
which had come to the Generalts attention at about the same time he was 
experiencing his first set-backs in the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations·. 
On November 15, Davies had submitted a memorandum entitled, "Amer­
ican Chinese Relations During the Next six Months,,,6 in which he urged 
that Chiang Kai-shek not be abandoned, but at the same time, that the 
United States be realistic, and exercise caution in supporting a bankrupt 
regime. Pointing out that the Russians might soon enter the Pacific war, 
Davies wrote that ".•• we must make a determined effort to capture po­
litically the Chinese Communists rather than allow them to go by default 
wholly to the Russians. 1I7 
A coalition government would be most desirable, Davies suggested, 
and pointed out that Hurley was negotiating with both factions to that 
5Smith, "Alone in China,lt 103. 
Relations, 1944, VI, 695. 
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end. But if that proved impossible, then the United States must deter­
mine \"hich side it would support. Meanwhile, there was little time to 
spare, Davies urged. "W'nile being careful to preserve the Generalis­
simo's 'face', we should without delay begin to expand our limited 
8
representation and activities at Yenan." Then, he wrote, if a coali­
tion government was established, the United States could immediately 
launch large scale operations against the Japanese in the Communist con­
trolled areas. If negotiations broke down, however, there would still 
be well-established relations with a Communist regime that would, in all 
likelihood, inherit Nm~th Chi na and Manchuria. 
The greatest danger, as Davies Sa\l it, was in the United States' 
being pla.ced in .'.'\ disadvantageous middle position, bet\.[cen "the British, 
undercutting us with Chiang, the Russians undercutting us with the COln­
munists, and we ... impotent with indecision.,,9 
Davies concluded his memorandum \"ith seven points which the United 
States, he wrote, should keep in mind as basic considerations. The 
seventh indicated his strong feelings about the whole political situation 
in China, and his pessimism toward the negotiations then going on between 
the two factions: 
. • still presupposing a collapse of the current negotia­
tions, should we reject the Communists and continue to back 
Chiang we shall be committed to a regime dependent upon Anglo­
American support for its truncated existence, a regime of 
slight use to us in our final attack on Japan.lO 
lOIbid., 697. 
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In addition to Davies' rather negative views on the possibility of 
a successful outcome of the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations, Rurley 
had become aware of the views of John Stewart Service, who, when Hurley 
was in Yenan, had been in Washington conferring with policy makers. On 
October 10, 1944, Service had submitted his report No. 40 from Yenan, but 
11the report had not reached the Embassy until November 9. Hurley undoubt­
edly saw it for the first time when he returned from Yenan on November 10. 
In submitting this report, Service indicated that in the past he 
had been allowed to express his opinions based on observations in Yenan, 
with perfect frankness and that he trusted he would be permitted the con­
tinued frankness which was evidenced in his attached report--a report in 
which he would advocate a stronger American policy toward Chiang Kai-shek 
and the Central Gaverr...men t . 
Service began his report by pointing out that the United States' 
dealings with Chiang Kai-shek conti-nued to be on the basis of an unreal-
is tic assumption that he was necessary to the cause. It was time, Ser­
vice suggested, that the United States, for the sake of the war and her 
interests in China, take a more realistic line. The Kuomintang was bank­
rupt, he contended, and with that party's failure, ~issatisfaction was 
rapidly growing in China. The Kuomintang was dependent upon American 
support for its survival, but the reverse was not the case--the United 
States was not dependent upon the Kuomintang. 
Service then went on to expand upon five areas in which the United 
States was not dependent upon Chiang's government or his party. "We do 
1lJohn Stewart Service, Report No. 40, "The Need For Greater Realism 
in Our Relations witi:l Chiang Kai-shek," Ibid., 707. 
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· f '1' . ,,12 h h' dnot need 1t or m1 1t~!X reaspn~, e emp aS1ze • The National Army was 
not, nor was it capable of, fighting an effective· offensive against the 
Japanese. Eut because of the sentiment of the people, the National govern­
ment could not refuse to allow American forces to fight the Japanese on 
Chinese territory, Service contended, implYlllg that the United States 
should perhaps, launch its own offensive despite the objections which 
might arise from the Central Government over large numbers of American 
troops on Chinese soil. 
Nor did we need to fear Kuomintang surrender or opposition, Service 
claimed. The Party and its leader, the Generalissimo, would stick by the 
United States because victory was certain and the United States was their 
only hope for conti.nued power. United States support of the Kuomintang, 
n ••• only encourage it to continue so~ing the seeds of future civil war 
by plotting with the present puppets for eventual consolidation of the 
occupied territories against the Communist-led forces of popular resis­
13tance." 
Collapse of the Kuomintang Government need not be feared, he con­
tinued, because all the other groups in China wished to mobilize to fight 
the Japanese. Any new government would be more cooperative and better 
able to mobilize the country. By continued support of the Kuomintang 
government, Service contended, the United States.was tending toward pre­
vention of the reforms and democratic reorganization of the government 
which were essential for the revitalization of China's war effort. With 
l2 Ibid ., 708. 

l3Ibid ., 709. 
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United States support the Nationalists would continue on their present 
course, becoming more corrupt and more impotent, and the other factions, 
particularly the Communists~ would eventually be forced to protect their 
interests by more direct opposition to the Central Government. 
Furthermore, Service noted, the United States did not need to sup­
port the Kuomintang for international political reasons. The day when 
China was to be considered one of the "Big Four" had come to an end, he 
argued. The United States could no longer hope that China, under the 
Kuomintang a.s it then stood, could be an effective balance to Soviet 
Russia, Japan, oJ.' the British Empire in the Far East. On the contrary, 
Service added, the perpetuation in power of the present Kuomin-II 
tang can only mean a weak and dis'united China--a sure cause of interna­
tional involvelnents in the Far East. ,,14 
Finally, Service contended, the United States need not support 
Chiang in the belief that he represented pro-American or pro-democratic 
groups. All the people and all other political groups in China were 
friendly to the United States, he argued, and they looked to the United 
States for their salvation, both then and after the war. Furthermore, the 
party ideology at that time, as evidenced in books written by Chiang 
himself, was fundamentally anti-foreign and anti-democratic, both po­
litically and economically. 
In conclusion, Service pointed out that American policy toward 
China should be guided by two facts. First, the United States could not 
hope to successfully deal with Chiang without being hard-boiled. Second, 
the United States could not hope-to solve the problems in China without 
14 :
Ibid., 710. 
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considering the opposition forces there--Communist, provincial, and 
liberal. 
As had others before him, Service drew the parallel between the 
Communist influence in China and the situation in Yugoslavia. The United 
States should not seek to solve the problems in China by talking only to 
the Kuomintang officials in Chungki.ng as the British had tried to do in 
Yugoslavia, through Mikhailovitch and King Peter's government, and by 
ignoring Tito. 
Reiterating his contention that the United States should not fear 
the collapse of the Kuomintang government, Service held that it might 
very well collapse, 
• but :H will not be the collapse of China's resistance. 
There may be a period of some confusion, but the eventual gains 
o£...tha..K\}QIH-in.tang1 s .collapse.will more thaa ,m~. up ,for this. 
The crisis itself makes reform more urgent--and at the same 
time increases the weight of our influe.nce. The crisis is the 
time to push--not to relax. 15 
These reports were crossing Hurley's desk at the same time that he 
was experiencing set-backs in his attempts to negotiate a settlement be­
tween the Communists and the Kuomintang. The proposal which he had 
brought back from Yenan--a proposal which he thought was fair and rea­
sonable--had been rejected out of hand, by the Kuomintang. This must 
surely have been a personal defeat for Hurley, if in fact, as the evidence 
seems to show, he did have a considerable influence on the wording of the 
Communist proposal. But other events were occurring which, when combined 
with a generally negative attitude expressed by Foreign Service personnel, 
were beginning to lead Hurley to believe that his attempts were being 
undermined by those around him. 
15 lbid • 
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Shortly after Stilwell's recall, Ambassador Gauss had resigned, and 
on November 17, President Roosevelt indicated to Hur1ey!hat he would like 
to appoint the General to the position of Ambassador. Apparently the 
President was of the opinion that Hurley was by then familiar with the 
situation in China, and as capable as anyone of assuming Ambassadorial 
responsibilities. But though Hurley commanded the respect of the President, 
he was not highly respected by the men who would work under him--men who 
had held Stilwell and Gauss in esteem and who saw Hurley as lacking in the 
professional military and diplomatic expertise of his predecessor. These 
men saw Hurley, furthermore, to have been to a degree, responsible for 
Stilwell's recall and Gauss' subsequent resignation. They were of the 
opinion that Gauss had resigned in protest to Stilwell's recall--an op­
16 in.:LQn...W'~.,hel.din_W~shingt,on as. ~\"ell. 
From the moment of Hurley's arrival in Chungking, he had witnessed 
a display of pessimism on the part of nearly all those with whom he came 
in contact, toward the possibilities of uniting the Chinese. Gauss had, 
from the beginning, been quite skeptical of the probability cif successful 
negot1at1ons h 1S k'., between t e two compet1ng' f act1ons,' 17 and h' s ept1cism had 
been shared by others such as Davies and Service. Initially, however, 
Hurley had shrugged off the pessimism and had moved ahead with confidence. 
But shortly after he had been confirmed as Ambassador, the person­
ality conflict became very pronounced over an incident which was a severe 
affront to the man who had displayed no lack of pride in the past. Prior 
to his appointment and confirmation as Ambassador, Hurley had maintained 
l6Smith, "Alone in China,1I 122. 
17Ibid • 
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quarters provided by the Army. But once he assumed his Ambassadorial 
position, he thought it only fitting that he reside in the Ambassador's 
residence. Upon investigation, however, Hurley discovered that after 
Gauss' departure a number of Foreign Service officers had occupied the 
house, and that the Ambassador's bed had been comandeered by George 
Atcheson, the senior officer in the Embassy. 
Hurley immediately demanded that the house be vacated, including 
the bed, but Atcheson claimed that the men had a right to live there 
and that the bed had been Gauss' personal property. Gauss had turned 
the bed over to him as a gift, Atcheson clair.led, and advised Hurley to 
maintain his Army residence. Hurley then ordered the men out of the 
residence, but met with initial resistance. Eventually the house was 
vm:at-ed 'and Hurley moved. in, though it has never been learned "lho kept 
the bed. Nevertheless, the incident did not rest well with Hurley, and 
did not make his relations with the Foreign Service personnel any 
smoother. A t he Genera1 never orgot t he · idpparent1y, f ~nc ent. 18 
To compound these clashes of personality, there soon occurred a 
drastic split in opinion about American policy in China, between Davies 
and Hurley. On December 12, Hurley reported to President Roosevelt that 
after a long delay, Chou En-lai had returned to Yenan and had, on December 
10, notified Hurley that the Communists would not accept a three-point 
proposal submitted by the Kuomintang. 19 On that same day, Davies, in a 
memorandum which was transmitted to Harry L. Hopkins at the White House 
19Hurley to Roosevelt, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 733. See also 
"Third Counter Draft by Chinese Representatives," Ibid., 706. 
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20 
as well as to Hurley, charged that the negotiations aimed at finding a 
basis for settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang had failed, 
although it was not impossible, he added, that one side or the other might, 
in the near future, revive the talks with new proposals. 
But as long as the deadlock existed, Davies wrote, or as new nego­
tiations dragged on, it was reasonable to assume that Chiang would con­
tinue to refuse the United S~ates permission to exploit militarily the 
position held by the Chinese Communists which extended far into the Jap­
anese zone of operations. With the war proving so costly to the United 
States, Davies argued, ". • • '\>le can ill afford to continue denying our­
selves positive assistance and strategically valuable positions.,,2l It 
was time, Davi~s continued, 
that· we unequivocally' told Chiang Kai-shek that we will 
work with and, within our discretion, supply whatever Chinese 
forces we believe can contribute most to the war against Japan. 
We should tell him that we .will not work with or supply any 
Chinese unit, whether Central Government, Provincial or Com­
munist, which shows any inclination toward precipitating civil 
conflict. We should tell him that we propose to keep him, as head 
of the recognized goverlllnenh informed of what supplies we give 
the various Chinese forces. 
23In an earlier report of December 9, which was also sent to Hopkins, 
Davies had charged that unless driven to an extremity, Chiang Kai-shek 
would not form a genuine coalition government. This was quite the con­
trary to what Hurley had been indicating to Roosevelt, and to what he 
again relayed to the President in his December 13, telegram: 
20Davies Memorandum, "Proposed Statement of American Policy," Ibi~., 734. 
2l Ibid., 735. 
22Ibid . 
23Davies Memorandum, "The Generalissimo's Dilemmas,1l Ibid., 724. 
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• • • Chiang Kai-shek again advises me that it has been and is 
his earnest desire to arrive at a settlement with the Communist 
Party. He assured nle again and wished me to assure you that it 
is now his purpose to make a settlement with the Communist Party 
his first order of business. 24 
The day following the despatch of Davies' memorandum in which he had 
claimed that the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations had ended in failure, 
Hurley wired the Secretary of State to stress that although the Communists 
had rejected the Central Government!s counter-proposals, the door to fur­
ther negotiations was definitely not closed. Nor was the Communist posi­
tion immutable, he argued. '''While they are unquestionably in a strong 
bargaining position," he 'lI7rote, "they will probably be willing to retreat 
somewhat from their original proposals provided that they are convinced 
that the Generalissimo is genuinely desirous of meeting them on an equit-
Awa~ 0 f Dai\li~s' mell1m::>aooum to HOi>ki.ns, Hur ley no doub t 
sent this message to the Secretary in an attempt to diminish the impact 
of Daviei remarks. 
By late December, 1944, it had become clear to Hurley that certain 
members of his staff, both those working directly with him and those as­
signed as observers in the north, were viewing the general political sit­
uation with much less optimism than he. In a report to the newly-ap­
pointed Secretary of State, Stettinius, dated December 24, Hurley indicated 
that he believed there was considerable opposition to unification, but 
mentioned only that which he thought was coming from foreigners. 
Generally speaking the opponents to unity in China are the im­

perialist nations who are now fighting for the reconquest of 

24Hurley to Roosevelt, Ibid., 734. 

25
Hurley to Stettinius, Ibi~., 737. 
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their colonies in Southeast Asia and for the reestablishment 
of imperi.a1ist colonial governments in the colonies. All of this 
group try to convince the Chinese that everything America does 
to unite and strengthen China is interference in Chinese internal 
affahs. 26 
But in a December 29, report to the Secretary, Hurley di.d, in an 
indirect way, implicate American Foreign Service personnel in such ac­
tivity. Under the guise of reporting on several rumors being spread in 
China and in the United States that Chiang had arrived at or was nego­
tiating secret peace arrangements with the Japanese, Hurley informed 
the Secretary that he was presenting all of the points to that effect 
which had been covered in the reports made by American diplomatic rep­
resentatives, who, among others, were persons ". , , who have predicted 
or who desired the collapse of the Chinese National Govertl.lnent, 1127 
T1'r:f's very slight hint that some American diplomatic personnel in 
China desired or predicted the collapse of the Kuomintang government, 
was the first on record made by Hurley, Although few, if any, of Hur­
1ey's superiors in Washington saw it as such, it was as well, the first 
hint of Hurley's alienation from the professional diplomats in China. 
Shortly after Hurley's clouded charges were made, John Davies, who 
had been the first to openly and directly confront the General with op­
inions which by this time were quite opposed to the Ambassador's way of 
thinking, arranged a transfer to the Embassy in Moscow. Just prior to 
his departure, he was confronted by Hurley and involved in an exchange 
which clearly evidenced lIur1ey's reaction to those who were by this 
time being viewed by the Ambassador as his enemies and as enemies of the 
ur Ib'd .26H 1ey to Stett1nlus,.. __1_" 737 

27
Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 214. 
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United StHtes. The confrontation was reported by General Wedemeyer, 
who was a witness to the exchange. 
While having breakfast with Hurley, Wedemeyer was visited by 
Davies who had corne by to bid the latter farewell. In the Genera1 t s 
words: 
It was inevitable that he and Mr. Hurley should exchange some 
remarks, which became rather acrimonious. Other members of 
my staff were present, so I suggested that we three go to an­
other room. The Ambassador and Hr. Davies then launched into 
a very heated argument during which Hurley accused Davies of 
being a Communist and of failing to support the directives of 
his country in support of the Chinese Nationalists. Tears 
carne to the eyes of Hr. Davies as he heatedly denied Hurley's 
accusation. Hurley said that he was going to have him kicked 
out of the State Department. 28 
Wedemeyer apparently calmed the two, however, and reported that Hurley 
relented somev:hat. telling Davies that he would not immediately take 
. . h'1m. 29 With that, Davies left the t\110 and, on the sameactlon agalnst 
day, left China. 
The break be~ween Hurley and Davies was a forewarning of future 
conflicts which would develop between Hurley and the majority of his 
senior Foreign Service officers. That Hurley's charges against Davies 
were unfounded, is, without doubt, in retrospect. But Hurley at the 
time was facing failure, perhaps for the first time in his life, and 
was experiencing difficulty in determining the causes of his failure. 
By all indications, the negotiations should have been a success, he 
felt, for each side had professed the same objectives, each avowedly 
seeking democratic unity and the defeat of Japan. But the negotiations 
28A1bert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Re.E.~.l'ts! (New York, 1958), 318. 
29 Ibid ., 319. 
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had broken down, and Hurley, hard pressed to determine why, began to see 
less than loyal forces at work which were beyond his control, and in fact, 
working directly against him and what he viewed to be the policy of the 
United States Government. 
In his December 24, report to Stettinius, Hurley had written that 
it had been his understanding that the policy of the United States in 
China was, among other things, "to prevent the collapse of the national 
government" and "to sustain Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic 
and Generalissimo of the Armies.,,30 But there is no indication that the 
State Department or the President had explicitly stated this to be the 
policy of the United States, either publicly or privately. The last for­
mal policy statement on China had been that which Hull enunciated to the 
JapeAceein--19 Irl--one which had denounced interfe.rence in the! internal 
affairs of other countries. Privately, Roosevelt had made it quite 
clear that he intended China to be one of the Great Powers after the war, 
and that the United States recognized the National government to be the 
legitimate government of all China. But there had never been an official 
policy articulated which called for the prevention of the national gov­
ernment's collapse or for sustaining Chiang Kai-shek as President of 
the Republic and Generalissimo of the Armies. Without doubt, the United 
States t po1itica1 and military leaders hoped that someone would bring order 
to the chaos which was China, but their concern by 1944, was with getting 
China into the war against Japan. The European conflict was drawing 
nearer to victory for the Allies and the theatre would soon shift to the 
Pacific. If Chtna was divided when Japan met defeat, there would be a 
30Hurley to Stettinius, F?reign Relations, 1944, VI, 745. 
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political vacuum on the continent--one which might be filled by the Soviet 
Union if some form of stable unity had not been found by the Chinese. 
Roosevelt had told Hurley in August that the United States would continue 
to support Chiang, not because Chiang was a good leader, but because 
Chiang was the best there was at the time and under the circumstances it 
would be unwise to sh:i.ft support to a leader who was untried. In other 
words, Chiang held at least nominal power, and at such a late date a 
shift in power might have resulted in greater chaos than already existed 
in China. 
But by the end of 1944, two major changes had been made in the 
American diplomatic chain. Hurley had been named Ambass·ador and Stet­
tinius had been named Secretary of State to succeed Cordell Hull. This 
meant that Hurley was Lack in the State Department chain and no longer 
communicating directly with the President. It also meant that he was 
now communicating with a Secretary of State who was unaware of the pre­
vious developments in China. Therefore, when Hurley arti.culated what he 
saw as policy in China, he received no word from Stettinius to the con­
trary. Roosevelt was, by January, 1945, making preparations for his 
journey to Yalta to confer with Churchill and Stalin, and no doubt put 
China in the background for the moment, confident that things were pro­
gressing well there as Hurley had been so optimistically reporting. 
With no word coming from Washington to contradict his view of 
American policy, Hurley came to believe that what he was promoting was 
the official policy of the American Government. Criticism of Chiang 
and the Kuomintang from any source other than the President or the 
Secretary of State, therefore, appeared to Hurley to be in conflict 
with the wishes and desires of the United States Government. Although 
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Hurley was not even a well-trained professional soldier, he was more 
that than a well-trained diplomat. Being more militarily-oriented, he 
was more disposed to the idea that servants of the American Government, 
both military and diplomatic, were obliged to follow orders. His orders, 
as he saw them, were to prevent the collapse of the Kuomintang Govern­
ment and to sustain Chiang Kai-shek in power. Any person other than his 
Commander-in-Chief or the Secretary of State, after Hurley had been ap­
pointed Ambassador, who suggested doing other than what had been ordered, 
was, in a sense, committing an act of insubordination. But llurley's mil­
itary orientation was not the sole source of his attitude that others 
were being insubordinate. He was clearly a man who took"pride in his 
O\\'ll perceived abilities and position. He recognized few who had greater 
authGr~thnl#i""that possessed by hinlself, and ~me"'ea3ily"offcmied by oth~ 
ers who seemed to be acting toward him with less than the respect he felt 
was due him. And as his attempts to find a reasonable basis for settle­
ment were met with continued frustration, he became ever more sensitive 
to criticism, until finally, he and the American policy in China, became 
inflexible in support, albeit de facto, of Chiang Kai-shek. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONFLICTING VIEWS OF A}ffiRICAN POLICY 
That Hurley's conception of American policy in China was not as con­
cretely accepted in Washington as it was by the Ambassador is well evi­
denced by State Department probings and expressed views of December, 1944 
and through the early months of 1945. 
Hurley's December 24, 1944 report to Stettinius had been in response 
to the new Secretary's inquiries into the Ambassador's activities and his 
l
views of the situation in China to that date. On January 4, 1945, Stet-
t:tn±us reporte&~to President Roosevelt, the impres-gious" gathere-d from 
2Hurley's return telegram. Briefly reviewing the impediments to a settle­
ment which had been imposed by both the Communists and the Nationalists, 
Stettinius suggested to the President that an alternative to a final 
settlement, if the latter proved impo$sible, might be an American military 
command of all Chinese forces. Both ~ides in China seemed to be in agree­
ment on such a command, and it would ~ake possible a limited supply of 
ammunition and demolition material to the Communists--material which n. 
all observers agree could be effectively used.,,3 An American command 
would, Stettinius informed the President, obviate political difficulties 
1stettinius to Hurley, Foreign Relations, 1944, VI, 744. 
2Memorandum, Stettinius to Roosevelt, Ibid., 1945, VII, 154. 
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in case of an American landing in coastal areas adjacent to Communist-
held territories. If Russia came into the war in the Far East,there 
would be considerable advantages to having an overall American command 
in China rather than a disuni~ed Chinese command. "And finally, an 
American command could serve as a stabilizing political influence in 
the period immediately following the conclusion of hostilities in China.,,4 
On or about January 12, the Division of Chinese Affairs had sub­
mitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff a memorandum entitled "Political Ap­
preciation of the Situation in China."S This memorandum was sent to Hur­
ley on February 8 by the Secretary of State, who remarked in his accom­
panying instructions that this and other material being sent to Hurley 
"may be helpful to the embassy as indit:::ating general lines of policy 
and thinking in th~ Department with regard to China and matters affect­
ing present and post-war international relations in the Far East.,,6 The 
memorandum was, in form, little more than a contingency report, which ex­
amined the various possible developments in the event tha.t the Japanese 
captured Kunming and/or Chungking. 
The loss of either or both of the two cities would, the report be­
gan, seriously weaken or destroy the Central Government's armies and its 
political position, which was already quite precarious. Such a loss 
would encourage the disaffection of the Central forces and probably lead 
to their disintegration, after which the dissident elements would become 
active and consolidated in a movement to form a "representative" govern­
ment, either through pressure~n Chiang to support such a government, or 
SMemorandum prepared by the Division of Chinese Affairs, Ibid., 169. 
6Ibid ., fn. 27. 
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independently of him. In such a government, "the 'Communists' would prob­
ably participate • • . and in any case the weakening of the Kuomintang 
armies and the heterogeneous, incohesive character of other groups would 
make the 'Communists' the tiominant force in China. ,,7 Along \-lith Hurley 
and many of the Foreign Service personnel in China, the Division of Chi­
nese Affairs was not yet convinced that the forces led by Hao were, in 
fact, Comnlunists. But by this time there was little doubt of the strength 
of those forces. 
If the Japanese were to fail to capture Kunming and/or Chungking, or 
if they did not attempt to do so, the situation would probably remain as 
it was., although if the Japanese did attack and were turned back by the 
Chinese, Chiang's political position would be made much stronger. The 
crit..a. .. .ism.··o f.· Chiang's regime, the.,. repor't sa.:i...d, .. hact. been basQd.· partial,ly 
on the failure of the Central Government armies to impede the Japanese 
thrust into Free China. Without a Japanese drive against Kunming/Chung­
king, the conditions would probably continue at about the same rate of 
deterioration as had been the case in the past. No perceptible change 
under those circumstances was expected by the Division until Americans 
landed on the China Coast or until the entrance of Russian forces into 
China, if the Soviet Union came into the war against Japan. 
There were two portions of this report which were no doubt of con­
siderable interest to Hurley. The first brought into doubt the success 
of his efforts to unify China. The second, if read in a certain light, 
would reinforce the Ambassador in his view of the China policy. The re­
• 
port was pessimistic toward the possibility of the Nationalists and Com­
munis ts being united. IIA Kuomin tang- I Comnlllnts t' rapprochement \oJhich 
7Ibi~., 170. 
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would provide the basis for real cooperation, is believed unlikely,,,8 the 
report read. If Chiang were to succeed in stopping the Japanese drives 
his position would be strengthened to the point that he would be less 
likely to cooperate with the Corr~unists, and the Communists could not be 
expected to modify their terms. If Chiang's position were to weaken, how­
ever, the Communists would probably be. encouraged to press for tel~S which 
the Generalissimo would stubbornly ,oppose. While Chiang would probably 
agree to Communist participation in the Government, he would not, it was 
believed, give them or any other non-Kuomintang participants any real 
voice. Informed Chinese observers, the report read, felt that in a genuine 
coalition government Chiang would slovlly lose his power 'and position and 
that he was aware of this fact and \vas thus opposed to a real coalition. 
Of-'greater hope, the report"'suggestE.d,. \-]Ould be- the cou-C'lusi-on of 
a Kuomintang-Communist agreement, which would involve the coordination 
of military activities through a coalition military councilor through 
an Allied command of the armies of the two competing factions. 
This suggestion was obviously a stop-gap measure aimed at putting 
the Chinese armies into the field in a joint effort to fight the Japan­
ese. It was not a political measure. The political situation was seen 
at best to be tenuous. The greatest fear, it appears, was that the Cen­
tral Government would fall at about the time the primary theatre of war 
shifted from Europe to the Pacific. If the Central Government were to 
fall, the report indicated, 'I ••• a considerable period of confusion 
might ensue before a new Government could be established and its machin­
9 
ery put into operations. II During this period resistance 'vould be 
8Ibid • 

9Ibid.. , 171. 
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disorganized and, quite likely, even less effective than it was at 
present. 
The Division believed, therefore, that under the existing circum­
stances it would be advisaEle for the United States to continue dealing 
with the presently recognized government. of China. To deal with other 
elements as long as the Central Government remained in power would ser­
iously endanger the existence of that government. However, when tpe 
United States found it necessary to land troops in areas of China where 
the authority of the Central Government ,,,,as non-existent, ". • • the 
American commanders could not be expected to deal with friendly local 
groups.through the medium of 	Chungking or to await Chungking's approval 
10
of supplying them with arms." Under such circumstances, the report 
co~"" military e:d.ngencies uould require the use of' aid to any and 
all groups able and willing to fight the Japanese--" ••• irrespective 
of such groups' political affiliations and the state of their relations 
with the Central Governments."ll 
From this report, one which was definitely not a policy statement, 
Hurley probably gathered that his view of American policy had been rein­
forced, though it did indirectly cast doubt upon the possible success of 
his exuberant attempts to find a basis for agreement .between the Communists 
and the Kuomintang government. But the report also focused on an idea to­
ward which Hurley had expressed and would continue to express veherr.ent 
opposition--the possible arming of the Communists. 
This report did not reach Hurley until February 8. In the meantime, 
the Ambassador had submitted the first of a four-part report to Stettinius 
lOIbid., 172. 

llIbid. 

143 
reviewing in considerable detail the steps he had taken in China; first 
to settle the problems between Stilwell and Chiang, and then to negotiate 
a d C . art1.es.sett1ement bet,yeen t he K · an ommunl.st P . 12uoml.ntang 
Hurley had apparently sent this report to his staff for review, for 
in a memorandum of the same day to the Ambassador, George Atcheson, Coun­
selor of Embassy, had responded with a protest in defense of the Embassy 
staff and others, against accusations which Hurley had apparently.leveled 
h · .. 1 d f 13i n 1.S Or1.g1na ra t. Hurley must have charged members of his diplo­
matic staff with advocating that the National Government be by-passed in 
favor of the Communists, for Atcheson responded: 
~e would question the statement in the next to the last para­
graph of the telegram that there is opposition among our own 
diplomatic representatives. There is no one on the staff who 
believes we should by-pass the National Government in dealing 
w.ith the Communists. From a recent conversation with-Hr; Ser­
vice . I am convinced that he does not think we should by­
pass the National Government in dealing with the Communists. 14 
Hurley must also have expressed in the original draft a feeling that 
his efforts were being unjustly criticized by his staff, for Atcheson a1­
so informed Hurley that in reference to comments about the staff in the 
preamble to his report: 
We would question the penultimate sentence of the second para­
graph. We have not heard anyone on the staff express an opinion 
that your conduct of the negotiations is an unusual and unjusti­
fied departure from State Department procedure. We do not believe 
that any member of the staff holds such opinion. There is no mem­
ber of the staff that I know of who has not who1e-hearted1y hoped 
for the success of your negotiations and the benefit to the war 
effort which will obviously result therefrom. IS 
12Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 192. 
13Memorandum, Atcheson to Hurley, Ibi~., 190. 
14Ibid ., 191. 
15Ibid . 
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Hurley apparently took Atcheson's comments to heart, for there is 
little in his report, as sent, which would indicate that the criticisms 
which Atcheson and the Embassy responded to had been retained. Hurley 
did, however, charge that he was meeting with opposition from some of the 
United States' military staff in China, n ••• on the ground that the Com­
munist armed party is stronger than the National army and we should deal 
• 16directly with the Communists, bypassing the National Goverhment." This 
opposition, Hurley concluded, was based on erroneous and ursound premi~es. 
Hurley made no mention of American policy in China. I The report was 
meant to review his activities ar-d to give the new Secretary of State an 
idea of how the negotiations had progressed to that pOint.1 He did point 
out, in concluding, that throughout the period of negotiadions he had in­
si:1!tt~"'tha"!::' the-United St'ates uould not supply or' othe"'''''i8Ie~aid the Ch:i:­
nese Communists as an armed political party or in an insurrection against 
the National Government. Any aid to the'Communists, he w~ote, must go 
through the National Government of China. But in making JiS point, Hur­
ley emphasized that, 
nle Chinese Communist Party had never indicated to me that they 
desired to obtain control of the National Government 4ntil, if 
and when" they achieve control through a political election. 17 
Stettinius responded to Hurley's report with remark~ supportive of 
Hurley's activities. In addition, the Secretary indicated that he was in 
full agreement with the view expressed by Hurley that there was opposition 
coming from the American military to continued support of the National Army. 
16Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 197. 

17Ibid., 196. 

l8Stettinius to Hurley, Ibid., 197. 
18 
Stettinius was referring here to a plan of which Hurley had become 
aware and had informed the President about on January 14. In the process 
of trying to determine why the Cownunist-Kuomintang negotiations had bro­
ken do'i.."I1 in December, with Chou En-lai' s return to Chungking, Hurley had 
discovered a plan which had been formulated by General Robert McClure, 
Wedemeyer's Chief of Staff, for the use of American paratroopers in the 
Communist-held areas. The plan, according to Hurley, provided for the 
use of Communist troops led by Americans in guerilla warfare. As Hurley 
related the plan to Roosevelt: 
The plan was predicated on the reaching of an agreement between 
the United States and the Communist Party, by-passing completely 
the National Government of China, and furnishing American sup­
plies directly to the Communist troops and placing the Communist 
troops under command of an American officer. 19 
This plan had become kno\\ru to the Communists, Hurley wrote, and had 
offered them exactly what they wanted all a1ong--recognition and Lend-
lease supplies from the United States, and the destruction of the National 
Government. If the Communists were to succeed in making such arrangements 
with the United States Army, Hurley contended, it would be futile to at­
tempt to save the National Government. 
Hurley had not known that the plan had been presented to the Commu­
nists, he informed the President, until he became aware of a message from 
the Communists, transmitted through Wedemeyer with instructions to by-pass 
Hurley, requesting passage of Mao and Chou to Washington to talk to the 
President. Wedemeyer had revealed this request to Hurley, and the Arnbas­
sador deduced that it was a result of the McClure plan having been revealed 
19Hurley to Roosevelt, Tbi~., 174. 
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to the Communists. Hurley believed that this was the reason for the 
break-down in negotiations. With such a plan, which would provide aid 
to the Communists without that aid being directed through the National 
20Government, the Communists had no need for further negotiations. 
Following a thorough investigation instigated by ,General Marshall 
at Roosevelt's suggestion, it was discovered that the plan, of which Hur­
ley was aware from the beginning, had been divulged to the Communists by 
an overanxious McClure. Hurley had thought the plan a feasible one, but 
only if it had the approval of Chiang. Against Hurley's advice, HcClure 
had discussed the plan with Soong and General Chen Cheng, both of whom 
expressed an 'interest but made no commitments. Excited at the response 
his plan was receiving, McClure sent Lieutenant Colonel Willis H. Bird, 
plore with the officials there the practicality of a special unit for 
operations in Communist territory. Unfortunately, Bird conveyed to the 
Communist leaders, much to the consternation of McClure who had not in­
tended such, that a plan for a special unit was in the making. He did, 
however, consistently point out that such a plan was tentative and sub-
Am' I'j ect to changes 1n. er1can po 1Cy. 21 
Once these events became known to Wedemeyer and Hurley, the two 
agreed wholeheartedly upon the facts of the case, but disagreed completely 
on the results. Hurley felt the revelation of this plan to the Communists 
had been the cause of the breakdown in negotiations. Wedemeyer disagreed 
emphatically. Nevertheless, in initially conveyi.ng the information to 
20.!.!:id., 176. 

2IR•T. Smith, "Alone in China," 134. 
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vlashington, Hur1~y led the President to belteve that high ranking officers 
of the United States Army had been negotiating separately with the Commu­
nists. For this reason had Roosevelt directed Marshall to instigate an 
investigation of the situation,22 and it was this inci.dent which Stetti­
nius had in mind when he wired Hurley on February 1. 
In part two of his four-part report to Stettinius, Hurley reviewed 
the events surrounding the leak of the McClure plan to the Communists, and 
pointed out that "as soon as I sensed this situation by opposition was more 
than aggressive, it [was] impeccable and, as the results have indicated, 
23
successful. tr It was a proud and boastful man, therefore, who received 
shortly thereafter the report issued by the Division of Chinese Affairs 
which had suggested that when the United States found it necessary to land 
t:r:a.opc...,...:i.n._ComlUl.Ulist-hGld tcrrHory) t.he American corrml~e£-s< shOttld provide 
the. local groups with arms and supplies without gaining Chungking's prior 
approval. 
In the period during "lhich the main thrust of the war had been to­
ward Europe, the United States had been using valuable time in the Far 
East seeking political stabilization in China in preparation for the in­
evitable assault on Japan. By January, 1945, time was running out, and 
China was in worse shape than ever. Those closest to the scene in China, 
except perhaps Hurley, were increasingly concerned, not about stability 
for its own sake, but rather over the ability of the United States to 
successfully prosecute the \Var in the Far East, given the unstable ccndi­
tions existing in China. On February 14, 1945 John Stewart Service and 
22 Ibid ., 137. 

23
Hurley to Stettinius, !oreign Relations, 1945, VII, 210. 
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Raymond P. Ludden expressed that concern in a lengthy memorandum to Gen­
24
eral Wedemeyer, a task which, for Service, must have been difficult. 
Having been in Hashington since October, Service returned to China 
in January to replace Davies. Returning at about the time that Hurley was 
involved in the controversy over the McClure plan, the Foreign Service 
officer had been summoned to the Ambassador's office where he was told by 
Hurley that if he interfered with the Ambassador in any way, he would be 
broken. Service took this to mean he was not to make any more policy 
. 25 
recommendat10ns. But he proceeded to do so, nevertheless, with Ludden 
in February. 
While in Washington, Service had been working in the Department of 
State and was in close contact with the attitudes being expressed there 
belbw the level of the Secretary. Unfortuaately, the Deparbnent had 
played a minor role throughout the war period, with Roosevelt conducting, 
as he did, his mvn diplomacy. In Service's opinion, the Department was 
not strengthened, but was, after Stettinius' appointment, " ..• drifting 
26
under a new and inept Secretary." As the European war was drawing near­
er to a close, the apparently imminent civil war in China and its post-· 
war implications began to concern the State Department below the Stettin­
ius level. Hurley was seen to be interpreting his mission more and more 
as that of supporting Chiang, and the analysis of Service and the men 
around him was that this was likely a losing cause. As Service had written 
in retrospect, "the State Department in this murky situation was operating 
24Memorandum, Service and Ludden to Wedemeyer, Ibid., 216. 
25R. T. Smjth, "Alone in China," 139. 
26John Stewart Service, Personal Letter to Author, November 23, 1970, 3. 
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hesitatingly and with difficulty and caution. Its desire was that we be 
able to maintain some flexibility in what promised to be an unstable sit­
uation in China to avoid all-out commitment to Chiang and his government 
27if they should go down." 
But the State Department was not, according to Service, " ... in 
a position to shout from the housetops, to issue orders, ot to slam the 
28table. II The Department did make its position clear, however, in a mem­
orandum, which was subsequently sent to the State-War-Navy Coordinating 
Committee as well as to Hurley, pointed out that the short-term objective 
of the United States government was " ... to assist in mobilizing all 
of China's human and material resources for prosecution of the war against 
29Japan." The long-term objective in China, the report continued, was 
to ". assist in the development of a united, democratically progres­
sive, and cooperative China which will be capable of contributing to 
security and prosperity in the Far East.~30 
The mission of the United States' military authorities in China, 
the report said, should be focused upon the short-term objective. Mea­
sures aimed at containing Japanese forces in cooperation with the Chinese 
would call for a degree of rearmament, but, it was believed, " ... mea­
sures undertaken at this time to rearm China in order that it might be­
come a strong Asiatic power would be impracticable. II3l The Department 
27Ibi.i., 4. 

28 Ibid . 

29Memorandum, John Carter Vincent to Joseph C. Grew, Foreign Rela­

tions, 1945, VII, 38. See also, fn. 52, Ibid., 37. 
30Ibid ., 38. 
3lIbid . 
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would like, it was added, to see the rearmament of all forces willing to 
fight the Japanese, " •.• but the present unsatisfactory relations be­
tween the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists makes it impol­
itic to undertake measures for the rearmament of the Chinese Communists 
even though it is generally conceded that they could effectively use 
t . t . f sma11 arms .. an emo1"1t10n mater1a. 1s. 11 If op­quan 1 1es 0 ammun1t10n d d 32 
erations were undertaken along the China Coast, however, it was suggested 
that American military authorities should be prepared to arm any Chinese 
forces which they believed c~uld be effectively used against the Japanese. 
It was the United States' purpose, the report stated, to utilize 
its influence to bring about, both as a short-term and as a long-term ob­
jective, the unification of China. But it did not necessarily follow, 
" ••• that· China should be: 'unified under Chiang Kai-shek. 1I33 
However, with regard to the short-term objective, Chiang appears 
to be the only leader who now offers hope for unification. The 
alternative to the support of Chiang for the attainment of our 
immediate objective might be chaos. With regard to our long­
term objective, it is our purpose to maintain a degree of flex­
ibiHty Ylhich would permit cooperation with any leadership in 
China that would offer the greatest likelihood of fostering a 
united, democratic and friendly China. 34 ' 
The report made by Service and Ludden on February 12 was in keeping 
with this two-pronged policy statement which Hurley had received on Febru­
ary 9. The United States had but one immediate objective, the two men 
wrote: "the defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time with the least 
expenditure of American lives.,,35 But the attainment of this objective 
32Ibid • 

33Ibid . 

34Memorandum, Service and Ludden to Wedemeyer, Ibid., 216. 

35Ibid . 
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demanded the effective mobilization of China in the war against Japan. 
There was ample evidence to show, the men argued, that the "'ar agains t 
Japan was of secondary importance to the Kuomintang Government. The 
. 
Generalissimo's intentions of eliminating all political opposition, by 
force if necessary, had not been abandoned, nor had its desire to con­
serve such military force as it possessed for use in maintaining its po­
litical power. 
The aim of the American policy in China, the report continued, was 
" • the establishment of political unity in China as the indispensable 
1 · . Ch" ff . 'I' b '1 . . ,,36pre 1M1nary to 1na s e ect1ve m1 1tary mo 1 1zat10n. But the execu­
tion of American policy had not contributed to the achie'vement of this 
stated aim. It had, in fact, retarded its achievement, the men argued. 
It has had this undesired and undesirable effect because our 
statements and actions in China have convinced the Kuomintang 
Government that we will continue to support it and it alone. 37 
The United States could not hop~ for any improvement in the situa­
tion, the argument ran, unless the decision was made to throw considerable 
influence upon the Kuomintang Government in the direction of internal 
unity. "We should be convinced by this time that the effort to solve the 
K 't C . t d'ff1 by d' 1omat' means h f a~-lled,,,38 theyuom1n ang- ommun1S erences 1p 1C as 
concluded. 
The men went on to offer suggestions on execution of American pol­
icy, referring, as had many in the past, to the British approach to the 
36Ibid . 
37 Ibid., 217. 
38Ibid . 
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situation in Yugoslavia, and Churchill's declaration of support for Marshal 
Tito. Quoting Churchill's statement, which in effect said that ideolog­
ical preferences were irrelevant to the problem, and that all parties and 
factions should be judged by their readiness to fight the enemy, Service 
and Ludden admitted that for the Commander-in-Chief to take such a stand 
would mean the withdrawal of support from the Central Government. But "that 
would be both unnecessary and unwise,,,39 they continued. 
It would service notice, however, of our preparation to make use 

of all available means to achieve our primary objective. It 

would supply for all Chinese a firm rallying point which has thus 

far been lacking. The internal effect in China would be so pro­

found that the Generalissimo would be forced to make concessions 

of power a~d permit united front coalition. The present opposi­

tion groups, no longer under the prime necessity of safeguarding 

themselves, would be won wholehe;:trtedly to our side and we would 

have in China, for the first time, a united al1y.40 

Service and Ludden were no doubt thinking of the original United States 
policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, when 
they then noted that, like it or not, the United States was, by its very 
presence in China, becoming a force in the internal politics of that country. 
Then, in their concluding paragraph, they made their strongest point: 
Our objective is clear, but in China we have been jockeyed into 
a position from which we have only one approach to the object:i.ve. 
Support of the Generalissimo is but one means to an end; ,it is not 
an end in jtself, but by present statements of policy we show a 
tendency to confuse the means with the end. There should be an 
immediate adjustment of our position in order that flexibility of 
approach to our primary objective may be restored. 4l 
This final point was clearly directed at Ambassador Hurley. That he 
had felt its impact as well as that of other messages reaching him by this 
39Ibid • 
40Ibid . 
41Ib · . ~a. , 218. 
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time was revealed when, on February 18, he despatched part of his report 
to Stettinius. After reviewing the developments of the negotiations, de­
velopments which by that time looked to him to be somewhat favorable if 
each side would make a few slight concessions, Hurley suddenly shifted 
from a discussion of the negotiations to an obviously bitter denunciation 
of the Communists. 
All the arguments and all the documents submitted should indi­
cate to you that the Chinese Communist Party is not democratic; 
that its purpose is to destroy the control of the government by 
the Kuomintang before there has been an opportunity to adopt a 
constitution or to return the control of the Government to the 
people on a democratic basis. 42 
It is difficult to determine whether Hurley intended to express his 
own opinion with this statement or to relay the thinking of the Kuomintang, 
for with the sentence 1i7hich followed he began a lengthy listing of argu­
ments against the Communists as expressed by Chiang and his close associ­
ates. In sum, these arguments said, in effect, that the Communists were 
simply interested in overthrowing the one-party rule of the Kuomintang 
and replacing it with the one-party rule of the Communist Party. All the 
criticism which had come from the Communists and all the propaganda about 
the Communists being democratically inclined had been just that--propa­
ganda, disseminated by the Communists " for the purpose of breaking 
the faith of the United States in the integrity of the Chinese National 
43Government. 11 
But whether or not they were his own arguments or those of the Chi­
nese Nationalists, it was clear that Hurley agreed with them. In his 
42Hurley to Stettinius. Ibid., 227. 

43
Ibld., 228. 
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closing two paragraphs he pointed out that he was convinced that the United 
States was right in its decision to support the National Government of 
China and the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, and that General Wedemeyer 
had read the report and had stated in his ovm opinion that it was an ex­
ce11ent and logical presentation of the facts. 
Hurley was, in a sudden and vehement manner, expressing his frus­
tration to the Secretary of State, a fact which was made perfectly clear 
44by comments attached to his February 18 report, sub-headed, "New Subject." 
On February 6, Hurley had received a telegram from Acting Secretary of 
State Grew, in response to a report the Ambassador had submitted two days 
earlier. Hurley had enclosed in his report a copy of the tentative agenda 
to be followed by T.V. Soong in his soon-anticipated meeting with govern­
..-l. • 1 S • U'" 45ment:' 1eCl:uers ln t'le OV1(!t Ulon. Gre\o.T J s response to Hurley \-Jas in part 
intended to caution the Ambassador: 
••• we feel, and believe you will concur in our Opl.nl.OIl that, 
while we are at all times anxious to be helpful to the Chinese 
Government, we should not permit the Chinese Government to gain 
the impression that we are prepared to assume responsibility as 
"advisor" to it in its relations with the U.S.S.R.46 
Although Grew's message was directed specifically at Hurley's at­
tempts to involve himself directly in the coming negotiations between the 
Chinese and Soviet government, Hurley apparently took it to be an admoni­
tion for his close involvement in the Kuomintang-Communist negotiations 
as well. In his February 18 attachment he informed the Secretary that he 
had prepared a reply to the February 6 telegram, but had not sent it as 
44 Ibid ., 229. 

45
Hurley to Stettinius, Ibid., 851. 

46
Grew to Hurley, Ibid., 852. 
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he intended to see him shortly and discuss the matter more fully in per­
son. Nevertheless, Hurley proceeded to express his opinion of Grew's 
suggestion: 
In your message you appear to have reduced my role in these neg­
otiations to the position of merely making suggestions without 
implementing my suggestions. It is my earnest desire to be amen­
able to every suggestion from [the] State Department even when I 
believe our position is weakened and accomplishment postponed by 
lack of vigorous implementation of suggestions. 47 
Hurley had obviously misread Grew's message, for the Acting Secre­
tary had not suggested a reduction in the Ambassador's role in the nego­
· i h h S . U' 48t i at10ns w t t e OV1et n10n. But by this time, Hurley's behavior was 
48 .In an interview with John Stewart Service on December 7, 1970, the 
present library curator at the Center for Chinese Studies, Berkeley, Cali­
fornia, made a point which meant little at the time but which has become 
much more meaningful in light of the consistent nisinterpretation of docu­
ments by Hurley, Grew's message of February 6, 1945, being-a particular 
case in point. Service. said that in all the time he had known Hurley in 
China he had never seen the man read. Hurley had always, Service said, had 
his material read to him by one of his staff or by his personal secretary. 
At the time, Service indicated, he had thought that Hurley simply disliked 
reading. But he had later come to believe that the man was somewhat short 
on reading skills and to avoid a task which must have been tedious, had oth­
ers read material to him. 
Taken at face value and in light of treatment Service received in the 
years following the war, the statement may have been vindictive. But an ex­
amination of Service's and other State Department reports, compared with 
Hurley's interpretation of those reports, indicates that for one reason or 
another, Hurley was missing the primary thr.ust of their arguments. 
If Hurley was, in fact, having those reports read to him, and was not 
spending time studying them, it is easy to understand how they might have 
been misinterpreted. Many of them deserved careful scrutiny, being complex 
in verbage and the subtle logic of trained State Department minds. 
On the other hand, it is hard to believe that a man with the legal 
background of Patrick J. Hurley would not be a skilled reader. The fact 
remains, however, that notwithstanding his legal training, Hurley had re­
ceived no schooling until he was 14 years of age, and then, what he did 
receive until he attended law-school was sub-standard. While he might have 
struggled through law training with low reading ability, the chances were 
great that the task remained a tedious one. If so, the chances were quite 
good that Hurley did, in fact, prefer to have one of his aides do his read­
ing for him. 
A far more reasonable explanation, and one which has been attested 
to by Mrs. Eugene Pierce, a New Mexico resident who has done a considerable 
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becoming symptomatic of one suffering from paranoia. He had ordered 
Service to cease interfering with him, had threatened to break both Ser­
vice and Davies, accusing the latter of being a Connnunist, and had turned 
abruptly against the Connnunists. In the short period of eleven days, 
since his telegram of February 7, in which he had noted· that the Connnu­
nists were not in fact Connnunists, but rather were striving for democrat­
ic princi.ples, Hurley had made a complete about-face, charging now that 
the Connnunists were not democratic. In the earlier telegram, he had 
written that the Connnunist Party had never indicated to him that they 
desired to obtain control of the National Government " until, if 
and when, they achieve control through a political election.,,49 Yet, 
eleven days later he noted that the Connnunists' purpose was to destroy 
the contrul of the government by the Kuomintang before there had been 
an opportunity to adopt a constitution. Patrick J. Hurley was on the 
defensive. 
It appears to be quite clear that during these first weeks of 1945, 
American policy in China was, in many respects, uncertain. The Secretary 
of State was in the process of trying to gather background information, 
most likely to get a feel for the situation in China so that he could 
formulate policy. The State Department, below the level of the Secre­
tary, was moving with caution, but at the same time held the opinion that 
the first priority was the defeat of Japan in the quickest way possible. 
amount of research on Hurley and had contact with the late Ambassador, as 
well as with his wife and son, is that Hurley, in his vanity, refused to re-' 
veal that his eyesight was deteriorating while.in China. He probably did 
not wish his associates to know that he needed ereglasses to read. It surely 
would not have been beyond the man, given his egomania, to lead his subordin­
ates to bel~_eve that in deference to his position, it was only proper that 
material be read to him. 
49See fn. 17. 
48 
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To that extent, some form of military unity in China was imperative. 
The drive against Japan was foreseen to be quite near and the Department 
believed the Chinese forces would be vital for the containment of Japan­
ese forces on the continent. Because of the immediacy of the s.ituation, 
it would be unwise at that point to shift support from Chiang to any 
other political or military leader. He at least controlled a government 
which was, if only to a degree, functioning. Service and Ludden, in 
their February 14 message, had not advocated that the United States 
shift its support away from Chiang, only that it shift from a "diplo­
matic" to a hard-line approach, and force Chiang, under the threat of 
cessation of aid, to create an effective fighting force which would in­
clude all those willing to fight the Japanese. 
Tha..ogr-eatesi -fear being expre,'>[;ed by Se.t::vl.ce,_ Ludden and the De­
partment, was that Chiang would come to believe that he had the complete 
and permanent support of the United States, not only against the Japan­
ese but against the Communists as well. If there were any clear-cut 
American policy in China, it was merely to sustain Chiang Kai-shek in 
his fight against the Japanese, not in his fight against the Corr~unist 
Chinese or any other dissident Chinese group. 
But Hurley had come to believe that American policy was to sustain 
Chiang Kai-shek in power-··period. He therefore saw not only himself but 
American policy as well being criticized by all, except perhaps the Sec­
retary of State and the President. As he received messages which, unfor­
tunately, were aimed at his activities in subtle rather than explicit 
terms, he became outraged and defensive. As indicated in his message 
attached to the February 18 report. his approach to the task facing him 
in China had included "vigorous implementation of suggestions," to the 
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negotiating parties. But as has been shown, his idea of vigorous imple­
mentation was active involvement to the extent of incorporating his per­
sonal ideological convictions into proposals supposedly written by the 
negotiating parties--convictions which were alien to the political cul­
ture of the Chinese people. And as evidenced by his final report to 
Stettinius, Hurley had made the shift which members of the State Depart­
ment had feared--he had rejected the Communists and had thrown his per­
sonal support to Chiang. Through Ambassador Hurley, the United States 
had taken sides in the internal affairs of China, and had violated the 
policy of non-interference articulated by Cordell Hull in 1941 • 
• 
• 
CHAPTER IX 
THE OPPOSITION FAILS 
On February 19, 1945, Ambassador Hurley departed Chungking for the 
United States for consultations with the State Department. Immediately 
upon his departure, the Embassy staff at Chungking grasped at an oppor­
tunity they had not previously been offered. Challenged by Hurley's au­
thority, threatened by the Ambassador's warnings to Service and his fight 
with Davies, faced with the accusations in Hurley's January 14 draft re­
port to Stettinius, and in general, objecting to Hurley's naive and un­
realisrlt view of his a.bility to <l find a soluti"Ol1~to the-pro&lems of 
China, the staff, led by the no" ranking officer in the Embassy, George 
Atcheson, prepared a report to the State Department. 
The draft report, which was actually written by John Stewart Ser·· 
vice,l was signed and sent by Atcheson on February 28, with the closing 
remark that it had been drafted ". with the assistance and agree­
2
ment of all the political officers of the staff of this Embassy. , , ,11 
It reached Washington shortly before Hurley arrived on March 3, and the 
next day was brought to the Ambassador's attention. 
"The situation in China appears to be developing in some ways that 
are not conducive to effective prosecution of the war, nor to China's 
lR.T. Smith, "Alone in China," 157. 
2Atcheson to Stettinius, !oreign Relaticns, 1945, VII, 246. 
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future peace and unity,,,3 the report began. The recent diplomatic and 
persuasive attempts by the United States to assist the Chinese factions 
in arriving at a compromise settlement of their differences was a neces­
sary first step, it continued. And unity had been correctly understood 
to be the best way toward the effective conduct of the war by China, as 
well as toward the speedy emergence of a peaceful, strong, united and 
democratic China. But recent developments had combined to increase 
Chiang Kai-shek's feeling of strength and had resulted in an unrealistic 
optimism on the Generalissimo's part which had in turn led to his lack 
4
of willingness to c.ompromise. 
The Communists, on the other hand, had come to the conclusion that 
the United States was definitely committed to Chiang's support, and that 
there w'ould ..be no force exerted to compel him to a IJ.Ov! aid to or cooper­
ation with them. The Communists were, therefore, for their own self-
protection, taking a line of action, and aggressively expanding their 
area of control southward. In doing so, it was the Communists' inten­
tion to make themselves invincible before Chiang's armies were ready, 
and to present the United States with the dilemma of accepting or refus­
ing COID."llunist assistance if American forces were to land anywhere along 
the China Coast. Some Communists close to the Yenan leaders were, as 
well, beginning to discuss the possibility of seeking Soviet aid. 5 
The conclusion seemed clear, the Embassy staff reported: 
although our intentions have been good and our actions in 
refusing to deal with or assist any group by the Central Govern­
3Ibid . , 242. 
4Ibid . 
5Ibid ., 243. 
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ment have been diplomatically correct, if this situation contin­
ues and our analysis of it is correct, chaos in China will be in­
evitable and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict 
will be accelerated. 6 . 
If the high military authorities of the United States Government 
agreed, the report suggested, that some aid and cooperation with the 
forces that had proven themselves willing and able to fight the Japan­
ese was necessary, it was the staff's opinion that any further steps in 
American policy should be based upon this military question. "The pres­
ence of General Wedemeyer in Washington as well as General Hurley should 
be raJ favorable opportunity for discussions of this matter,,,7 they urged. 
Assuming that the military necessity existed, the staff proposed, 
for the Department's consideration, that the President inform Chiang in 
no uncertain terms "that military necessity requires that we supply and 
cooperate with the Communists and other suitable groups who can assist 
in the war against Japan • • . and that we are taking direct steps to 
8
accomplish this end." Assurances could be made to Chiang, they added, 
that the United States was not contemplating a reduction in aid to the 
Central Government and that the Central Government would be kept fully 
informed of the extent and types of such aid. Chiang could also be im­
pressed with the idea that aid at that time would insure him against any 
independent action on the part of the Communists, and would lessen the 
chances that the Communists would turn to the Soviets for aid. 
As one result of the recent Kuomintang-Communist negotiations, the 
report claimed, the principal and over-riding issues had become clear: 
6Ibid • 
7Ibid., 244. 
8Ibid . 
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The Generalissimo and his Government will not at this time on 

their own initiative take any forward step which will mean loss 

of face, prestige or personal power. The Communists will not, 

without our guarantees in which they have confidence, take any 

forward step which will involve dispersion and eventual elimin­

ation of their forces upon whiC'.h their present strength and fu­

ture political existence depend. 9 

The steps the staff was proposing, therefore, would exert upon both 
parties the necessary force needed to break this deadlock. The "modus 
~randi" embodied in the proposals would, furthermore, initiate concrete 
military and eventual political cooperation which would, in turn, provide 
10 
IIa foundation , for increasing future development toward unity,II
The staff's proposals 1;.;rere quite reasonable: 
(1) The formation of something in the nature of a supreme war 

councilor "lar cabinet in which Communists and other groups 

would have effective representation and some share in respon­

sibility for the formulation and execution of joint war plans, 

arrd (2) the nominal incorporation of COllmll'lnist~ and othel" se­

lected forces into the Central Go~'ernment armies under the op­

erational command of American officers designated by the Gen­

eralissimo on the advice of General Wedemeyer, on agreement by 

all parties that these troops would operate only within their 

llpresent areas or specified extended areas. 
The report stressed, however, that it should be made quite clear 
that the above proposals would not be contingent upon reaching final agree­
ment, on internal Chinese arrangements. In other words, the immediacy 
of the situation called for implementation of the proposals before reach­
ing a negotiated settlement between the Communists and the Kuomintang-­
contrary to the condition lvhich Hurley had demanded. 
9Ibid • , 245. 
1.°Ibid • 
11.l bid . , 244. 
163 
Again, the staff referred to the Yugoslavian predicament which was 
handled successfully, it appeared, by Churchill. The statements of policy 
should perhaps be made to Chiang in private, they suggested, but in the 
. 
event that he refused to cooperate, the policy should be made public, just 
as Churchill had done in Yugoslavia. But even if not made public, the 
fact of American assistance would quickly become known throughout China, 
and would, the staff believed, have " ••• profound and desirable.polit­
ical effects in China.,,12 There was tremendous pressure in China for 
unity based on a reasonable compromise with the Communists, which would 
perhaps give the repressed liberal groups a chance to express themselves. 
Liberals within the Kuomintang had been ignored in the recent negotiations 
by their own government, but not by the Cow~unists. This group had be­
come djJ3illusioned and discouraged by what they saw as an AmericaI1commit­
ment to the reactionary Kuomintang leadership. But if the steps being 
proposed were implemented, the Embassy staff argued, the morale and pres­
tige of these liberal groups would be raj.sed considerably, " • and we 
would exert the strongest possible influence through these internal forces 
to impel Chiang to put his own house in order and make the concessions 
necessary to unity.,,13 
The Chungking Embassy staff had been genuinely concerned over the 
situation 'in China for some time. A great part of that concern was over 
the good possibility that the Co~~unists would turn to the Soviet Union 
for aid, purely out of necessity. This concern was expressed again in 
the February 28 report, when the staff argued that 
l2 Ibid ., 245. 
246. 
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. by such a policy, \orhich we consider realistically accepts 
the facts in China, we would expect to secure the cooperation of 
all of China's forces in the war, [and) to hold the Communists 
to our side rather than throw them into the arms of Russia (which 
is otherwise inevitable if Russia enters the war against Japan).14 
There can be no doubt that the Division of Chinese Affairs received 
this report with approval. On March 1, John Carter Vincent addressed a 
memorandum to Undersecretary Grew and to Joseph W. Ballantine, the Direc­
tor of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs,15 in which he wrote that 
• • • the probability that unity of command will not be achieved 
in the near future, considered in the light of prospective mili­
tary action in China this year, compels us to seek an alternative 
solution to the problem of effective utilization of all forces in 
China capable of fighting the Japanese. 16 
.There was every likelihood, Vincent wrote, that United States forces 
which might land in coastal areas north of Shanghai would find Chinese 
COnl.'!l!ttni:b~troops near-by. There- se-emed to 1:.e· every ind:ff.c,ation., he con­
tinued, that the Communist forces would be of assistance to the American 
troops, not only in coastal landings but in related operations against the 
Japanese in North China as well. The United States should be prepared, 
therefore, " ••• while continuing to exert our influence to bring about 
Chinese political and military unity, ,,17 to supply those forces It,hen the 
need arose, with arms and ammunition. 
But this had been said many times over in recent weeks by several 
State Dep~rtment men. What had not yet been said, and what Vincent now 
wrote, was: 
l4 Ibid . 

15Ibid ., 247. fn. 19. 

l6 Ibid ., 248. 

17 Ibid • 
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There should be no question of choosing between Chiang and the 

Conununists; of withdra\val of support fron Chiang. But likewise 

there should be no question of an exercise of our prerogative, 

dictated by military necessity, to utilize all forces in China 

capable of cooperating with us in the fight against Japan. 

Chiang, having failed to effect military unity, should be told 

that he has forfeited any claim to exclusive support. 1S 

Vincent then added parenthetically, that since writing the above report 
he had read Atcheson's February 28 report, and felt that it should receive 
. °d ° 19the most serlOUS conSl eratlon. 
On the following day, the Division of Chinese Affairs issued a 
statement entitled, "American Policy With Respect to China." Written by 
Everett ~1. Drumright with contributions from Vinc.ent and Edwin F. Stanton, 
Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, this policy statc­
ment incorporated every suggestion and argument made by the Embassy staff 
20
and by Vincent in his memo'l:"andum of the previous day. Although not' 
versed in terms as strong as those used by the Embassy staff, the policy 
statement did press the point that Chiang should be " •.. frankly in­
formed that because of the vital importance of the vigorous prosecution 
of the war we may find it necessary to give military assistance not only 
to his forces but to other groups who in the op'inion of our military au­
thorities can be effectively used in specific military operations against 
,,21t he Japanese. It was clear, the statement read, that the United States, 
must, in its own interest, maintain a flexible policy, vis-a'-vis Chiang 
Kai-shek, for two reasons. First, the United States might be in a posi­
18Ibid . 

19Ibid . 

20Ibie!.. , 249. 

21Ibid ., 252. 
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tion to withdraw support from Chiang should his government become impo­
tent; and second, " .•. the United States appears to possess, in its 
discretion to grant or to withhold support and assistance, a weapon which 
may be used to induce Chiang to cooperate •••. ,,22 
Although the title of this statement indicated that it was one 
which defined American policy toward China, the fact remained that but 
one person made policy in Washington--President Roosevelt. Unless Roose­
velt directed Hurley to follow the policy outlined on March 2, the Ambas­
sador tllould continue to follow what he considered to be the President's 
original instructions. 
Joseph Grew, Acting Secretary of State, received the policy state­
· . 23ment on t he same day l.t ~-Jas ~,yrl.tten. Although there is no indication 
th·at·-hC'~sent···the vJIro:l:e- document, he did transmit to the'President the 
Embassy telegram of February 28, with the comment that despite a number 
of encouraging developments in China over past months, the Department 
had become increasingly concerned over indications that Chiang had adopted 
an intransigent attitude toward a settlement with the Communists. "These 
developments," Grew wrote, "emphasize the need of flexibility in applying 
our policies toward China."24 The coming meeting with Hurley and Wede­
meyer, Grew concluded, would provide an opportunity to go over the whole 
situation with them, ". in particular the Embassy's recommendation 
that we consider giving war supplies to the Chinese Communists as well 
as to Generalissimo Chiang.,,25 
22 Ibid .• 251. 
23Bal1antine to Gretv, Ibid., 253. 

24
Grew to Roosevelt, lbid., 254. 

25 Ibid . 
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On March 4, 1945, Hurley was shown the Atcheson telegram at the 
State Department and his reaction to its contents was violent. 26 Claim­
ing to have been "called on the carpet" by Vincent and another man, Hur­
ley, recounting the incident in 1946, charged that the two men had put 
him on the defensive about his activities in Chirla, but that neither of 
I 
the two had understood America's role there. "H~ told Vincent the pol­
icy he had been implementing as Ambassador in Ch+a was the policy of 
the President, which had been in effect since thel beginning of the war 
I 
I 
: 
There exists no record of Hurley's conversations with Vincent on 
II . 
that day, other than Hurley's own account given t? Life Magazine in 
28 IJanuary, 1946. There does exist, however, a reqord of a telephone con-
I 
versation between Hurley and Joseph Ba.llantine Orlithe following day, in 
I 
which Hurley's objections to the Atcheson telegracl are clearly revealed. 
I 
Hurley had called to tell Ballantine that he woul~ not be able to make a 
scheduled appointment with him on that day, and ha~ then referred to the 
I 
I
conversations of the previous day about the Atchespn telegram. He wanted 
to know if his point of view had been understood. ! Ballantine told the 
I 
Ambassador it had, although it was felt that Hurley had read into the 
message implications which were not in accord withlt-he Department's in­
terpretation. 29 Apparently Hurley had argued that Iarming the Co~~unists 
would be a recognition of their belligerent status Such recognition 
26R•T• Smith, "Alone in China," 159. 
27 Ibid • 
28Ibid • 
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would be inconsistent \yith the United States' recognition of the National 
Government as the government of China. Ballantine attempted to point out 
to Hurley that he did not see how Atcheson's recommendations would in­
volve recognition of Communist belligerency, but to little avail. Hurley 
simply turned to the ethics of the telegram, telling Ballantine that he 
felt the sending of it was an act of disloyalty to him on the part of his 
staff. 
Hurley had argued furthermore, 
• • • that it reopened a question which he had thought had al­
ready been decided, that it revived the question of the recog­
nition of the Communists as armed belligeren~s, and that it was 
over that issue that General Stilwell had been recalled. He 
felt that the sending of the telegram made it necessary for him 
to fight all over again with the State Department, the War De- 30 
partment and the White House the issues raised in the telegram. 
Bailant:ine rep6"rtedly tri-ed· to convinceIIurleythao Atcheson had 
merely been doing his duty in sending his estimate of the most recent de·­
velopments in China along wi.th the thoughts of the Embassy in that connec­
tion. But Hurley had responded that he had ended the Army's opposition 
to his policy by " • getting the die-hards transferred.,,31 It looked 
to him as though he still had the State Department career officers to 
contend with nmy, " • .• who were upholding each other and who resented 
Ambassador Hurley's policies.,,32 The net effect of,the telegram, Hurley 
told Ballantine, was to undermine his efforts. The Communists would not 
be conciliatory if they thought that they were going to get supplies from 
the United States. Ballantine then closed the conversation with Hurley, 
30 b'd 261~., . 
3lIbid • 
32Ibid . 
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informing the Ambassador that any decision made would be done so at 
high levels and that Hurley should talk to Mr. J.C. Dunn, Assistant 
Secretary of State and to Mr. Grew. 
On the day fOllowing'the Ballantine-Hurley telephone conversation, 
Ballantine, Stanton and Vtncent drafted a memorandum to Assistant Secre­
tary Dunn, in which they stated that as far as they could determine, there 
was no difference in view between them, (including Atcheson) and Hurley. 
They again reviewed the recommendations which had been coming through the 
Department, and those which they had favored, particularly the ones which 
urged the creation of a unified military force commanded by an American 
officer and that of giving aid to all military forces irt China. 
As far as they could understand him, Hurley was concerned that the 
supplying of military arms· to the Communists would constitute re.cognition 
of that party's belligerent status, and would result in the speedy over­
throw of the Nati.onal Government. They differed with Hurley on both 
counts, the message indicated. Arming the Communists to the degree ~lhich 
they had in mind, would neither provide them with enough to overthrow the 
National Government, nor constitute recognition of belligerency. This 
did not involve any question of concluding a formal agreement with the 
Communists, they reported, or the taking of any steps which would consti­
tute recognition of belligerency on the part of the Communists or any 
33
other group. 
Again, the message urged that a statement be made to Chiang that, 
• • • with a viet... to expediting operations against the Japanese in 
the Jo'ar East our military "authorities may give limited quantities 
of military equipment to the Communists or any other Chinese group 
33Ballantine Memorandum, Ibid., 262. 
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which in their opinion would effectively use such equipment in 
carrying on guerilla warfare against the Japanese. 34 
In concluding the report, they stressed that Atcheson's plan had 
been proposed as a method to be turned to only in case of a deadlock. If 
there should be no deadlock, and " ••• if an agreement is reached between 
Chiang and the Conununists, which Ambassador Hurley feels confident will be 
achieved by the end of April,,,35 then no alternative plan would be war­
ranted, and the need for Atcheson's plan would not arise. 
What Hurley vIas doing during this period is not quite clear. Th.e 
most comprehensive coverages of the events following his reaction to the 
Atcheson telegram are to be found in R.T. Smith's "Alone in China,1t Her­
bert Feis' ..china Tangl~, and Don Lohbeck's Patrick J. Hurley. Smith's ac­
cOJJnt, one which 'was based almost entirely on the Hurley Pa.pers, merely 
states that, Itconfident that he still enjoyed the support of President 
Roosevelt, Hurley began the process which would bring the situation in the 
Chungking Embassy under control. ,,36 Smith then goes on to report that 
Atcheson and Service were eventually reassigned at Hurley's request. He 
offered no documentation on either of the two points. In China Tangle, 
Fei.s wrote that Hurley talked to Stettinius, Marshall, Stimson and the 
President about the issues, and, "in the upshot the'President upheld Hur­
ley. It was again decided that we would not help the Communists unless 
and until Chiang Kai-shek consented.,,37 Here again, no documentation is 
provided. 
34Ibid .,264. 
35Ibid . 

36R• T. Smith, "Alone in China, II 161. 

37Feis , China Tangle, 272. 
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As Lohb~ck reported in his biography on Hurley: 
Pat Hurley did not accept defeat. He carried his fight against 
the sabotage of American policy to higher quarters; he talked to 
Secretary of State Stetti.nius, with Chief of Staff Marshall, ,vi th 
Secretary of War Stimson, and finally President Roosevelt. 38 
. 
Lohbeck then quoted Hurley as having later said, "I won over all of 
their criticism for one reason only The President sustained my 
position and said it was in keeping with the traditional American policy 
in China.,,39 There is no indication by Lohbeck of where he obtained this 
information, except that the above quoted statement was made by Hur.1ey in 
retrospect. 
It is truly unfortunate that no record or documentable information 
is available to substantiate the three claims put forward that Hurley was 
upheld by the President. Not to be debated is the fact that Atcheson and 
Service were transferred shortly after Hurley's clash in Washington. But 
there is nothing in the record to show that this was a result of Roose­
ve1t's interference on Hurley's behalf. Furthermore, there was no need 
for the President's interference in this action. Hur1eY'was Ambassador, 
and the'reca11 of Foreign Service officers is a prerogative of an Ambassa­
dor. The alternative would be for the Secretary of State to refuse and 
cause the Ambassador considerable embarrassment which would, in turn, no 
doubt lead to his resignation. That the latter was' highly undesirable at 
that time is without doubt. 
That the President upheld Hurley on the question of American policy 
in China, as Hurley understood it, is questionable. '1'he evidence which 
is available leads to the cone1usion that Hurley did not take a strong 
38Lohbeck, 382. 

39Ibid • 
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stand with the President over the China policy which was being debated 
between the Ambassador and the Department of State. By the time Hurley 
did see Roosevelt the issue raised was one dealing with the recent agree­
ments arrived at between Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta Conference-­
agreements which were secret, but which had been the subject of rumors in 
China, and about which Hurley intended to learn more. On that point, more 
will be written later. 
Suffice it to say that there existed no substantial agreement be­
tween Hurley and the State Department on China policy. The Department 
was calling for flexibility to meet certain military exigencies which 
might arise as the war in the Far East progressed toward the final as­
sault on Japan. It was not,yet known if the United States would be 1and­
il'lg"American fOTcesalong the China coast. though it was suspected. If 
that should be the case, it was felt wise to prepare for the use of what­
ever Chinese forces were available to fight the Japanese in the landing 
areas and possibly elsewhere. This meant that Communist troops might 
have to be armed--if and when that exigency arose. The post-war situa­
tion was as yet unkno~m. But even on this question the Department was 
advocating a flexible position. Flexibility meant, to the State Depart­
ment, keeping the United States free to shift its support to a political 
leader other than Chiang Kai-shek if he should prove impotent, and unable 
to maintain a viable government. The Department was carefully avoiding 
an all-out commitment to Chiang and his government, but it was also cau-' 
tious not to indicate that American support. if it did shift from Chiang. 
it would go to the Communist Party. 
Hurley, on the other hand, was vehemently opposed to even the sug­
gestion that relatively small amounts of assistance be given to other than 
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the National Government and its forces. Not only had he become inflex­
ible in his support of the Kuomintang Government, he had reached the 
point where he would not even consider a course of action lv-hich was pro­
posed to take effect only in ~he case of his failure to bring the two 
Chinese factions together. The very suggestion was a challenge to his 
ability and he firmly believed that aid in any form to the Communists 
would constitute the recognition of their belligerent status in a civil 
war. He held this opinion in spite of the fact that men who were edu­
cated and trained in international relations rejected the argument that 
aid to the Chinese Communists to fight the Japanese would constitute rec­
ognition of that Party's belligerent status vis-a-vis the National Gov­
ernment. Perhaps Hurley believed that because he had been trained in 
law, he was better prepared to make such a judgment. 
Nevertheless, Hurley believed that the outcome of his clash with 
the State Department was renewed support for his China policy. He had 
been victoriouG over those whose intent it was to sabotage all that he 
had accomplished so far. Service and Atcheson were to be recalled, and 
in his opinion the President's faith in the Ambassador to China had been 
reaffirmed. That reaffirmation came in the form of another special mis­
sion upon which Hurley was sent following his meetings with the President. 
.CHAPTER X 
THE VICTOR FAILS 
Ambassador Hurley did, on several occasions, talk to the President 
during his February, 1945, visit to Washington. He confronted the Pres­
ident in fact, though he immediately softened his approach upon seeing 
Roosevelt's extremely poor physical condition. Having had no success in 
gathering information about the Yalta agreements from the State Depart­
ment, Hurley went to the President, as has been reported on numerous oc­
casions, "with my ears back and my teeth skinned, to have·a fight about 
1
what. hac,l... been: done." But when·- the Ambassador saw-how- ill the Pres<ident 
was, he lost all the fight he had in him, and quietly inquired about 
2
what had occurred at Ya1ta. 
According to most accounts, Hurley and the President discussed the 
Yalta Conference on several occasions far into the month of March. Hur­
ley finally prevailed upon Roosevelt to let him examine the documents, 
and once this had been accomplished, the Ambassador attempted to show 
the President that the secret portion would be a violation of China's 
territorial sovereignty.3 
1F .e1s, China Tangle, 279. See also, Lohbeck, 366. 
3For "Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War 
Against Japan," signed on February 11, 1945 by Roosevelt, Churchill and 
Stalin, see Foreign Relations; The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, 
968-84. See also Diane Shaver Clemens, Yalta (Ne,,, York, 1970), Appen­
dix A, 315. The agreement ,,7as as follows!The three signatories agreed 
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According to all that Hurley said and testified to in later years, 
the President finally came to agree that" •• Hurley's fears seemed to 
be justified," and gave the Ambassador a special directive--" ••• to go 
to London and Moscow; to speak to Churchill and Stalin; and seek a way 
to ameliorate the betrayal of China and return to the traditional Ameri­
4 
can policy in the Far East." 
But with a view to the discussions which subsequently took place 
between Hurley and the British and Russian heads of state, the directive 
which Hurley claimed to have received from Roosevelt must be questioned. 
There is no indication whatsoever that Hurley discussed the amelioration 
of the Yalta secret agreement with either of the two. In substance, his 
discussions with Churchill and Stalin revolved around questions of sup-
pOl:4:.of the American policy in China. In addition, Hurley discussed 
with Stalin the coordination of joint Soviet-American disclosures of the 
Yalta accords to Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang had not been at Yalta, and 
Roosevelt and Stalin had decided to hold back on revealing the secret 
agreement to him, both feeling that if he received the information pre­
3that Russia would enter the war against Japan within two or three months 
after Germany had surrendered and the war in Europe had been terminated. 
The conditions of Russian entry were: (1) The status quo in Outer Mon­
golia shall be preserved; (2) The former rights of Russia vtolated by the 
treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored viz: (a) the south­
ern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be 
returned to the Soviet Union, (b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be 
internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this 
port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of 
the USSR restored, (c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchur­
ian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated 
by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being under­
stood that the preetninent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safe­
guarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria; (3) The 
Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. 
All of the above were conditioned upon the successful conclusion of 
a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China. 
4Lohbcck, 368. 
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maturely, it might quickly be leaked to the Japanese. But as R.T. Smith, 
who had examined the Hurley papers, has written, " ••• the subject of 
changing the terms of the [Yalta] agreement did not arise."S 
Roosevelt had no doubt expressed some reservations about the agree­
ment to Hurley in February and March, but it appears that those reserva­
tions were over questions of implementation. He had received word from 
the State Department about the possibility of the Chinese Communists 
seeking Soviet aid if not aided by the United: States, and was well aware 
of the problems of disunity in China. These problems were no doubt re­
emphasized by Hurley in his discussions with the President. But in view 
of the,fact that Hurley's mission to London a~d Moscow was to gain a re­
statement of Churchill's and Stalin's commitment to American policy, it 
a~ars·"that Roosevelt's concern'was more witl1 gaining' guarantees that 
the Soviet Union in particular 'WOUld support the Central Government rath­
er than the Communists, when the Russians ente:red the Pacific War. 
Judging from the concerted efforts made ¢arlier in the war to con-
I 
vince Chiang Kai-shek that he need not fear th~ Russians, Roosevelt 
I 
might very well have sent Hurley to London and!Noscow on his return trip
I 
I 
to China, so that when the Ambassador returnedlto Chungking he could 
I 
again announce to the Generalissimo that he ha4 talk,ed to the Russians 
I
and had received their guarantees of support. iChiang, as well, had ex­
pressed fears of continued British imperialism lin China and Hurley's stop 
in London was quite probably aimed at alleviating those fears. 
SR.T. Smith, "Alone in China,1I 170. For reports on Hurley's conver­
sations with Stalin, see Hurley to Truman, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 
867; Kennan to Secretary of State, Ibid., 339. For Hurley's report of 
conversation with Churchill, see H~rley to Secretary of State, Ibid., 
329. 
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That this was most clearly Roosevelt's intent in sending Hurley to 
London and Moscow, is revealed in Hurley's telegram of April 14, 1945, 
sent through the Secretary of State to the new President, Harry S Tru­
6 
man, on the occasion of Roosevelt's death. As the Secretary was aware, 
Hurley began, he was then presently on a special mission which had been 
directed by President Roosevelt to confer with Churchill and Eden in 
London, and Stalin and Molotov in Moscow. Hurley then went on to out­
line the intent of his mission: 
It was the President's suggestion that I undertake to obtain co­
operation from the British and Soviet Governments for the Ameri­
can policy to support the National Government of China; to unite 
the military forces of China to bring the "lar with Japan to a 
speedy end and to support all reasonable efforts of Chinese lead­
ers for the purpose of creating a free, united, democratic China. 7 
Although Hurley did not and was not instructed to, seek an amelior­
ation of the Yalta secret agreement on his'mission, he did become en­
lightened on at least one point of British policy toward China. The Brit­
ish, he learned, had no intenUon of giving up Hong Kong. While Hurley 
and others had suspected for some time that the British were not support­
ing American attempts to unify China, his suspicions that they were in­
tent upon continuing their imperial position in the Far East were rein­
forced while in London. It was here that a basic portion of the views 
expressed in his later letter of resignation--that the United States was 
"using its reputation to • bolster imperialism, "--\"ere formed. What 
he learned from Churchill, and what he would observe in China at war's 
end, would combine to convince him of America's rejection of the Atlantic 
Charte~ principles. 
6Ibid . 

7
Ibi<!., 330. 
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Vice-president Wallace, it will be remembered, had indicated Roose­
velt's intent to return Hong Kong to China when he visited Chiang Kai­
shek in June, 1944. In Hur.ley's report to Truman of April 14, 1945, he 
wrote that Roosevelt had briefed him "..• regarding Hong Kong," and 
had authorized him to discuss it with Churchill if the question was in­
troduced. The question had apparently been raised, for, according to 
Hurley, "Churchill flatly stated that he would fight for Hongkong to a 
finish. II Furthermore, Hurley went on, Churchill had said that "'Hong­
kong will be eliminated from the British Empire only over'my dead body. ,"8 
Hurley had discussed the matter further with Churchill and had re­
marked that if the British were to decline to observe the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter and continue to hold Hong Kong, then Russia would 
probal:l>ly- makQ., similar demands on areas in North China. This would fur­
ther complicate the situation and probably nullify most of the principles 
for which the leaders of the United Nations had said they were fighting. 
Expanding on his reported remarks, Hurley added: 
I said that such a position would also be a complete nullifi­
cation of the principles of the Atlantic Charter which was re­
affirmed by Britain and the Soviet [sic] in the Iran Declara­
tion. At this point Churchill stated that Britain is not bound 
by the principles of the Atlantic Charter at all. I then called 
his attention to the fact that he reaffirmed the principles of 
the Atlantic Charter • when he signed the Iran Declaration. 
Notwithstanding all this he persisted that Britain is not bound 
by the principles of the Atlantic Charter. 9 
Hurley announced in a press conference, upon his return to Chungking, 
that he had discussed American policy with the heads of state in London 
8 . 
Ibid., 331. 
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and Moscow, and had found, ft ••• all in agreement on the Chinese pol­
,,10i cy. But when the time came, three months later, to accept the Japan­
ese surrender throughout China, it was quite obvious that the British 
had not agreed on the American policy toward Hong Kong. 
On August 11, 1945, shortly after the Japanese a~ceptance of the 
terms of the Potsdam Declaration, the new Secretary of State, James F. 
Byrnes informed the Chinese Government, through Ambassador Hurley, that 
the Allied acceptance of Japan's surrender had been forwarded through 
the Swiss Government. 1l On that same day. but in a separate message, 
Byrnes notified the Chinese Government that in accordance with the word­
~ng of the acceptance of surrender General MacArthur had been designated 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that he was to coordinate 
12
and carry-into effect the general surrender of the~.Japanese armed forces. 
In addition, the message stated: 
It is also contemplated that General'MacArthur will direct the 
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to have Japanese forces 
in China, other than those opposing the Russians, surrender un­
conditionally to you or your subordinate commanders. 13 
But on August 16, Hurley revealed to Byrnes a difference of opinion 
between the Chinese and the British over what constituted the China The­
atre. The British Embassy, Hurley informed Byrnes, had notified the 
Chinese Government that they were arranging for n ••• the despatch of 
10Hurley to Secretary of State, transcript of press conference re­
marks, Ibid., 377. 
11Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid. , 494. 

12
Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid. , 495. 
l3Ibid . 
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the necessary British forces to reoccupy and restore the adnlinistration 
,,14
of Hong Kong. • The Chinese had informed the British that this 
action was " ••• not in accord with the general order of surrender 
which President Truman has' sent to the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
,,15 h hPowers. • •• Reviewing t e wording of t ose orders, which clearly 
designated areas of Japanese surrender and to whom the Japanese forces 
were to surrender, the Chinese Government's note pointed out that " ••• 
Hong Kong is not included in the places to be surrendered to the Supreme 
Allied Commander of Southeast Asia Command and it is in the area which 
Japanese, forces are to surrender to the Generalissimo of the China 
16Theatre." In conclusion, the note stated quite emphatically that 
The Chinese Government respect all legitimate British interests, 
and are prepared to accord them every necessary protection. But 
as-'a conce'rted plan of accepting the su~render.· of the, Jap'aneae, 
forces is essential to the restoration of peace and order in 
Asia, it is suggested that'His Hajesty's Government should make 
arrangements for the acceptance of the surrender of the Japanese 
forces in accordance with the general order of the Allied Nations 
and refrain from landing troops in any place in the China Theater 
without getting authority from the Supreme Commander for Allied 
Powers and the Supreme Commander of this theater. 17 
In addition to this note to the British Embassy, which Hurley for­
warded to the Secretary of State, Chiang Kai-shek memorialized the Pres­
ident, informing him that " •.. if the British Government does take such 
actions in contradiction to the agreements and the cooperative spirit of 
the Allied Nations, it will be indeed a matter of great misfortune to the 
14Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 500. 
15Ibid • 
16Ibid ., SOL 
17Ibid. 
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All ' Chiang then suggested that Truman bring the matter to thel.es. ,,18 
attention of the British Government and request that they make their ar­
rangements in accordance with the general order of surrender. 
On August 18, Prime Minister Atlee informed Truman that the British 
Government did not concur in the Chinese Government's interpretation of 
the general order of surrender. The British could not accept, Atlee wrote, 
" ••• any interpretation of general order number one as meaning that 
Hongkong, which is British territory, is included in the expression 'with­
in China'. ,,19 
Truman apparently agreed with the British interpretation, for on 
the same day that he received Atlee's message, the President informed the 
British government that "f::-om the U. S. standpoint there is no objection 
to' the,,·,su-pl'eooer of Hong Kong being accepted-by a British~officer~, ,,20 
as long as full coordination had been effected between the British, Chi­
nese, and American forces in the area. Such action, however, did not, 
as Truman had informed the Chinese Ambassador, n ••• in any way repre­
sent U. S. views regarding the future status of Hong Kong. lin In other 
words, Truman was accepting for the present the British demands that they 
accept the Japanese surrender, but was reserving for the time any deci­
sion on the part of the United States pertaining to the future political 
status of Hong Kong. 
18Chiang to Truman, Ibid., 502. 
19Atlee to Truman, Ibid., 504. 
20As reported to Chiang in Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid., 509. 
2lIbid • 
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In forwarding Truman's message of August 18 to Chiang, Secretary 
Byrnes made it quite clear that the problem was " ..• primarily a mili­
tary matter of an operational character." No question had been raised, 
Byrnes informed the Generalissimo, " with regard to British sover­
eignty in the area.,,22 
Chiang's response to these messages was quite diplomatic though 
somewhat arrogant. He simply informed the United States that he would 
delegate to a British officer the right to accept the Japanese surrender 
on behalf of the Chinese Government 23_-a position which was tactfully 
24
accepted by Truman. Chiang was surely "saving face" with this mes­
~age, for it\olaS quite clear that Truman had accepted the British ar­
gument that Hong Kong "laS a part of the British Empi.re, and that it 
was the legiti.mate right of the British to take the surrender, therc~ 
The Japanese had taken the island from Great Britain and the Chinese had 
not taken it back. Under the circumstances, there was little Chiang 
could do. 
During the same period in which the question of Hong Kong was be­
ing debated, problems had arisen over the taking of the Japanese sur­
render in Indo-China as well. Hurley notified Byrnes on August 13 that 
the Chinese Government had be~n approached by the French ChargeI d'Affairs, 
Jean Daridan, requesting that the Chinese use the approximately 5,000 
French troops in the vicinity of Kunming for the occupation of French 
22 Ibid . 
23Chiang to Truman in Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 51. 

24
Truman to Chiang, Ibid. 
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Indo-China. Apparently Daridan had earlier informed a Chinese Government 
official that there might be "serious trouble" should Chinese troops en­
ter Indo-China, and that Sino-French relations might be gravely prejudiced 
if the Chinese did not allow the aforesaid French forces to join in the 
25
occupation of that area. 
Byrnes had acted on Hurley's message by instructing the American 
Ambassador to France to inform Georges Bidault, French Minister for For­
eign Affairs, that the Japanese in Indo-China were to surrender to Chiang 
Kai-shek in the north and to the British under Mountbatten in the south. 
This division, Byrnes wrote, was to be considered purely operational and 
. h 1· . 1 . . f . h 26w~t out any po ~t~ca s~gn~ lcance w atsoever. On August 31, however, 
Byrnes informed Hurley that the French had been notified that if they 
could make arrangements with the Chinese, which would provide for Chi­
nese acceptance of the Japanese surrender in the north and French accept­
ance on behalf of the British in the south, the matter would be left to 
27the discretion of Gen~ral MacArthur. Hurley responded on September 6, 
writing that the Chines~ Government felt that because surrender arrange-
v' ments were by then so far advanced, it would not be practicable from a 
28
military point of vie,,7 for them to accede to the French request. 
By September 11, Hurley had become totally dissatisfied with the 
developing situation in China, and in a telegram to Byrnes, expressed 
that dissatisfaction. Giving himself credit for having prevented the 
25Hurley to Byrnes, Jbid., 498. 

26
Byrnes to Caffrey, Ibid., 499. 

27
Byrnes to Hurley, Ibid. , 513. 

28
Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid. , 555. 
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collapse of the National Government predicted by Vice-president Wallace 
and two Congressional leaders in 1944, Hurley outlined Roosevelt's di­
rectives to him as personal representative to Chiang. The Ambassador 
then pointed out that the United States had some long-term diplomatic 
objectives in China and that those objectives were"•• ' • to support the 
aspirations of the Chinese people for the establishment of a free, united 
democratic government in China.,,29 The President had directed him to 
London and Moscow in April, Hurley wrote, where he had discussed with 
Churchill and Stalin all the problems pertaining to China, both military 
and civil, and had gained public endorsements from both, of the long-
range American policy. Implying that the United States' China policy 
had been well-established under President Roosevelt, Hurley proceeded 
to suggest that it was being violated. 
The fundamental issue in Asia today is between democracy and 
imperialism; between free enterprise.and monopoly. The Ameri­
can delegation at San Francisco last May voted with Great Brit­
ain and France against China and Russia on the question of co­
lonial independence. Then came the reversal of the Roosevelt 
Atlantic Charter policy on Indo-China and, perhaps, Hong Kong. 30 
Although these actions had probably been exaggerated, Hurley wrote, 
the fact remained that an opinion was steadily grolving in Asia, ". 
that America is supporting the imperialisms of Britain, France and the 
31Netherlands as against democracy." President Roosevelt had definitely 
stated in their last meeting that the United States had favored the sus­
taining of the Republic of China as the strongest stabilizing force in 
29Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 555. 

30Ibid ., 556. 

3l rbid . 
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Asia, Hurley contended. But it was being stated that these imperial na­
tions favored sustaining Japan as the dominating regulatory force in Asia. 
He was, therefore, " .•• convinced that all of the imperial nations rep­
resented in China are supporting a policy intended to keep China divided 
against herself.,,32 
Perhaps the United States had decided not to continue what Presi­
dent Roosevelt had outlined as the long-range policy toward Chlna, Hur­
ley concluded. tfuether or not this was true, he added, fl. • there• 
seems a definite trend in American policy toward the support of imper­
ialism rather than democracy in Asia.,,33 With that, Hurley requested 
permission to return to Washington. 
There could be no argument with the fact that the situation in the 
Fa:r·F.as,\iwaslittle le&(;, than chaotic when the war ended ,there. The 
atomic bomb had pre-empted long··range. coordinated planning for surrender 
arrangements. The speedy capitulation of the Japanese had come as a 8ur­
prise to most, as had the effects of the two bombs dropped on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Quick decisions and equally quick planning were the order 
of the day. Hurley was not prepared, however, for the rapidity of events 
around him, nor for the vagaries accompanying those rapid developments. 
For a man with limited patience and a hasty temper, such an environment 
was hostile and uncomfortable. 
One incident in particular had doubtlessly stuck in Hurley's mind, 
and was surely a contributor to his opinion that American policy was 
changing, without there being any concerted effort to inform him of those 
32Ibld . 
33Ibid ., 557. 
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changes. On August 20, he had wired Byrnes to inform the Secretary that 
the day before he had been summoned to the Generalissimots country resi­
dence, where Chiang had read to him, a cable from the Chinese Ambassador 
. 
in Washington. The cable constituted an outline of the United States' 
post V-J Day policy on Lend-lease, UNRRA, and the arming of Chinese for­
ces, in addition to general statements concerning the United States' 
post V-J Day economic assistance to China, as well as its relations with 
China. Asked if he was aware of these policies, Hurley was forced to 
admit that no such information had as yet reached him. Wedemeyer was 
then summoned and the cable was read again. Wedemeyer was asked if he 
4ad been in receipt of this information, and was also put in the embar­
rassing position of ansvlering as Hurley had. The Generalissi.mo then pro­
ceeded to instruct the two to meet with the appropriate government of­
ficials to begin planning for implementation of American policy.34 
Although this information did come to Hurley the next day, and 
although it was e more tentative appraisal of American po.licy than 
Chiang's cable had indicated, the fact remained that Hurley received 
the information II ••• some 44 hours after the Chinese had received 
theirs. ,,35 Given Hurley's rather high estimation of himself and his 
position, a grave error in diplomacy had been committed, not between 
the Americans and the Chinese, but between the Department of State and 
the Ameri.can A.1J.1bassador himself. 
Perhaps a trained and experienced diplomatic representative would 
have understood the circumsta~ces in which this incident had occurred, 
34Hurley to Byrnes, Ibid., 535. 

35 Ibid .,537. 
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" 
and would have taken it in stride. But Hurley lacked such training and 
was definitely without the ability to respond to the incident with subtle 
grace. On this particular occasion he merely informed the Department 
that such was in keeping with the normal course of events, which had 
found the Embassy in Chungking receiving its first indication of changes 
36in American policy from other than Department sources. 
Shortly after Hurley had informed Byrnes of his desire to return 
to Washington, the Ambassador discovered that George Atcheson and John 
Stewart Service had been assigned as political advisors to General Mac-
Arthur. In protest, Hurley composed a strongly-worded memorandum, 
c,harging that Atcheson and Service had opposed American policy in China 
and had supported the imperialistic nations in their objectives of a 
divided China. Both men, Hurley charged, supported the Chinese Communist 
Party, whose purpose it was to overthrow the government of Chiang Kai­
shek, and to bring about civil war in China. He had accomplished his 
mission in China, Hurley noted, only over the extremely able opposition 
of the t~o Foreign Service officers. 
Hurley then turned to the State Department's Division of Chinese 
Affairs, arguing that the Division had long been attempting to subvert 
his goals in China. Even after he had gained the concurrence of Churchill 
and Stalin" in American policy, the Division of Chinese Affairs had done 
all it could to report every minor skirmish and every political and per­
sonal clash, as indications of impending civil war in China. 
Talks were still continu!ng between the Nationalists and the Commu­
nists, Hurley having managed to bring Mao to Chungking, in what he thought 
36Ibid • 
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was the final successful move on his part to bring the two factions to­
gether. But the presence of Atcheson and Service in the Far East would 
disrupt the conferences, Hurley.wrote, as the two would again attempt 
to break up the talks just as they had in the fall of 1944. 37 
38But Hurley did not send this letter of protest. Instead, it ap­
pears that he left that task to Chiang Kai-shek. On September 20, Hur­
ley wired the Secretary of State that the Generalissimo had requested he 
transmit an enclosed aide-memoire to the President. 39 The aide-memoire, 
allegedly written by Chiang, pointed out that recent press reports had 
indicated that George Atcheson and John Stewart Service were to be mem­
bers of a Political Advisory Board for General MacArthur's assistance in 
determining American policy in the Far East. These press reports had 
also indi'Ceted tha~· the Board- migbt- be trc.veling to Chungking, Chiang 
added. 
Both men, the Generalissimo argued, were generally accepted in 
China as having strong convictions that a coalition between the Commu­
nist and the Kuomintang Parties should be imposed arbitrarily. They 
had both expressed views that were definitely unfriendly to the Central 
Government and had clearly revealed their support for the policies of 
the Communist Party. 
The Kuomintang Government and the Communists had been in important 
conferences for the past three weeks, Chiang pointed out, and each side 
\>las sincerely striving to reach an equitable and reasonable arrangement 
37R• T. Smith, "Alone in China," 216. 
38Ibid ., 218, fn. 21. 
39Hurley to Byrnes, Foreign Relations, 1945, VII, 565. 
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and to alemiorate their conflicting views. But there had recently oc­
curred a noticeable change in the Communists' attitude, and they were 
reliably reported to have taken,the view that n ••• prominent Ameri­
cans will soon come to China with the mission of firmly supporting the 
40Communist Party." 
They know that Mr. Atcheson and Mr. Service are sympathetic and 
they interpret the above referred to appointments as indicative 
of the change in the United States policy on China.4l 
lIe felt certain, Chiang concluded, that the United States, having 
done so much to assist China in its attempts to realize unity and dem­
ocracy, would not knowingly approve the appointment of officials" 
that might militate against the hoped-for success of the present Central 
Government. 1142 
l~," HUi"d:ey·. finally departed from Chullgking on September 23, sev­
eral things were clear in his mind. The United States had supported 
Great Britain in its desire to accept the surrender of Hong Kong, and 
had deferred to the French in their desire to accept the surrender of 
French Indo-China. The fact that the United States had clearly stated 
its position as one which applied only to the military exigencies of 
the time and not to the future political status of either area, was of 
little importance to Hurley. In addition, the United States Government 
had by-passed him, or at least had treated him with less than the dig­
nity he deserved by informing the Chinese of policy or tentative policy 
without first informing the Ambassador. To make matters worse, Atcheson 
40Ibid ., 566. 
4l Ibid . 
42 Ibid • 
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and Service had been reassigned to the Far East, an act which was a direct 
affront to the man who had succeeded, he thought, in discrediting them. 
Yet, as Hurley left China, Mao Tse-tung himself was in Chungking, 
conferring with the National Government--evidence, in Hurley's view, of 
the continuing 	success of his efforts. Hurley had met with Chou En-lai 
on September 16, and had received a draft communique to be issued as a 
joint declaration by both sides. Chou's draft contained six points, 
each with a number of subdivisions. 43 . Hurley set to work on the draft 
and simplified 	it to nine, one of which called for the promotion of a 
44bill of rights. Just prior to his departure, Hurley dictated a letter 
to be sent to the Secretary of State, in which he pointed out that beth 
sides had agreed on all points but two. Those two had not been rejected, 
the--1!les'!!!;1!tge'stated·, but were merelybeinrr re'eOlls"!f:de-:red by the Communists. 
As usual, Hurley's message was versed in optimistic terms: 
The spirit between the negotiators is good. The rapprochement 
between the two leading parties of China seems to be progressing 
and the discussion and rumors of civil war recede as the confer­
ence continues. 45 
Nor was the message lacking in self-glorification, for added to the 
dictated report was a separate statement of praise informing the Depart­
ment that both negotiating parties had " . agreed upon a paragraph 
to be included in their proposed final resolution thanking the Ambassador 
for his great services to China in bringing about the conferences and 
for his general helpfulness as mediator during the negotiations.,,46 No 
doubt Parker LaNoore, who had written a glittering biography of Hurley 
in 1932 and who had gone to Cmna in 1945 to act as one of Hurley's press 
43Chou to Hurley, Ibid., 464. 

44R•T. Smith, "Alone in China," 219. 

45Hurley to Byrnes, Forei8? Relations, 1945, VII, 468. 

46 Ibid • 
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aides, had taken Hurley's dictated message and, with Hurley's knowledge, 
had added the additional comment. 
This suspicion is more credible in view of the fact that shortly 
. 
after Hurley arrived in Washington, LaMoore was credited with an article 
printed in the New York World Telegram which, in R.T. Smith's words, fl. 
made it appear that Hurley had single-handedly united China in the face 
of a Corr~unist-inspired State Department plot to subvert his activities.,,47 
Here was the final rock for Hurley's foundation of charges yet to be 
leveled in his letter of resignation. 
Only a short time earlier Hurley had met with James Forresta1, 
Secret·ary of the Navy, and had told the Secretary that the Chinese Com­
munists were not Communists at all, and that the Soviet Union was sup­
port'ingfu11y the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The Russians did not 
want civil war or anarchy in China, Hurley told Forrestal, because theh 
own problems in Asia were far too complex as it was. But he had, at the 
same time, indicated to the Secretary the problems he had experienced 
with the Foreign Service personnel, and had suggested that these men were 
communistically inclined48_- a contradiction to say the least. 
Thus, having presented himself to American in an aura of success-­
victorious over the communist-inspired opposition of nearly all State 
Department" men with whom he had been associated--Hurley marched proudly 
into the President's office on October 13, 1945, to offer his resigna­
tion. 49 He had done his duty for America, had served well and faithfully, 
and now that China was clearly on the road to unity and democracy, it 
47R.T• Smith, "Alone in China," 224. 

"8Ibid ., 223. 

49Ibi~., 225. 
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was a 	 fitting time for the old General to step down. 
But Truman would have none of it. Refusing to accept his reisgna­
tion the President told Hurley to have a checkup at Walter Reed Army Hos­
pital and to take a few weeks' rest in New Mexico. Only then would they 
50
again 	discuss the matter of Hurley's resignation. 
On October 14, the Secretary of State announced that Hurley would 
Ch ' 51return to lna. The announcement came amid numerous reports of pro­
gress in the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations. By October 29, the 
Chungking Embassy was able to report on a news release issued two days 
previously by the Chinese Minister of Information, telling of an agree­
ment between the two sides to maintain the status quo of the Communist 
forces around the northern railway zones, provided the Communists left 
the." r ailr.oada , alone. 52 This had been the Unal point of. conflict be­
tween the two men when Hurley departed from Chungking. With this re­
solved, it looked as though unity had finally come to pass. 
But the report raised false hopes. On October 31, another Embassy 
report revealed that the National Government's news release was designed 
only for foreign consumption. The National Army, according to a later 
report to the Embassy, had managed to acquire United States arms and equip­
ment, and now that the Japanese had been disarmed, the Kuomintang forces 
were turning to the elimination of the Communists. 53 A second report of 
the same day, relayed a message from Wang Shih-chieh, Chiang's ~finister 
50Ibid • 
5lIbid . 

52
Charge in China to Byrnes, Foreign Relations, 1945: VII, 480. 
53Ibid ., 481. 
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of Foreign Affairs, which h~ld that the Russians had forbidden the landing 
of Chinese Government troops at the port of Dairen. They had made arrange­
ments for landings at the ports of Yingkou and Hulutao, but both were in­
fcrior to Dairen, and there were reported to be large concentrations of 
Chinese Communist forces near Hulutao. The Commun:i.st-Kuomintang negoti­
ations had been going well, the Minister told the Embassy, until about 
September 24. Since then the Communists had cut every railway line over 
which the Government's forces were to be transported north to occupy for­
merly Japanese-held territory. Government forces had, furthermore, suf­
fered from numerous unprovoked attacks by the Communists, there having 
been heavy Government troop casualties in a recent surprise attack in 
Shansi Province. 
Th~l11tlister had informed the Embassy that in the opinion of the 
National Government, the actions of the Chinese Communists and the re­
fusal of the Russians to allow landings at Dairel1 had a direct relation-
h . 54S lp. 
In. Santa Fe, New Hexico, Ambassador Hurley was receiving this news 
with considerable consternation. It was becoming quite clear not only 
to Hurley, but to the American press as well, that civil war in China 
had not been averted. By late October it was even clearer that full-
scale civil war was being waged there, and the press had begun openly 
and harshly to criticize the Ambassador for his activity in committing 
all-out support to the Kuomintang Government. An editorial in the New 
York Herald Tribune of November 2, leveled these charges at Hurley, 
claiming that he had made the United States a virtual ally of the 
54Ibid ., 1036. 
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Kuomintang Government in its civil war with the Communists. Accord­
ing 	to R. T. Smith's account of the editorial: 
The most outrageous a.spect of the situation, the editor said, was 
that the State Department offici,als knelv very little of what was 
going on in China, primarily because of Hurley's refusal to for­
ward to Washington any reports by subordinates which contained 
criticismof the Kuomintang. 55 
Nor was the criticism limited to the press. On November 5, 1945, 
the issue was raised in the House of Representatives by Congressman 
Albert J. Engle, whose critical remarks followed the general line of neg­
56
ative press reports, then circulating throughout the nation. 
With an eye to this increasing criticism, Hurley decided the time 
had come for him to resign, and on November 15, returned to Washington 
to prepare a letter to that effect. With assistance from Parker LaMoore 
and" 8notirer of his China press c:.ides, Lacey Reynolclt;, Hurley drafted· 
and, on November 25, signed his letter of resignation. The next morn­
ing, the Ambassador to China met with Secretary Byrnes to tell him his 
reasons for resigning. 57 
He had not been getting the support he felt he deserved from the 
Administration, Hurley told Byrnes. He had heard rumors that as soon as 
the war was over his post was to go to a deserving Democrat, and that if 
he returned to China some pretext would be found to discharge him. Fur­
thermore, 'in spite of the opposition which had been expressed to the as­
signment of Service and Atcheson to the Far East, the men were still there. 
55R. T. Smith, "Alone in China," 231. 
56 Ibid ., 230. 
57Ibid ., 232. 
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IByrnes' response was cautious as he told Hurley to reconsider his 
I 
I 
desire! to resign while he, the Secretary, had time to investigate the 
charges the Ambassador had leveled. Hurley left his letter with Byrnes 
but agreed to meet with him again in the afternoon to discuss the matter 
further. 
Meeting again that day, Byrnes attempted to convince Hurley that 
the Administration did support him and that it had the greatest confi­
dence in his ability to continue his work in China. Finally, Hurley 
gave in and agreed to fly back to China, but not until after he had ad­
dressed the National Press Club on November 28. Byrnes then informed 
Truman that Hurley would return and that a plane was being readied for 
his flight to China. 
Ful.l¥, int:ending to return to". his duties in. China, Hurley arose 
on October 27, and began casually to glance through a recent Congres_­
siona1 Record. Much to his shock, he happened upon the printed record 
of a speech given by Congressman Hugh Delacy on November 26. Delacy 
had charged in his speech that the United States had contributed mili­
tary supplies to a government bent upon suppressing the aspirations of 
millions for a new democracy which they had spent years in building for 
themselves. Delacy blamed Hurley for bringing about Gauss' resignation, 
and said that Hurley's step by step reversal of the Roosevelt-Gauss 
policies in China had made civil war unavoidable. Piling charge upon 
charge, Delacy finally accused Hurley of committing the United States to 
armed intervention in China. 
Although Delacy's charges had been based upon reports coming from 
newsmen in China, Hurley was convinced that the Congressman had received 
his information from the Ambassador's reports, the contents of which, 
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Hurley believed, had been "leaked" by personnel in the State Department 
who were in opposition to his views. Hurley had taken all the criticism 
he could stand. He immediately telephoned various press headquarters to 
inform them that he would hold a news conference at twelve-thirty. One 
half-hour later, the reporters had assembled, and without first informing 
his superiors of his fi-nal decision, Hurley announced his resignation to 
58the American people. 
Patrick J. Hurley, who had stepped from the poverty of the Oklahoma 
coal mines to a career of ". consulting with Presidents, admonishing 
Prime Ministers, consoling Generalissimos, debating with Dictators, and 
giving advice to Kings,,,59 had, perhaps for the first time in his life, 
failed. In 1938, just as the negotiations to settle the }lcxican oil ex-
p~!:a_on" dispute had broken d-own, Patrick EurJ.cy, representing the 
Sinclair interests, had gone to Mexico and had independently negotiated 
an acceptable agreement. For his services he had received in excess of 
one million dollars and Mexico's highest honor. But that dispute had 
been between the Mexican Government arid American private enterprise. 
Occurring at the height of the Good Neighbor era, the United States had 
refused to interfere. From 1941 to 1945, however, the United States 
was involved in a world war. No longer were matters to be settled by 
virtue of the gregarious nature of diplomats, or, for that matter, by 
the outgoing personality of a President. Unfortunately Patrick Hurley 
did not agree. In 1944, Hurley went to China holding the belief that, 
as in Mexico, his personality would bring the competing factions together. 
58Ibid ., 234-237. 
59See Chapter I, 23, fn. 61. 
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His independent action and approach had worked for him in 1938; why 
should it not work again? 
But as he became more deeply involved in the negotiations, the 
struggle became more and more his own. Viewing each side to be demo­
cratically-inclined, Hurley quickly introduced his own, perhaps his 
nation's, political philosophy into the proposed terms for agreement, 
and thus became personally committed to a political structure alien to 
the negotiating parties. This alone would perhaps not have been in 
error had Hurley not become so personally dedicated to the kind of unity 
which he had designed. But once he had made the commitment, the out­
come of the negotiations became the test of his mvn success or failure, 
and the man became inflexible and quite vulnerable to criticism, which 
he'always' thereafter saw dire(.:.ted at him personally, rather than, as it 
was at firRt, to\-Jard the government of Chiang Kai-shek. 
That John Stewart Service, George Atcheson and other State Depart­
ment Foreign Service personnel who came to be Hurley's scapegoats, were 
not siding with the Communists, must be considered an understatement. 
Their loyalties \-rere to their government. Their recommendations were 
made with what they saw as their government's best interests in mind. 
As John Stewart Service still maintained, in a Dece.mber 1970 interview, 
the greatest fear of the Foreign Service men with whom he was associated 
was that the. Chinese Communists, who by all indicators were far superior, 
militarily and in terms of popular support, to the Central Government, 
would be alienated by American refusals of support and would thus turn 
to the Soviet Union. If that were to occur, Service said, it was be­
lieved that the United States would eventually lose China as an ally.60 
60lnterview with John Stewart Service, December 7, 1970. 
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Though the statement was made in retrospect, the evidence shows 
throughout, that these were opinions held by many in 1944-45. 
Service and the others who had witnessed the activities of the 
Communists in Yenan were far from captured by the Marxian rhetoric 
they heard. They in fact had discounted it, as had the Russians, accord­
ing to Hurley's consistent reports. Service had considered the "so­
called" Communists to be democratically-inclined. So had Hurley, up to 
the time of his last meeting with Forrestal. 
But in spite of Service's ideological view of the Communists' form 
of democracy relative to that in America, the fact remains that his pri­
mary emphasis was on the fact that the Chinese Communists had a popular 
following compared to the Kuomintang, that because of this popular sup­
poact; tha.~Yel't&n-contt'o11e& forces were the only ones effectively fight­
ing the Japanese., and that unless the United States directE~d aid to the 
Communists as well as pressure on Chiang to bring the Communists into 
the Central Government, there would be civil war following the Japanese 
surrender. If, by that time, the United States had not shown support,of 
the Communists, but had instead supported the National Government, the 
Communists would in all likelihood turn to the Russians. But even with­
out Russian support, the Communists were clearly strong enough to defeat 
the National Government troops, and in such an event the United States 
would have supported the losing side. 
It was with this in mind, Service commented in December, 1970, that 
he and others who held the same views received with dismay the ne\V's of 
the Yalta secret agreement and the Sino-Soviet friendship pact. Those 
two 8.greements guaranteed civil ~V'ar in China, Service said, Once Chiang 
was assured that the Russians would not support the Chinese Communists, 
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he had confidence in his ability to win in a civil war and was no longer 
hesitant to launch an all-out effort to eliminate the Communists. 6l 
But -Hurley had viewed the Sino-Soviet pact much to the contrary. 
He firmly believed that once the Co~~unists realized they would receive 
no aid from the Soviets they would come to terms with Chiang's govern­
62
ment. Hurley could not have been further from the truth. 
There can be no doubt that Patrick J. Hurley was a dedicated and 
sincere American. He put a considerable amount of energy into trying 
to bring unity to China. One would be amiss in placing even a moderate 
portion of the blame on his shoulders for the problems which developed 
in post-l.Jorld War II China. It any blame were to be placed for the mis­
takes Hurley made during his tenure in China, it would he better directed 
at a President who placed too much confidence in personal representatives, 
one of whom did not prove worthy of the assignment. 
But the problem went farther than that of Roosevelt having made a' 
poor choice of Ambassadors, for Roosevelt could hardly haye been blamed 
for hisovm death. Here lay the base for the final breakdown of rela­
tions with China--in the shift from the diplomacy of Roosevelt back to 
that of the State Department; in the face of Truman's overwhelming respon­
sibility in picking up the pieces cf world events; and, because the big­
gest pieces were European, China and the American Ambassador were given 
secondary consideration in the final months of the war. Policy was in a 
state of flux through the summer and early fall of 1945, and Hurley had 
not, in fact, been kept up to date on developments. But then, neither 
had many others. 
61 . . h S .InteIvlew Wlt erVlce. 
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The fact remains that a more competent and less vain man, and one 
with more training, might easily have weathered the storm of shifting 
policy. As George F. Kennan, one of America's more experienced diplo­
• 63 
mats, indicated throughout his Russia Leaves the War, the Ambassador 
is often the last to know when policy changes have occurred. Had Hur­
ley been an experienced international politician he might have under­
stood this fact of diplomatic life, and would not have left his position 
in such an irresponRible manner. 
But Hurley's temperament had not allowed him to weather the storm, 
and as the criticism toward him increased at home in the fall of 1945, 
his vanity and pride did not enable him to fade quietly from the scene. 
He felt his reputation was at stake, so he took his case to the American 
peep-l'!;!; nearly' ruining the liv~s of several whum he picked as scapegoats 
in the process. 
One of those persons was John Stewart Service, who, on June 6, 1945, 
had been arrested following a raid on the office of Amerasia Nagazine in 
New York City. In that raid, 600 documents were discovered, classified 
from personal to top secret. They had originated in the State Department, 
Department of War, Office of Strategic Services, Office of Naval Intelli­
gence. Office of War Information, and the Federal Communications Commis­
sion. A considerable number of them had been written by John Stewart 
. 64SerVlce. 
But on August 10, a federal Grand-Jury refused to indict Service 
and two others of the six who had been arrested at the same time. 
63George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War: Soviet American Rela­
tion~ 1917-1920 (Princeton, 1956). 

64AmeraS13. PaRers,'~''3 
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Documents written by Service had, in fact 1 been among those confiscated, 
·but there was no evidence to show that he had supplied them. The Grand-
Jury voted 20-0 against indicting Service. Subsequent investigations 
ascertained that the material written by Service had been stolen from 
the Departmentts files and turned over to p~erasia.65 
Nevertheless, the fact that the arrest llad occurred, strengthened 
Hurleyts charges and made it much e~sier for him to use Service as one 
of the principal scapegoats when he! testified before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee following his resignation. The raid itself had no 
doubt confirmed Hurleyts suspicions that information was "leaking" from 
the Department. With Service being implicated, the Ambassador became 
convinced of a conspiracy against himself. 
It has been clearly shown that neither John Stey.,art Service nor 
any of the others whom Hurley charged were guilty of atteIllpting to over­
throw the National Government of China. Further evidence that Service 
in particular was unjustly charged by Hurley and later by others, in-
eluding Anthony Kubek most recently, has been provided in a 36-page 
rebuttal memorandum by Service following the publication of The Amerasia 
Paper~ in February, 1970. 66 In this detailed refutation of Kubek's at­
tempt to place Service in the "central role" in the Amerasia case, Service 
provides the strongest evidence of his innocence by listing ", , • a 
whole series of decisions conscientiously reached over the years,1t which 
were in his favor: 
66 
. See Appendix 1, "Memorandum: A Partial Examination of One Aspect 
of the Many Gross Errors Contained in The Amerasia Papers," 
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a) 	 the grand jury, which voted unanimously against my indict­
ment, 
b) 	 the State Department, under Secretary Byrnes, which cleared 
me and returned me to duty in August, 1945, 
c) 	 the Loyalty Security Board, under General Snow, and the re­
sponsible security and personnel officers of the Department 
of State, under Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, who cleared 
me in some seven investigations and hearings between 1946 and 
1951, 
d) 	 the Tydings Subcommittee, including Senator Lodge, found Sen­
ator McCarthy's charges--simi1ar to those here revived by Dr. 
Kubek--to be unfounded, 
e) 	 the State Department, under Secretary Dulles, which accepted 
my return to duty (after the Supreme Court had ruled unani­
mously that my discharge was illegal) and which, under Secre­
tary Herter, restored my security clearance in 1959 after 
another full investigation. 67 
It is sufficient to say in conclUSion, that Patrick J. Hurley's ex­
pM'ieooe' in China had a profound. effect on the lUe of at least one 
American, to say nothing of his contribution to the ideological orienta­
tion of America for at least two decades. 
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insight to his view of events, the reader must be aware that the 
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ex-ambassador's perception was clouded by what had by then become an id­
eological crusade. It may have been this that motivated Hurley's biograph­
er (Don Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley [Chicago, 1956],) to avoid mentioning 
this final Hurley testimony. 
Of greater significance was Hurley's testimony before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee's Investigatio~ of Far Eastern Policy [unpub­
lished] (Washington: National Archives), Decimal File Number 120.1/11. 
3045. These hearings, conducted very soon after Hurley resigned, were held 
to determine whether or not a full investigation of the Department of State 
was in order. Hurley's testimony showed clearly the vagueness of the ex­
ambassador's charges, and his unwillingness to cooperate when, finally, 
he refused to go into executive session where the contents of the documents, 
which would purportedly substantiate his arguments, were to be examined. 
For the student interested in pursuing Hurley's career to a greater 
extent, a task which has not yet been accomplished, the Patrick J. Hurley 
Collection, Bizzeel Library~ Manuscript Division, University of Oklahoma, 
would be an invaluable source. Unfortunately, that collection was closed 
to other than Russel D. Buhite, Professor of History at the University of 
Oklahoma, when an attempt was made to do research there in the summer of 
1970. 
The Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, at Hyde Park, New York, would al­
so reveal a considerable amount on Hurley if the student could travel there. 
Some material in this work did come from the Roosevelt Collection, thanks 
to the cooperation of Associate Professor Jim Heath, Portland State Univer­
sity, \",ho devoted part of his valuable time to search for some pertinent 
information at the Hyde Park Library in the summer of 1970. 
Some very valuable insights to Hurley's personal ideological in­
volvement in the Communist-Kuomintang negotiations are to be found in 
David D. Barrett's remembrances, Dixie Mission: The United States Army 
Observer Group in Yenan, 1944 (Berkeley, 1970). 
Also from Berkeley came the very willing and gracious remarks of 
John Stewart Service, who must surely be tired of answering questions 
pertaining to his role in China. Unfortunately, the time spent with 
Service was extremely limited, though well spent indeed. Any study of 
Hurley's role in China is incomplete and v1ill continue to be so until 
Mr. Service sees his way clear to publish his ow11 me:lloirs. A great deal 
can be learned, however, from his testimony before the United States 
Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations' State Departl~el~!-oya..!Si. Investi­
gation13"'"-(Hash±ngton, D.C., 1950). Because of the e}.tcmt of that testi­
mony and the limited nature of this work, only the actual documents 
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ember, 1970 personal letter to the author, were cited in this Hork. 
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value to this paper. General Albert C. Wedemeyer's Wedemeyer R~orts! 
(New York, 1958), and Dean Acheson's Present at the Creation: My Years 
in the State Department (New York, 1969), would be of value for a more 
comprehensive account of the whole China situation after 1944. But for 
purposes of examining Hurley's activities, both are of limited value. The 
same might be said of the Stilwell P~ers (New York, 19q8), edited and ar­
ranged by Theodore H. w'hite. Extremely superficial relative both to his 
complete works and to his relationship with Hurley during the period of 
principle focus in this work, Stilwell's edited papers do provide the. 
reader with a clear indication of why he was called "Vinegar Joe," to say 
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nothing of the opinions he held of Chiang Kai-shek. 
That portion of this work which briefly outlined Roosevelt's dip­
lomacy-by-personal-representative was based in part on a previous seminar 
paper enti.tled "To the Hurley Mission in China: A Case Study in Roose­
veltian World War II Diplomacyl1 (Portland State University, July 29, 1970), 
which used, in addition to many sources cited herein, Cordell Hull's Hem-
airs (New York, 1948). An Examination of Hull's Memoirs clearly shows
---- . 
the degree to which the Secretary of State's responsibilities were chan­
neled more in the direction of creating the structure for a post-war in­
ternational peace-keeping organi.zation than toward traditional diplomatic 
activity. Also clear in this work are his and other's opinions about 
Roosevelt's use of personal diplomatic representatives and the President's 
n~~ of,the'··State DeI~artment "vhen it came to informing the Department 
of these representatives' activities around the world (see: Ibid., II, 
1585). 
Though not cited in this paper, Harry S Truman's Memoir~, Volume I, 
(New York, 1955), are of value to the student interested in the difficulties 
Truman faced following Roosevelt's death, and the implications this had on 
China and the policy there--a policy which had been formed primarily in 
Roosevelt's mind and was transmitted in garbled form to the new President 
by Hurley "through the equally uninformed Secretary of State Stettinius. 
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The most comprehensive account of Hurley's activities in China to 
date is to be found in R.T. Smith's "Alone in China: Patrick J. Hurley's 
Attempt to Unify China, 1944-1945" (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 
University of Oklahoma, 1966). The predominant amount of Smith's material 
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came directly from the Hurley Collection at the University of Oklahoma. 
He focused to a great extent on the actual negotiations between the Com­
munist Chinese and the Kuomintang representatives, and Hurley's involve­
ment therein. He unfortunately did not have the benefit of the Foreign 
Relations volumes on China for the years 1944-1945. He was, therefore, 
unable to examine the great number of reports submitted by Service, 
Davies and other Foreign Service officers in China, other than those 
which Hurley had retained in his personal files. His account suffered 
as well, from the unavailability of documents relating to internal State 
Department attempts to formulate a reasonable China policy. Nor did he 
have the benefit of such insights as those provided by Barrett, relating 
to Hurley's inclusion of a bill of rights into the Communist Five-Point 
Prtrposal coneluded· at Yenan in' November, 19411. 
Herbert Feis' China Tangle: The American Effort in China from 
Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton, 1953 [Atheneum 1965 re­
print used herein]), is without question the most comprehensive coverage 
of wartime China diplomacy. Published prior to the printing of the For­
eign Relations 1944-1945 volumes, Feis had been granted the privilege of 
having prior access to the archival material. But because of the compre­
hensive nature of his work, Feis devoted little space to the deep-seated 
conflicts between Hurley and the Department of State personnel. "The 
main seams of the terrain of difference between Hurley and the Foreign Ser­
vice officers," were "briefly traced" by Feis in a total of five pages (see: 
Ibirl," 260-264). The one incident expanded upon was that \vhich developed 
after the Atcheson telegram of February 28, 1945 (see: Ibid., 268). 
Relative to these t\VO very excellent accounts, this paper may be 
considered to have combined and expanded upon the information they both 
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provided, with material which has since become available. In addition 
to the primary sources cited above, several related secondary sources 
were, in thAt respect, of added value. Barbara Tuchman's Stillwell and 
the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York, 1971), in spite of 
its incomplete documentation and general classification as "popular his­
tory," is the best, most comprehensive account of Stilwell's life, and, 
in particul~r, his experiences as the Commander of American Forces in 
China until his recall in 1944. James HacGregor Burns' Roosevelt: The 
Soldier of Freedom, 1940-1945 (New York, 1970) might also be classified 
a "popular history" but offers, nevertheless, a valuable contribution to 
the study of Roosevelt's life during the war years. Burns' work tends to 
substantiate that of Gaddis Smith, in his American Diplomacy During the 
Second World War, 1941-1945 (New York, 1967), which develops the theory 
that the Department of State was reduced to the subordinate task of creat­
ing a structure for the future United Nations Organization. 
Again, Feis must be credited with having written the most comprehen­
sive account of world diplomacy during the war, in his Churchill, Roosevelt, 
and Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sough~ (Princeton, 1967), 
His account, combined with Charles F. Romanus and William Sunderland's 
Stilwell's Mission to China (Washington, D.C., 1953), Stil~ell's Command 
Problems (Washington, D. C., 1955), and Time Runs Out in C. B. I '. (Washington, 
D.C., 1959), and Smith's American Diplomacy, provides an accurate account 
of Roosevelt's intent to make China a Great Power following the war and the 
gradual frustration of that policy by a China which did not live up to the 
Pres::!.dent I s expectations. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason I s The 
Undeclared War, 1940-41 (New York, 1953), contributes to an understanding 
of Roosevelt's early desire to end world colonialism, and therefore 
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complements the five accounts cited immediately above. 
The weakest portions of this and all other works which deal with 
Hurley are those relating to the man's complete life. There have been 
two biographies written on Hurley, one by Parker LaMoore, Pat Hurley: 
The Story of an American (New York, 1932), the other by Don Lohbeck, 
Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago, 1956), both of which were politically moti­
vated polemics and of little use to the scholar, except for general in­
formation. Additional material may be found in two sketches of Hurley, 
both of which were quite superficial. George Milburn's "Mr. Hoover's 
Stalking Horse," (American Mercury, XXVI, No. 103 [July, 1932], 257), 
was a rather cynical review of Hurley's life and activities leading 
to his appointment as Undersecretary of Defense by Hoover. Combined 
with a sket:ch in Who Was Who in America (Chicago, 1968, IV [1961-1968], 
477, Lohbeck's and Milburn's works offer enough information for a work 
of this nature. The task is left, hO"lever, for a more complete and ob­
jective accounting of Patrick J. Hurley's life and experiences, with par­
ticular reference to the effect he had on the ideological orientation of 
the nation after 1950. 
Appendix 1. 
Memorandum: 	 A Partial Examination of One AsPect of the !vtany Gross 
Errors Contained in Tne Amerasia Papers. 
From: John S. Service 
Date: September 18, 1970 
A few months ago (in February, 1970), the Internal Security 
Subcommittee, with the help of Dr. Anthony Kubek as editor, 
published a massive tviO-volume compendium entitled The Amerasia 
Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China. The title offers a 
good clue to the theme. It is an elaborate attempt to breathe 
new life into many of .the charges of Senator Joseph J:.!cCarthy and 
the China Lobby. Except for some re search schol6.r s ("';\'ho welcomed 
the publication of documentary materials on the period) and publi­
cists in Taiwan (who expressed opinions I'unning the gamut from 
"a turning pOii,t in hi story" to "a book of the centt<ry"), the book 
deservedly attracted little notice. 
However, on 	August 21, 1970, the Government Printing Office 
jn it s biweekly bullE: tin S8~~~~ed United state s ~-0 vel'nment_~~~~:~_~­
tions carried--fOl' this nOl'mally austere and straitla.ced sheet--a 
surprisingly 	flamboyant and imaginative notice. 
---------.------------------­
THE AMt::rV\.SIA PflPE::RS: A CLUE TO TH~ CATAS· 
TP-OP:iEOF CIiIf'It'\. ThEse documents read like a spy Ihlillcr, but 
is all the more interesting because it is true. They contain hundreds 
of official doclJm~nts, many hitherto l!l1pu;;lished, which reflect abun­
dantly the tragic errors in the Far Eastern pone}, of th~ Ul1ited Sta:~s 
Government in the closing months of \'foTid War II. The sfory of what 
happened to China prior t~, during, and jmlil~diately fJllcwing World 
War II is the subject of a number of len£lhy historical studies, Oile 
of which was the work of the aullNr of these documents. Thst story. 
hi brid, reHews as Part t of this introduct:on. P.rt II treats tlil con­
trov~rsiJl CilSd of Amer.'!sia ma;:azine, or "C~Sl of lila Six" as it 
was called in the newspa~~rs ill INS wh~n six American ,iU::er.s l'I..:r~ 
suddenly ~m;;ted on C~I!rZ3S of conspiring ttl '<lmrnit esrionaf'~' oild 
Part 111 pre~en!$ an an~ly~js of ~ome of Ihl! dccumeflt~. herein pUll­
fished in Tull t~d. wilich w',re written i,1 19.t3-1SIS rs \lindal uis­
patch€.5 by one of t:le ~rrc:it[d siJ: t John ~tC'1'jar~ Su.,ic..:., th~n a ;J>jun& 
career diplo'nat on ~iaticn in Cll!;.a. 
3!JN. VO:'JI1\P, •• 1970. 
Y4.1 B9/2:,c.~11 3/v.l 
[1Cl7j fl. iL 
}!.OO 
40N. V,;)!ume II. 19711. 
Y 4J f.3/2'flhl 3/'1.2 
[914] p. 
;1.7::; 
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'l'hc GPO bulletin obviously has a very '....ide circule,tion. Sir.ce 
its appcf•.rance) I have been deluged ~lith inquiries from i'3.!' and near, 
friend..ly and not so friendly. People ask, What is this aJ 1 about?-­
Does it contaln nel'l material on the case?--Hhy is it being reopened 
after bventy-five years? It is understandable that questlons are 
directed to me, since I am the only person mentioned by name in the. 
blUl'b. 
In this respect (but in very few others), the GPO advertisement 
is accurate. Tr.e book does, indeed, seem to concentrate on me as 
its main target. As Dr. Kubek puts it: 
His central role in the strange case of the purloined Govern­
ment-papers:rests on the i.ntegral fact that Ser:vicewasthe-­
author of so many of the documents .·,hich turned up in the New 
York office of an ardent Communist sympathizer in 1945. The 
content of these documents may prove, hO'llever, to be of even 
greater i!11portance to the historical record than the fact that 
they were s·tolen, because herejn the fall of China to Communi sm 
was anticipated E'~d espoused. (Page 70: emphasis added. All 
references are to-The~rasia Papers unless otherwise noted.) 
Lest it be thought that I am irrnrodestly jumping to conclusions, 
. here·:;.-brief'ly--is' what Dr. Kubek 1',.as done. He has carefully studied 
923 tlnon-personaltl documents turned over to the Subcommittee by the 
Justice Depa....·tme.I:t. Of' the se, he has selected 315 ('~more than a. 
third") as signif'icant enough to warrant' publication. And of the se 
315, a fthundred-odd" (about a third of the total publishedl were 
originally vrritten by me. 
Each has been chosen for at least one special reason--its 
source, its classification when known, its innate interest of 
content, or its diplomatic significance. The last reason is, 
of cour ze, the mo::.t important. Among the 315 different docu­
ments to be published here, therefore, the hundred-odd items 
from the pen of John Stewart Service that were recovered in 
the Amerasia seizures are by far the most vital. (p. 71) 
Of course I was not the only officer reporting as an individual 
from China.. There vlere several Foreign Service Officers attached, 
as I was, to the Army; others vlere scattered around the country by 
the Err.bassy to observe and report. From the mass of material avail­
able, Dr. Kube3{ has made the folloydng selection: 
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E.E. Rice 8 

E .1" • Drunll.' 5.ght 7 

R.M. Seryi~e 5 
J.K. Penfield 5 
R.S. l-18.l'd 5 
J.K. Emmerson 3 
P.D. Sprouse 2 
R.P. I;udclen 2 
O.E. Clubb 2 
J.P. Davies 1 
A.R. Ring,.,ralt 1 
J.S. Service 101 
This comes out to a total of 41 for eleven other experienced and 
-capable Foreign Service reporters in China as against my 101. The 
Embassy at Chungking \-las a large and comprehensive reporting organi­
zation s.nd certainly the principal source of information on China 

reaching the Department of State. Only 30 of its reports are in­

cluded, only 6 .from the important Consulate at Kunming, and only 

12 documents i"rom the whole State Department. It is preposterous 

to pretend that I was that much more prolific or that my 
reports had that much more "interest of content" and "diplomatic 
s:l.e,uificance. " Some. of Dr . Kubek I s strains in build:ing up my total 
will be discussed later. 
To prepar'e the reader for the documents he has selected, Dr. 
Kubek has contributed a 113-page Introduction. This has three parts: 
a historical survey of' Kuomintang-Communist rela,tions, an account 
of the Amerasia case, and an analysis of the ItAmerasia documents" 
published. The 30-page historical survey reaches John Davies, John 
Service, et al, on page 22 and thereafter "Kuomintang-Communist re­
lations" are largely ignored. I share the peroration with John 
Davies: 
••. the ha~ds at the control levers were those of a few young 
men on diplo~~tic duty in China. What John Paton Davies and 
John Stm·rart Service '\olere writing in their official reports 
was of the greatest importance at the time. They were at the 
scene as expert observers, and their despatches from China 
contained opinion wh.ich was accepted as gospel in the Depart­
ment of state. The slanted words of the career diplomats re­
leased the stefu~) therefore, to reverse the wheels at this 
juncttrre ~~d ch~~ge the direction of United States policy in 
the Far East. (p. 30) 
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. . John Davies 'Vlas not, of course, involved in the Amerasia case. 
So I clea:r:ly outshine him in Dr. Kubek I s ~Q-.page discussion of the 
case. In fact, I even outdo Jaffe, ''''ho pleaded guilty, a,.t'Jd tar sen, 
who pleaded nolo contendere. Tvlelve pages seem to be devoted ,.,holly 
to me, and I re ceive promi.nent mention on at least eight others. 
Dr. Kubek tu:rns next to an analysj.s of the Amerasia "collection 
as a whole." He 'oJ'arns his readers that I 'Was not the onlr source 
of document s reaching the "mysterlous network" of Amerasla. 
While it has been emphasized that the hundred-odd documents 
from the pen of John StevIal·t Service comprise the most 
significant segment of the 315 items published in these 
volumes, the reader ,.,ill readily recognize many other docu­
ments to be highly impo~tant not only because of their source 
but because of their content as well. (p. 7l{) 
The 2lh documents not credited to me are then dealt with in 5 pages, 
in which only 17 documents are specifically mentioned. By contrast, 
Dr. Kubek devote s 26 page s to my report s, with ::;pecific mention of 
68 of them. 
Actually, the .point need not be made sts.tistically: Dr. Kubek 
himself is quite direct---and insistent • 
••• the one whose importance to these -volumes is paramount. 
This person was John stewart Service. (p. 36) 
••• the hundred-odd items from the pen of John stewart Service .•• 
are by far the most vital. (p. 71) 
••• the hundred-odd documents from the pen of John Stewart 
Service coreprise the most significant segment •.. (p. 74) 
His fifty-odd reports from the Communist base ..• are by far 
the most important documents in these volumes. (p. 86) 
_For the busy reader, who has no time to wade through an un­
avoidably rather lengthy discussio:., let me say, therefc>re, that 
there is in fact nothing new in this ponderous effort of Dr. Kubek 
and the Internal Security SUbcommittee--except that my peripheral 
involvement in the Amerasia ~ase has, after a lapse of twenty-five 
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years, been mi:-aculously metamorphosed into the "central role. If 
If the reader is interested in the histury of ~he case itself, he 
"rill not :!'ind it in The Amerada Payers. The authoritative source 
is still the transcript and report of the Tydings Committee, published 
by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate in July, 1950. 
*' * it- * 
Before examining how Dr. Kubek tries to achieve this remarkable 
transformation, it may be more convenient to deal firsJ(. with his 
second general charge (see first quotation on page :!::), concerning "the 
content of the documents." 
Dr. Kubek's concept j.s baffling in Hs simplicity. Using, 
and going beyond, the more extravagant statements of Hurley's extreme 
late period, he essentially reduces American policy in China to un­
limited support of Chiang Kai-shek. Ergo,. to l'eport information 
critical of the Chiang regime is to "oppose and subvert" American 
policy. And to foresee the failure of the Nationalist government 
'.j..is to "espouse" 1", • Furthermore, the IDe:re submissfon of these re­
port's v:as fated to becc;ne the direct cause vf "the fall of Chi~1a ;.t~ 
But that is not all! 
Just as these documents of W'orld War II provide a clue to the 
catastrophe that befell China a few yea:r slater, so vlill The 
~merasia Papers te seen to pertain irresistibly to the present 
perplexities of American policy in the Far East. 
When the United States umdttingly assisted the wrong side in 
gain'ing control of China proper, Korea and Vietnam became in­
evitable involvements for the nation that had to assume the 
mantle of leadership in the free world. History will set it 
dOvm as simply as that. (p. 113) 
Not all scholars of the period will accept h:istory as betng 
quite as simple as that. And if they do,. argument--or even friendly 
persuasio,n--is proba.bly wasted. One thing that can be said, if 
Dr. Kubek is correct, is that there has never been a higher testi­
monial to the potency of Foreign Service reporting. 
, Dr. Kubet's line of logic has--for him--certain clear advantages. 
Since his real concern is vlhat pe alleges to be the effect of the 
repo:rts, the actual conter.t of each report has no relevance except 
as it may contain something which Dr. Kubek considers to be deroga­
tory to the Kuom:i.ntang or favorable to the Communists. Thus it is 
6 
entirely \umecessary for him to confront the question of the truth 
or fa.lsity of the information reported, or to deal wH.h the broader 
issue of the validity wId value of the reporting, either as helpful 
to ~~ tmderstanding of the contemporary situation, or a projection 
of likely future events and trends und their probable impact on the 
long-ra.n;:;e interests of the United states. This confrontation, it 
may be noted, is conspicuously absent. 
There are other advant.ages. vlhat some scholars might consider 
to be si.gnificant agreement regarding the situation in China by 
isolat,ed reporting officers scattered allover that large country 
need not, again, be related to the question of whether this une.nimity 
might indicate something about the validity of the reporting. On 
the contrary, to Dr. Kubek it is only suggestive of conspiracy. 
Other questions can also be ignored if one is "'illing to 
follmv Dr. Kub~k t s circumscribed and predestined way. What is the 
nature of Foreign Service reportin~, and what are the responsibilities 
of Foreign Service officers? Ho'" is American foreign pol icy actually 
made) and i'lhat shctlld the. role. of American public opi.nion be? vlhat 
part rr.ay have been played by the five or six hundred million people 
of China in reviev;ing "the mandate of Heavenf!? Should they have 
been permitted (by us) to express and exercise that mandate? And 
so on. 
* * * * * 
Moving back to the first segment of Dr. Kubek I s charges, we 
start dealing with things a bit more tangible. My "central role" 
in the Amerasia case, he says, rests on "the integral fact" that I 
was the author of "so many" of the "purloined Government papers" 
seized in the possession of Amerasia. Dr. Kubek lays a foundation 
by insistently drumming into the head of his reader three points: 
a) 	 that all the documents ",hich he discusses E'..nd which are 
publisheu in The Amerasia Papers were found by the FBI in 
th(;; vffices of Amerasia magazine; 
b) 	 that they ,;ere all official government documents "'"hich 
had been stolen fron. the United States government; and 
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c) that a V<2.!';f large numbe:c--"a hundxed-odd"--of these "pilfered 
••• classified U.S. Government docun:ents" i'Tere drafted by me. 
Thus one reads: 
Dr. Kubek has examined some 1.700 Government documents seized 
on Jun~ G, 19!f5, by the Feder~,l Bureau of Investigation from 
the office of Amerasia. (p. iii) 
More than 300 of these stolen Yiartime documents i.;ill be found 
in full text in the page s which follo'll. (p. iii) 
Since all the documents published herein were recovered by the 
FBI at the time of the spectacular arrest, these volumes are 
entitled The Amerasia Papers. (p. 2) 
In March of 1945--special agents of the Office of strategic 
Services made a midnight raid on the headquarters of the little 
magazine. Here .••were literally hundreds cf classified U.S. 
Government docum2nts •.. almost a hundred bore the signature of 
of John SteHart Service.... (p. 30) 
••. the fact that they were stolen. (p. '(0) 
The prec:eding parts of the Introduction are to be regarded, 
therefore, as background for the reader's personal study of 
the recovered Amerasia papers themselves. (p. 70) 
•••the hundred-odd items from the pen of John Stewart Service 
that yrere recovered in the Amerasia seizures. (p. 71) 
•.• the rich variety'of materials that Amerasia editors received 
during Horld ,\-Tar II from their secret sources within the Federal 
Government. (p. 73) 
In no way, of course, does the date of a document indicate just 
\-rhen the Amerasia people first sa',' it, but it may properly be 
assumed ~hat the earliest were perhap8 among the first to be 
pilfered. (p. 73) 
The next documents from the pen of John SteYlart Service to turn 
up in the knerasia collection were his field reports. . . . (p. 86) 
8 
Classification refers to the classificc.Uon noted at the time 
the document "Has obtained from the Amerasia offices.... (p. 115) 
Dr. Kubek recognizes that in the case of one document, No. 315, 
he has a problem. 
Since Se:.rvice 'Has making comment here en an article appearing 
in the NC"l York Times the day before, his memorandum could 
hardly have been either misdated or post-dated. It is possible, 
therefore, that this document was never in the actual possession 
of Amerasia, and that it ended up in the Department of Justice 
simply because it 'Has among the papers confiscated by the F'BI 
from Service's desk at the State Department at the time of 
his arrest. (p. 112) 
Only" skeptics /' he goes on, could wish to consider that this might 
be the case with more than this single document. But to confuse 
even the skeptics, he concludes that it is "not really important ... 
exactly how many documents Service passed--or how many documents 
comprised the total "Thich Jaffe received from his network of sources" 
(which j.s hal'dly the point Dr. Kubek started out to discuss). 
It so happens that the actual number of my reports of which 
copies were found in Amerasia has been no mystery since July, 1950. 
That is ",!hen the 'I'ydings Subcommittee (of the Senate Foreign Rela­
tions Conunittee) published the whole transcript of my lengthy hear­
ings before the Department of State Loyalty Security Board in Pal't 2, 
Appendix, of its own state Depal"tment Employee IJoyalty Investigation. 
The e.ctual number--a matter of public record for twenty years--was 
41. Not "one hundred-odd." 
While I am on the subject, testimony before the Loyalty Sec'L:.ri.ty 
Board, and in the Tydings Subcommittee hearings, established a number 
of facts about these reports: 
a) None of them was in a form that could have come from me. 
b) A number of them showed the fingerprints or bore the hand­
'\olTiting of E.S. Larsen--who was indicted and eventually 
pleaded nolo contendere. 
c) All of the doc'L:.ments had been routed to the section in the 
State Depart~ent ~here Larsen was working. 
d) l.a1'ser, had admitted giving some of the reports to Jaffe, 
9 
and "lUS an inconsistent a.'1d cha.!lgeable witness regal"ding 
9thers--ev2n concel'ning documents vlhlch he vIas kno,'ffi to 
have given to Jaffe. 
Dr. Kubek notes (correctly) that by official, "routine" a,pproval 
of the U. S. Army headquarter s in -Chungking (for who!r. the report s 
were v~itten)~ I had in 1~' possession personal copies of the memoranda 
I had prepared d-uring the Yenan period. He fails to note that I 
had also personally acquired and collected what vlUS, at that time 
in the United state s, probably e, unique collection of recent reseal"ch 
materials deal ing w-ith the Chinese Communist movement: publications, 
reports, speeches, notes of interviews, et cetera. There was, of 
course, nothing secret or improper about this attempt to find out 
all I could about the Chinese Communists: it had been !r~ principal 
assigned official duty for a long time. All of these research 
materials v/ere kept with the persona.l copies of my memoranda in my 
desk at the State Department. After my arrest, the entire contents 
of my desk--personal copies of memoranda, research materials, personal 
corraspo.ndence, address books, memos to myself--,'cere taken by the 
FBI. It was not long, however, before the Department of Justice 
conceded that none of these materials were government property or 
taken from official files, and that they were all my personal and 
private papers. Accordingly, the Department of Justice very punc­
tiliously returned them all to me--personally. 
Fortunately, the Department of J-ustice was courteous enough 
to provide a list of these personal papers that were taken and then 
returned. Furthermore, so that I could be interrogated on them, 
the Loyalty Security Board provided a list of my reports of which 
copies were actually found in Amerasia. vllien these two lists are 
compared vlith Dr. Kubek's so-called "Amerasia papers," some quite 
interesting facts are revealed. 
Sixty-nine of the documents which he selects to print were 
never an;~rwhere near Amerasia. They are purely and simply (if 
those are the right words) lifted from my personal papers. The 
Department of .rustice may have been proper and punctilious about 
returning the originals to me, but it appears t'hat somebody thought 
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it might. come in handy to keep copies. 
At one point in his Introdu(!t.ion, Dr. Kl.lbek claims that the 
editors of Amerasia he,d obtained: 
••.many translations of basic doctrinary pr'onouncements 
of the Chinese Commun:i.sts .... In other words, the Amerasia 
editors ,,;ere receiving grist of every sort, size, and 
textu.re for the mill they .;ere operating in New York. (pp. 71-72) 
This is a wonderfully graphic picture. Apparently to help drive 
home the point, Dr. Kubek prints a total of fifteen of these "doc­
trinary pronouncements"--"t"hich t1.lrn out mainly to be wartime ,vritings 
by Mao Tse-tilllg and Liu Shao-ch'i. But it happens that all fifteen 
are among the sixty-nine documents just mentioned that Vlere never 
near Amerasia. They all come from my personal papers--in this case 
my research collection. 
Some questions are suggested.' Dr. Kubelc tells us repeatedly 
that he is concerned with stolen govel'maent document s, of diplomatic 
and security significance. What, then are these papers doing in 
here? Mao Tse-tung's Vlell-kno.m "InvGstlgation cf the Rural Village" 
and J,iu Shao.-ch I i I sold stenc1by "On Self··CultivD.t:5.on" are not cle.ssi­
fied, not stolen, not U, S. government documents, and not reports of 
diplomatic significance. Even if they had been found in Amerasia 
(,,-,hicb in thif: case they I':ere not), so what? Amerasia was a specialist 
magaz~ne :i.n Far Eastern affalrs ",ith a particular interest in China. 
I 
"iliat [scholar of modern China would not be c>..--pected to have in hi s 
libra~y these basic materials, and others such as Mao's Selected 
Works. Does not Dr. Kubek, himself, have these publications in his 
possersion or readily ava:i.lable? It is hard, therefore, to see any 
reasop for their inclusion here except to provide a suggestively 
prejudicial stage-setting, The reader apparently is intended to 
v!sutize a Communist magazine busily collecting Comnunist publica­
tions! from a mysterious network of "pro-Communist ll conspirators 
Withih the government. I suggest that the only thing mysterious 
here fS the naivt!te t of Dr. Kubek, or his expectations of gullibility 
on the pa:l:t of his audlence. 
±come next to an interesting group of thirty-one documents 
among those selected by Dr, Kubek. As printea., all thirty-one are 
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fro~ my personal papers. But the material contained in each of 
them, thov.gh in somew'hat different form, actually ,,,as found in 
the Amerasia office. The int(;resting CJ..uestion~ of course, is the 
reason for this seemingly illogical choice. Wny use a copy of a 
report from my personal file, when another copy of the same report 
was available from .:hat may. legitimately be called "Amerasia papers"? 
I have some thuughts on this, .but they may come more logically at 
a. later poj.nt. 
And then, finally, Dr. Kubek has printed fifteen of my reports 
which do not come from rr:y ovm personal papers. These actually did 
come from among the "Amerasia papers." 
To summarize, among the 315 documents published in The Amerasia 
Papers, a total of at least 115 are tied to me by authorshfp or were 
a part of my personal research collection. Of this 115 documents, 
69 were from n~ personal papers and were not in Amera,sia in any 
form; 31 were n~ personal copies although the same material was in 
Amerasia in a different form; 15 were from Amerasia. Thus, 100 
. documents as printed are from my personnl papers. This makes Dr. Kubek' s 
dismissal of "skeptics" seem perl1aps a bit disingenuous--sincc the 
skept:i.cs cleaxly win by a score of 100 to 15. Nor 0.0 I find it 
possible to agree with Dr. Kubek that. the matter "is not really 
important. " 
One th:i.ng that obviously is' of importance to Dr. Kubek is to 
build up the number of my reports. This makes it difficult for him 
to a.dhere to his otm standards for selection: 
Each ~ocument publishe~ has been chosen for at least one 

special reason--its source, its classification .rhen kno-..n, 

'its innate interest of content, or its diplomatic significance. 

The last reason is, of course, the most significant. (p. 71) 

So far as reports by me '.rere concerned, diplomatic significance 

apparently inclucled: 

a request fcr travel orders, 

an incomi:Jlete and abandoned draft of a memorandum, 

very br:i.ef, sketchy outlines of contemplated but never v.Titten 

memoranda (5)" (How ciid unwritten memoranda help to 

accomplish "the fall of China"?) 
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brief, routine trclJlsmission of texts of nevIS broadcasts (3), 
similar routine transmission of nevlSpnpers (at least 3). 
strangely, my systematic collection and fori.;arding of Yenan newspaper s 
seems to have been one thing that particula.l'ly upsets Dr. Kubek! 
Service employed every device in the arsenal of propaganda ...• 
One of his favorite method.s vlaS to deliver voluminous rr.aterials 
from the Yenan daily newspaper, the Chieh ~'ang Jih Paa. • .• (p. 98) 
'The research and informational value of this type of material hardly 
needs emphasis to scholars. Personally, I was rather pleased vlith 
being able to obtain and forward the complete back file of this 
important and hitherto unavailable Party newspaper. And, as I 
pointed out in my first transmitting memorandum: "The Chieh JPang Jih 
Pao is probably of greatest value because it is a publicity and 
propaganda organ of the Communist ;Party." (Emphasis in the originaL) 
Indeed, it appears (with one exception) that every single 
piece of paper written by me, or attributable to me, that could be 
found either in Amerasia or among my personal papers, has been selected 
by Dr. Kubek for inclusion as an importa.'1t and diplomatically sig­
nificant document. If one could accept this evaluation with a 
straight face, it would seem that no field reporter has ever before 
had such a high batting average. It is an accolau.e which, under 
the circumstances, I decline. 
The solitary exception--the only memorandum not selected by 
Dr. Kubek--was my memorandum No. 5, written from Ch1.mgking in February, 
1945 , entitled "Chinese Feeler s Regarding Formosa." It reported 
the concern of some responsible non-Communist Chinese in Chungking 
that the national Government v7as not adequately prepared to take 
over the a&linistration of Formosa (Taiwan) immediately after the 
Japanese surrender. In view of the record of events in Taiwan during 
the first t.,O years of Nationalist administration, one wonders why 
this report vras not considered to have some interest of content and 
diploma.tic significance. 
One v:ay tha.t my total is increased is by duplicate printing 
of tlr!O of rrry memoranda. In each case, the basic memorandum (from 
my personal papers) is printed alone. Then it is reprinted as an 
enclosure to a transmitting Army report (from Amerasia). It seems 
reasonable to assume l ho,-rever, that anything so bi.earre i.s more 
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B.kely to be the result of editorial ove:.--sight than consciolls intent. 
There is another vlay in which the total is. given the appearance 
of being increased. Here is an exenrJ)le out of a group. In the 
bona fide "Amerasia papers" there '{e.s a copy of an Embassy despatch 
which transmitted and c0Jill1ent~d 6n a lIlcrcloranlhl'f1l "'hich I had prepared 
at Yenan. Among the per conal paper s from m~l de sk, there ~{as my 
file copy of that memorandUlil. For reasons not apparent, Dr. Kubek 
first prints the memorandum .from my personal file and then, at a, 
considerably later point, the transmitting Embassy despatch from 
Amerasia. Since the headings for both documents make prominent 
mention of "report from John S. Service," the umlary reader can 
hardly be blamed for feeling inundated by Service reports. But 
at least the editor does not--as i~ the paragraph abcve--reprint 
the memorandum .itself for a second time. 
Several pages ago, I mentioned that Dr. Kubek laid a founda­
tion for his allegation of my centrality in the Amel'asia case by 
three much-repeated ~ssertations: (1) that he is offering his 
readers only' documents found iIl Amerasia; (2) that; they were all 
documents stolen from the U.S. eovernment.; and (3) that. a hundred-odd 
of thesE' stolen official documents were dr~fted by me. It is now 
amply clear that the first assertation is false: so far as documents 
related to me are concerned, the pverwhelming majority were never 
anywhere near Amerasia. The second assertion is like-yrise false: 
most of the papers he is talking about were not official documents, 
were never in any official file, and were not stolen--they were, 
in fact, my personal papers. Not much ts left, by this point, of 
his third allegation. Dr. Kubek does indeed, by some !emarkable 
exertions, put together one hundred pieces of paper originally drafted 
by me; but the majority, being nothing more than u~ personal papers, 
were never :In Amerasia and thus have no relation to the Amerasia 
case. 
One would like to be able to conclude that Dr. Kubek had made 
a simple mistake in treat.ing my personal papers and research materials 
as having been seized in the Amerasia office. But Dr. Kubek obviously 
Y..nOHS the record; and he could hardly be that simple. The elaborate 
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ms.nner in which he has prepared £lnu repea.ted these allegations 
makes H clear ~ instead, t.hat !,he Amerasia ?apers is an attempt 
at fraudulent deception of the readel'. 
** * * 
One might leave the matter at this point--but Dr. Kubek does 
not. '1'0 buttress his allegation that I played a central role in 
the Amerasia case, he goes beyond the !!these-are-all-stolen-government­
documents!! ploy in several important ways: 
a) doubt is cast on the number of memoranda which I loaned 
to Jaffe; 
b) it is then suggested that "many" documents were fldelivered fl 
by me to Jaffe; and finally, 
c) the record is ignored and distorted to suggest non-existent 
mystery and official laxity in the prosecution of the case. 
I have, of course, al'-lays ackno\-/ledged that I permitted Jaffe 
to read and to retain for a time in his possession eight to ten 
of my personal copies of descriptive reportorial memoranda which 
I had.v.'ritten 5.n China~-
••• 1 went through ray personal copies of n,y Yenan memoranda 
and selected. several--I think about 8 or lO--whl.ch were 
purely d<esc:riptive and did not conta:i,n discussl.on of American 
m:ili tary or political policy. These I considered it \-lOuld be 
appropriate to allov! Jaffe, as a writer on China, to see ••• 
These personal copies I refer to, and from among which I 
allowed Jaffe to see selected ones of a descriptive nonpolicy 
nature, were some of my file copies of memoranda \-/hich I had 
written in China over my own signature, recording my own ob·· 
servations a~d conversations as a reporter. They did not rep­
resent, nor purport to represent, the views of the Embassy, 
the Army, or the Department of state. They bore only the un­
official classification which I placed on them when I wrote 
them, a classification \-lhich by this time was of no significance 
since the information contained in them had been extensively 
reported by American nei{Spaper correspondents who had visited 
the Co~~nist areas. They were not removed from any official 
files; they had never been in official files. 
It was not U!1usuaJ. to allow \-rriters to have access to this 
type of factual material for background purposes, r:ince reading 
the materiel or taking notes on it "las always more satisfactory 
from the vie'v:point of accuracy than merely relying on one's 
memory and ore.l recitation. (Service testimony before the Tydings 
Committee. State Dep~'tment EJPIOyee Loyalty Investigation 
L?ereafter T17, pp. 1272-1273. 
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.As alrea.dy noted, I had. offic:i.al permission to retain these 
personal copies, and kept them in rr:y ctesk at the St.ate Department. 
i'hey bore no official classificatiop.., vTere never part of the state 
Department or any other government files, and lending them to a 
journalist was not a violation of law (thou&~ admittedly--particularly 
with the benefit of hindsight--unwise and indiscTeet). FurthermoTe, 
the papers vTere loaned: not "supplied," "delivered," or "passed." 
They vJere all returned by Jaffe to me, a..'1d no reproductlons or copies 
were found in Amerasia. The record is more than amply clear on these 
points. 
Mr. HITCHCOCK. The personal copies which Service admitted 
lending to Jaffe never were part of the state Department files. 
(Testimony of Mr. Robert M. Hitchcock before the Tydings Committee, 
V!8.y 26, 1950, llJ.T, Hitchcock ~"as spectal assistant to the Attorney 
Genera.l in 1945 and in direct charge of the prosecution of the 
Amerasia case, TT, p. 1008) 
Senator TYDINGS. Now, if Service had given Jaffe his own personal 
cop:i.es, vlould he have violat.ed any injunction of secrecy as to 
state Department documents? 
Mr. HI1.'CHCOCK. To my knowledge he would have vi olated no lavT 
whatsoevel' or inj1.ln;~tion the State Depaltment may have had 
with reference to Servicef~. personal copy ••.• (TT, p. 1008) 
All documents fOQ~d in his desk at the State Department 
were carbons of his reports ~hich he ~rvi~ was entitled 
to keep. As Mr. Service suggests, it is not logical that he 
should take official copies of his reports, that had become 
Government property, when he had carbon copies that he could 
freely lend vTithout violating any law. (Tydings Committee Report, p.93) 
While not condoning it, we recognize that it wa.s an accepted 
practice for State Department officials to impart some types 
of classified information to writers in order to give them 
background information for their articles. John S. Service 
was in an tmusual position in China and, in accordance with 
General Stillwell's wishes, he maintained relations with the 
representatives in China of the American press in order to 
brief them on political and quasi-milite:~:,y developments in the 
China theater. He appears to have been alloTtjed a greater freedom 
in contacts vIith the press than would an officer in a similar 
position in 'Vlashington. r-£ should also be emphasized that 
both Mal'k Gayn and Philip Jaffe v;ere considered reputable newsmen 
and writers by the public in the spring of 1945 when Service 
first met them. (TCR, p. 93) 
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Dr. Kubek, hOi-leVer, has it somE:i-lhat differell ~ly: 
According to a statement by Service in 1957 to the State 
Department security officer otto Otepka, he passed only 
eighteen documents; and in his testimony E.S. Larsen admittecl 
having shmm to Jaffe some documents written by Service. It 
cannot be &tated viith certainty, therefore, exactly how many 
documents Service passed--or how many documents compdsed the 
total which Jaffe received from his netvrork of sources. The 
actual numbers, in both cases, are disputable and not really 
important. (p. 112) . 
It is quite clear, I think, that to Dr. Kubek the actual number of 
documents that I "passed" to Jaffee is not really important. As 
I shall note pre.sently, his next charge literally depends on this 
uncertainty. 
A few points. I made no statement to Mr. Otepka, so far as 
I can remember, in 1957. I believe my first meeting with him was 
in the a.utumn of' 1958 vihen I went through a lengthy "interrogation" 
(by a panel of three officer s, not two as Va'. Otepka says) as a 
step to\-lard my eventual security clearance. Thi s went on for more 
days and sessions than I can recall. Unfortunately, though a stenog­
raph'er""'Wat;"pre'S";!TIt and: busy ~ I have no trans(:ript: the l"edcral Loyalty
. 
Security progranI has long since .evolved beyond the stage of allO'.<ling 
the person most concerned to l'eceive transcripts in proceedings 
such as this. I repeated my best recollection that the number of 
personal copies of my memoranda involved was eight to ten. It was 
then intimated (as it had been in even more vague terms in some of 
my previous heru:ings) that someone' was supposed to have been heard 
to say to someone else that the number was eighteen. The implica­
tion--never made clear--was that this was a wiretap of a phone con­
versation betueen Jaffe and another person involved in the Amerasia 
case. There was never any identification of persons, never a record­
ing, t.ranscript, text, or even clear statement of just what was said. 
I could only reply that I believed (as I still do) that the number 
was eight to ten; but that since my recollection was .not"absolute, 
it \-<ould be difficult for me to prove othenlise if clear and positive 
evidence was presented that the. number Vias eighteen. The panel made 
no attempt to present such evidence, and I have never seen or heard 
anything that cc,uld be cons:idered eviden-::e to show that my m~mory 
I 
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is incorrect. The panel was interroga.ting me, it might be noted, 
more than thirteen years after the event--·which is nou more than 
twenty-nve years a\·:ay. I should also mention here that it is like­
wise untrue that "Service told Otepka that his on].y motive in passing 
the papers to Jaffe ,...as to discredit Ambassador H1.lrley" (fo'.)tnote. 252, 
'p. 112). I had no such motive; but even if I had, it is hard to 
see how it would have been furthered by any such action--since none 
of the memoranda mentioned Hurley or dealt with his attempts to bring 
the Communists into a coalition government. 
Dr. Kubek is not really interested, hOi'lever, in any such l'ela­
tively modest number as eighteen. He is ready to go far beyond it. 
Because evidence to the contrary is lacking, it may be assumed 
that many of Service's documents found at Amerasia were delivered 
by Service himself in these few meetings with Jaffe and his 
associates. (p. 111) 
I. understand that Dr. Kubek is not a lavT.ver: nor am I. Nonetheless, 
find it rather startling to be told that if I cannot present com­
plete ~~d incontrovertible proof of innocence, then I am guilty. 
Innocence is not al\oiays easy to pl'ove--though I have ahl<:!.Ys thought 
that there was ample direct evidence in my ovm case. But if someone 
else is found to have done wr.at you are ac.cused of, is that not to 
be considered "evidence to the contrary"? The record, as in other 
aspects of the much investigated Amerasia case, is copious. A few 
examples: 
Senator TYDINGS. Let me ask you this: '-las there any evidence 
gathered by the FBI that came to your knowledge that shovled 
that Service was connected in any manner, shape, or form with 
the taking or stealing of documents from the State Department 
other than we have had described here in your memorandum? 
Mr. HI'l'CHCOCK. No sir; other than the clearly identified 
ei.ght State Department ozalid copies which were found in 
Jaffe's brief case which I assumed, up until the time Larsen 
had admitted giving them to Jaffe, might well have come from 
Service. 
Senator 'l'YDINGS. Was he ever detected passing any document 
to anybody connected ''lith this case or anybody on the outside? 
lvIr. HITCHCOCK. No, sir, not to the best of my recollection. 
(TT, p. 1008) 
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Mr. HITCHGO:::K. From rny recollect.ion--and I think it is 
pretty good on that point.-··Larsen was in a position to supply 
them. 
Mr. HORGAN. Any of th8 documents in the case? 
Mr. HITCHCOC"'".t<. Hell, nml as I said earlier this morning, my 
recollection is that virtually all of these documents, even 
those that had not 0:riginat8d from State, had been routed to 
state. NOl-l all of these, from anything I kno,v to the cont:rary, 
had to come from IJarsen. (TT, p. 1034) 
Mr. '!'ORGAN. I s it proper to say, therefore, that from your 
handl:ing o:f the situation, you were adequately satisfied on 
the basis of the docu~ents and other Government material you 
had available to you, that the subjects who vlere being considered 
for prosecutive action ivere those who had, a hand in obtaining 
these documents? . 
Mr. HITCHCOCK. Yes; in this sense; that there was nobody else. 
Now, what I mean by that is--I am not trying to quibble. Larsen 
is the only person that I could ever attribute from the evidence 
submitted to us as having b~en able to do this, with the exception 
of Roth. (i~, p. 1035) 
Earlier in this memorandum, I mentioned a group of thirty-one 
documents printed by Dr. Kubek, where he had selected a copy from 
my personal papers although, in each case, the same basic ma.terial 
was among the documents actually :found in Amerasia. This sort of 
thing might be regarded as an accident if it happened once or twice; 
it cannot be an accident 'When, as her€', it is done consistently. 
What, then, can be the explanation for this seemingly illogical 
choice? 
Most of the copies of my reports that were in the possession 
of Amerasia had been forwal'ded to vlashington under cover of Embassy 
despatches, Army or other o:fficial reports, or were ozalid copies 
prepared in--and hence clearly the property of--the State Department. 
As the record makes very clear, these various types of· material 
were never available to me (since I never prepared the transmitting 
despatch or report). They were generally unknown to me, and were 
never in my possession. On the other hand, if it is alleged--as 
Dr. Kubek does repeatedly--that Amerasia had in j,ts possess:i.on, not 
Embassy despatches, but my Dim file copies--,.,hich Dr. Kubek points 
out I had permission to retain--then the reader will be much more 
19 

ready to believe Dr. Y.ubek when he says that "mfillY of Service I s 
documcnts found at Amerasia were delivered by Service himself .•.. " 
A..'1 ex9.tnple may ma.""e this more clear. Document No. 275 is my 
report No. 13 from Yenan, dated March 15, 1945, giving a factual 
summary of "Chinese Co:nmunist Views in Regard to Sinkiang." The 
copy of this report 'Vlhieh was actually in tne possession of Amerasia 
was an ozalid fac simile reprocl.uction of the signed original. It 
carrj ed on i't·.s face state Department di stribution symbols which 
linked it to the office in 'Vlhich E. S. Lar sen 'Vlorked. It was, in 
fact, one of the docur.:..ents which Larsen had admitted giving to 
Jaffe. The personal copy of this report which was in my desk 'VIaS 
a typed carbon copy. It could not have been very sharp and. di stinct, 
since it was the fourth copy, made on a small Hermes portable 
typei'lTiter, at night in a cave in Yenan. But it carried my hand­
written initials above my typed name on the last page. In the 
Foreign Service in those days (a..'1d perhaps also today), the drafter 
might sign the origirre.l but, of the duplicate s, he :i.nitialed only 
the.·Silc.....capy .. 
When we turn to Document No. 275 itself (page ])109), it will 
be seen from a thoughtfully added footnote that: "This is a c~.rbon 
copy, but the initials JS are wrj.tten above the typed signature." 
There is, therefore, no question whatever about the source of the 
document that Dr. Kubek has selected to print. Despite the facts 
that the copy actually in Amerasia ~.S clearer and more legible, 
and carried markings which identified it indisputably as being 
government property, he has preferred the copy from my personal 
papers--i-Ihich i.-iaS never near Amerasia.. The reader, particularly 
if he knows an;ything about State Department procedures, vTill naturally 
assume that Amerasia, \-lher e he is erl'oneously told it was found, 
could only hav·~ gotten thi s copy from me directly. 
Finally, Dr, Kubek persistently suggests that there was some 
mystery about the Amerasia case, and that :t was mishandled and 
covered up . 
••• reads 15ke a spy thriller, but is all the more interesting 
because it is true. (p. iii) 
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' •••one of the stranGest tales in recent American history. (p. 30) 
The strange case of Amerasia, like many a fictional spy 
thTiller ••. (p. 31) 
••• the strange circumstcUlce s .... (p. 35) 
•. •perhaps the most bizarre of all its peculiar feaJcures. (p. 49) 
••. strange arrangement .•. a final peculiar piece of business (p. 51) 
• •. strange case of the purloined Government paper s. . • (p. 70) 
••. secret sources within the Federal Govermnent. (p. 73) 
• •• through the).r mysterious nehlork... (p. 71:) 
• .• Service I s role in the whole strange af.fair. (p. 111) 
In no real ~ense was the Amerasia case tried; it w<::',s mer'ely 

hero.'d. (P. 51) 

• .• the e'Jlnals of American jwisprudence contain few example of 
misused legalism as shocking as this one. (p. 52) 
• •• the curtain "las quietly dra"m on the spectacular case of 
the purloined document s. (p. 55) 
Why, indeed, did the Criminal Division of the Department 

of Justice handle the whole case of Amerasia in so timid and 

apo~ogetic a n~ner ... ? (p. 59) 

••. the hitherto all-but-forgotten "Case of the Six" vlhich had 
been so tffectively buried ..• (p.62) 
Had the Amerasia case been prosecuted honestly and vigorously, 
as some had hoped ••• (p. 113) 
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One interE.:sting aspect of this labored filld studied atten,pt 
to suggest dark mysteries, both in the backgrowld of the case itself 
and in the vTay in which it was prosecuted, js that Dr. Kubek is un­
able to offer al'ly l1e.....: facts whatsoever about the case that are not 
to be found in the transcript and report of the 'Iydings Committee. 
That transcript included testimony from the lirEI and Department 
of Justice officiaJ.s in charge of investigating and p:cosecuting the 
case. It also contained the report of the 19116 investigation by 
the Hobb s Committee or the House Committee on the ..Tudiciary, the 
presentment of the Nev; York grand jU't'y in 1950, testimony bY E. S. 
Larsen, and the full transcript of ray o.m hes.1'ings before the state 
Departm<;nt Loyalty Security B9ard as '\-Tell as my testimony in three 
days of hea.1'ings before the Commit~ee itself. 
If there was ever a case which has been thro1Jghly investigated, 
and of which the full record has been opened to public scrutiny, 
it must be the Amerasia case. Unfortunately, the 'l'ydings Comro.i t tee 
finished its wo::ck twenty years ago, and its transcript s.nd report 
total some 2,850 pages. }<'rom a record of this she (though the 
Tydings transcript is not entirely taken up with the Amerasia case), 
Dr. Kubek h~s been 'l-lhat can only charitably be descl'ibed as "highJ.y 
selectlve. If It may be helpful to the reader, therefore·, to insert 
here a factual summary of the case. Thts was prepared in 1950 by 
the Department of Justice for the Tydings Committee which) after 
its long investi~ation, concluded: 
The facts set forth in the ensuing memorandum of the Department 
of Justice are in all respects consistent and in accord with 
the facts and evidence adduced before this subcommittee. 
CrCl\ p. 122) 
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'MEMon.\NDu~1 OF 'l'HE Dl:PARnIENT OJ,' JUSTICI} o~r THE A~!F;nASL\ CASE 
t:-;T~WDUCTION 
This report is It summitry or the events relating to the prosecution in the 
Amernsia cnse. In addition to the salicpt facts, it sets forth the various pro~ecu­
tion l)roblems enconntered and the rea:;OIlS for thf) decisions made at the various 
st.ageil of the litigation. The legal conclusions expres~cd are documented by an 
analysis of the pertinent SupremeComt decisions, which is attached to this 
repoit as an appendtx. 
THE BACKGROUND OF 'l'HE CASH 
"Amerasia" wa'> a bimonthly magt.-zine owned, edited, and published by 
Philip J ..Jaffe in Xew York Citro Kate tlIitchell WliS an n~sociate editor. The 
publication, ill existence for some 8 years, had a small circulation, less than 
2,000, and was devoted exclusively to politica.l and eC')I;omic matters in the Far 
f~ast. Both its editorial pOilition and the contents of its articJe~ projected the pro­
Communist vicwpoint. It" chief appeal was to persons interested ill a. spccinltzed 
study of pnn-l'acific problem;!, e\'cnts, and de\·elopment~. 
Since many avenues of comll1unication between the Far East and the United 
States were cl05ed durillg tIle war, Iler;;on:; interested in politicill, economic, and 
other developments in the I'a.cific area were cut off from the usual ~ources of pub­
lic inforl11(l.tlO!'l and were hugely dependent 011 informa.tion obtained through 
government!1.l sonrces, If:gctlly or illegally. Data. of the charMter required could 
be obtained from censored disp!1.tches, departmental retea.ses and press relntions 
offices, from on-the-record and off-the-record il!tervirn';s \dth gon)rnrnenU..1 
officifLls, from monitorcd broac1castii, and from the Onice of War Information. It 
appeared tlmt c1D.s~ified docwncnts were shown to writers and others for "bltck­
ground" purpo3Ps with the understanding that the article, i'ltory, etc. subscqumitly 
writwn would bE: submitted to censorship (l.uthcritics. And, of course, in this 
C!lsu~dr.t(l. .of this Ch!1.fncter were 1'.150 oht/\ined by ncquiring unauthorized acceSll to 
actual Government documcnts and report$. 
The Amerasia case in vestigation was commenced. l'.S a re,;;ult of au instance in 
the l!l.tter c:>.tcgOl'Y where the contente Or!l. Government, document, not authorized 
for publication, were found in an issue of the magazine Amerasia. An article, 
"The Case of Thailand," prepared by OSS, ,vas reprinted in almo3t vel'batim form 
at page 23 of the January 26, l!H5, isslle of Arnern.si::t.. 
The Thailand article dated December 11, 1944, was part of a. classified OSS 
document and in general pointed Ollt tile major differences of British and American 
vie\\l)oints on Thailand, commenting upon that country's political future. The 
document was a stard~nd OSS report pt}blished periodically eyery 2 weeks. These 
reports were made up prilll:lrily for the USd of OSS and State Department 
employees. 
THE ISITIAL SEARCH .>\ND SEIZURE BY OSS 
In February 1945 an official of the Office of S~rategic Sen-ices, in examining the 
foregoing issue of the magazine Amerasia, noticed the Thailand article. 
Since the unauthorized publication of the contents of a clas,;,ified document would 
ha.ve been n. violation of sccurity regulations, the OSS official turned the docu­
ment, together with the Amerasia article, over to ~Ir. Archibald Van Beuren, 
security officer of OSS, who, in turn, 011 February 28, ID4.'i, took them to )01r. 
Frank B. Bielaski, Director of Investigation, OSS, in New York, N. Y. Mr. 
Bielaski was requested by ~Ir. Van Beuren to place under 511r\'eillll.nce every 
person in Wa~hington who had access to the document in an effort to determine 
who was supplying secret information to the editors of the Amerasia magazine. 
When Hielaski was informed that Ilumerous person;; had access to the document, 
be decid",d against surveillance of thcse individuals, and on his o\vn initiative 
decided that the way to get the tacts concerning the matter would be to go directly 
to the offiee of the Amerasia nngazine. 
The OSS aprroacherJ the matter a3 being solei.\' One of countersecurity within 
thll.t agency. It ol'erlooked or disregarded the fact that there might be involved 
possible vhbtiolls of Federal crimin:\l laws and thnt they had no investigative 
jurisdiction wh(!.tcvcr in r<!spcct to criminal offenses. Consequently, the OSS at 
this point should hn,ve referred the entire m:J.tter to the FBI, which has primary 
investigative jurisdiction of espionage cases and unlawful removal or concealment 
of Government docllments. 
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Acting without the kr:owl~dge or approval oC tt,e Department of Justice, 
JUebs!:i proceeded to the office of the Amerr.sia magazine at 2:<'5 Fifth Avenue, 
New York City, and by subterfuge and without the kuo\';ledge or consent of 
Philip J. Jaffe, the sole owner and publisher of the Amerasia Ulagazine, secured 
admission to the Amerasir. promise3 around midnight on Suudny, 11:m:h 11. 19'15. 
}'or about 2;,f hours ther<:afte:r HidL.s~d Ilud 5 as:;istunts thO:Ollghly searched ::-JI 
the papers, records, and documents on the premises and, after eX!1.l11ining ill the 
neighborhood of 300 documents, mel5.s~:i d~cidcd to take 20 or more of tho docu­
ments to Washington as proof. After taking these documents, IHcluski and 
his Il!"sistunts then replaced all the other documents so that there would be no 
evidcncc of their illegal search and seizure. 
THE lo'JJl INYl:S'l·lOA'l1.0N 
lmmedill.toly after this search find f>ciwrc of the documents ill the premise.;; of 
Amerasia, Bielaski camc to Washington bringin~ with him the documcnts seized 
and reported to General Donovan, heRd of the vSS. ThereaftJr, the documents 
were shown to the Secretary of Stale. The latter immediately requ,~sted that 
future investigat.ions be conducted by the Pederal Bureau of Inve;;ti~atioll and 
the docutUt:nts were turned over to the Burcau at that time. ',"ith thIS informa­
tion the Burea.u immediatel} ill!1ugurated all intensive and full-sc:lle investig:'..tion 
beginniug in the middle of i\!arch and continuing until after the arrests on June 
~1"~ . 
It is, therefore, clear the illegal search of the Amerr.sia premi~es and the illegal 
seizurc of the dot)umcnts by the OS8 agents constituted the basic information 
'whieh started the FHI investigation in motion. Until the FBI received these 
documents ill l\Iarch 19-15 it lind no knowledgc oC thc activities of thc OSS agents 
and was not thcn conducting nn independent investigation of this matter. 
The invt!stigation launched bY the !<'llI, cons:sting largely oC continuolls physical 
8urveilltl.l)cc, established that J9.f1"e, in the spring oC l!H5, D1ttclc several trips to 
Washincton on which he contHcted Emmanuel S. Lr,rsell, a China speei!'.list+ 
employcd by the Stntc Department. JulIe also contacted Andrew Roth, an ON! 
lieutenant 'who W:1S 11 Far gr.::;t ~pecblbL !lltd a fJl;G tjwc employce of Amende,. 
John S. Service, 1\ State Department Foreign Service employec on duty in China, 
returncd to thc United St2.tes on al:>out April 15, 1945, and was observed in the 
company of Jaffe 011 several OCCI'.SiQllS bc~wccn that time and thc time cC hi:. 
arrest on June 6, 19-15. Oil some o~casiolls, the~e persons were observed studying 
pape!":; together or passing papers to each other, but since both Jr.ffe and Roth 
wele writing books at the time and all of the pen:ons we:e intcrested in a common 
eubject, no significant or guilty connotations could be drawn Cromsnch conduct 
without. some admissible evidence of identification of thc papers as official docu­
ments. However, there was no evidence of the contents or natu,'o of the papers 
which were passcd bctwe';lI these pcrsons.. 
Insofar as criminal prosecution was concerned, the carefully observed actions 
of the suspects in this respect were as consistcnt with innocence as with guilt. 
As was later found by the House subcommittee which made a painstaking examin­
ation of the cuse, "No Governrr.cnt itcms were ever seen to be passed from one 
subject to another, although all oC them were under constant su;yeillance for some 
time." (Report oC Subcommittee IV of the Committee on the Judiciary, House 
of Representativcs, 79th Cong., 2d sess., pursuant to H. R. 430.) 
While in New York City, Jaffe was, of courbe, in daily association with Kate 
Mitchell, bis office Ilssociate. He was also in frequent cont:1.ct with Mark Gayn, 
a correspondent and magazine writer who also specialited in Car eastcm subjects. 
Once duritlg the invcstigation, Gnyn while riding on a bus was observed reading 
what appeared to be a copy of an official rcport. This report, it was later ascer­
tained, had to do with common go;;sip about thc marital relations between Gencral­
issinlo Chiang K..i-shek and his wiCe. Generally speaking, the results of the phy~i­
c,'1.lloUrveillances of the subjects while in New York were or a neutral or negative 
chnrllc:t~r exc<:!pt as prooC of association. The surveillance f'tiled to eEtablish 
the actual theft or unauthorized remoy:d of a. single official document by anyone 
of the subjects and no evidcnce wa;l adduced which indicated t'kl.t !lony official 
documcnt or other paper W!lS ever pas)l"d or delivered by any 0f the s:Ispects to a 
kuown or suspected espionn!;c agent. In this connection, the Honse subconmlittee 
which later ruviewed thi~ cn::e found: "although the various perties wc:e frequent­
ly observed in the company of one another by trained iuYestigators, no one of 
them was ever seen to delivt:r allY Gon·rnment items to a.nother." 
The investigatiou oC the FBI, in addition to establishing association between 
the various subjects, elso eSl!1b1isbed tll.Rt there w(;re I!umerous cL"..Ssi.fied docu­
lllants or copies of such documents on the premises of Amorasia, at IJMSCll'S 
bom~ and in Gayn's home. The possession of these documents wa,s established 
by menns of unnut.horb,d and megal entries upon the premises of the subjects 
and the inforIIHl.tion and evidclIc,'.so obt:dncd could not, of COUl'se, be legally used 
, in a criminal prosecution. In fact, in {,he onmt or a sub1'cqncnt trill! or cven pre­
trial hearings, in which the ('"idcllel) was challenged, the Depll.rtment would have 
been required to concede the bcts as to thc illegAl trespasses, searches, and seizures. 
, The otI:ces or Amerasia were enterlld wit,hout senreh ,\'<urants on March 20, 
19·15, March 26, 1945, i\Iareh 27, 1945, April 23, 1945, April 24, 1945, and 
May 14, 19·1.5, and the documellts four,d thcrdn inventoried ll.lld p11otographcd. 
The opnrt.nl':nt of Philip Jacob Jl'ffe was entered withl'ut sean·h warrallts 
on April 2, 19,15, and April G, H),t5. No material of interest was locnted, 
The apartment of Emmanuel Sigurd V\rseu Vias entered without a search war­
rant on April 6, 19'15, aud some of the documents found were photographed. 
The apartment of ~Iark Julius Cayn was entered without a search w~rrant 
on April 0, 1945, and April 27, 19'15. Photographs were made of the documents 
found. 
The apartment of Kate I,ouise Mitchell was entered without Il. search warrant 
on l\Jarch 31, 19·15, Nothing material W!'l.S found. 
Of course, a criminal prosecution in any case, and pnrticulnrly in this case, 
'V.ould be the grentcst of det.errents. B1lt even absent the po:;sibility of a success­
ful prosecution (bccnuse of the necessary methods by which the e\'idence in 
this case was secured), the steps taken by the FBI were more than justified, not 
only to put a stop to the loose hnndling of Governmcnt documcnts, but also to 
protect tbe internal sccuri~y. of the country. ' 
SUB~nSSlON OP CASE '}'O CRUUNAL DIVISION 
Untill\Iay 29, 1945, the Criminal Division of the Department had no knowledge 
of the facts hereinbefore set Iorth or of the investigation conducted by the OSS 
or the FBI. On that dllte the Fir,;t Assistant of the Criminal Division was 
given a IlwmOrandlllH dated l\Io.y 29, 1915, which had lust been rcceived Irom 
the.EBI. This mcmc:a:1dlUTl briefly summarilcd the salient fact~ developed. by 
the FBI inYC;3tigation. The First Assistant was itlstructed to study this mcmo­
ralldum and make an immediate decision with respect to pro~ecutioll. The FBI 
mcmomndulIl itself solicited a dcci~ion within 2·1 hours f\,S to the arrc:>t of the sub­
jects, 
The First Assistant reviewed tbe FBI mE'IDornndum and then conferred with 
the FBI ofllcials who had the case in charge. After this conference and after a 
review of the memorandum of Mr.y 29, 1945, he came to two conclusions. The 
first conclusion was that the Departmf'nt did not then have the neces,ary legal 
evidence available to convict the individuals involved. An attachment to the 
memorandum of May 29, 1945, under the heading "Evidence" pointed out the 
warning thnt-"Most of the !oregoing information rcgarding the contacts made 
by the various principals and ~he documents wbich were exchauged were oLtained 
throu,gh highly confidential means and sourccs of information which cannot be 
used In evidence." [Emphasis supplied.1 
The Criminal Division, of course, recognizcd the obstacles inherent in the easc. 
Nevertheless, it was concluded that, with the usual "break" which attends the 
spprehension of Federal law violators, sufficient e~idence might be obtained to 
e;;tablish a casc. This conclusion was based on t.wo factors: One, that more 
tha.n 80 pcreent of Federal law violators confess their offcnse after their arrest. 
and two, by confronting the suspects with the incriminatory documents expected 
to be round on their arrest, damaging admissions might be obtained. 
It was decided to authorize the issuance of B. complr.int for three reasom: 
First, we were then at war and the indications were that the suspects were 
engaged in what might be dangerous espionage activities. Their arrest would at 
lelk't put a stop to these aetiyities and unearth their ramifications. The Bureau 
"anticipated that a. considerable amount of additional evidence will, of course, be 
de,'elopcd" against contacts r.nd a:'3ociates of the defendants after their arrests. 
Seco;'ld, it wa~ hoped that sulilcicnt legal proof might be acquired by admissions 
upon tl,eir lH1'fcSt and otherwise. ' 
Third, there existed the pO~5ibi1ity that timely motions to suppress any docu­
ments whic" might be seized at the time of the arreHt migl.~ not be ma~e. 
The Crimin3.1 Division authorized the fiJi!!g of So comphint on J He 5, 1915, 
again5t Philip J. Jaffe, Emmanud Sigurd Lar~c!1, Andrew Roth, and J hn Stewart 
Service as suggested by the Bureau, In addition, the Crimin.s.l DiviSion author­
ized the arrest of K.s.te Louiso twIitcboll and Mark Julius Gs:yn. The, comp1aint 
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charged nil six witl> 1'. CO:15pir!l.cy to violatc t.it!e 50, sect ion 3t of the Espionage 
Art" k,villg to do with the lln!lul,horizcd r€'moval 811el possession of documents 
rehting to th.:, ll!ltiOllal dcfclIse. 
On '!t.:nc 6, 1945, sJl the defendants were arrested in New York City or in 
Washington, IJ. C., lH:d in e3cll" caso where (\ defendnnt wa~ found en his prC1Jli:;<es, 
the pr('ll1isc-;< ,,;ere th<}ro:16hly senrched nnd the documents fO!lnn rernoved by the 
arresting offiCers, No "<'ol1-'>cnt to senrch" lluthorizations '\\'~re obtained froIn any 
of the defendants. 
The results of the :l.H;c;sts, the s6nl'ches and the interviews WDre, on the whole, 
disappointing: and did DOt. p:oyidc the prosecution, except in the case of I,arsen 
l'mo. Jaffc, with the evidence hoped for fIS to whel1, whtre, how, a.nd by whom the 
oflici:lI p::tpers were removed ann recciyed by the defcndauts. No documents 
were found on Hoth or Senice or at their premises. Jaffe, ?lIitchell, and Roth 
dcc\ifl{'" to sign stat('m~nts. Only It Sm9.lI})NCcntage of the documents seized by 
the }'BI related to the national defense. . 
After the arrests, the prosecution of the case "ras, on JUIlC 13, 1945, fI;:;sip;ned to 
Rohert ?II. Hitchrock, a Speda l Assistant to the Attorney General, one of the most 
ahlf', expcrie,lced, and conscientious trial attorneys in tI,e Department. Des­
ignated to assist him w:t.'; Donald B. Anderson, a former Federal Bllreau of Illycsti­
gat.ioll speei~l agent, StaLe judge, and prosecutor. 
All of the dr:fenclanU· were scp:uately represclIted by counsel and all indieations 
were PUlt the ra!\o would be \'igorOllsly defeaded. Defense coull:,el requested 
conferences with re[lr(;i;entative~ of the Criminal Di\·i,.,ion, and demnnded er.rly 
hearings in Kew York and '\'nshington. Since preliminary hearings before a 
United States Commio',,;ioner would not have been in the intere~ts of the GO\'CrIl­
ment bccall"e they \\'ould pre:mnturely exposc the prosecution evidence, an imme­
diate indirtr..1('nt wa~ ;;ought to mi'lke such h(~aringi\ unlleceS3:J.ry. Anindict.ment 
".:QuId eliminn.te the defendants' rigl1t to 1\ preHminary hearing lit which evidence 
of probahlc cause WC'Jld hl1.ve to be add\!ced. This Wh~ pnrticularly illlport1111t 
for the additional re:F;:,n tha~, it would !'<!c:uire considerable time to process in the 
FBI hthoratoTy hundl'c::!s of seized documents COl flI1gt'rprinting, ht\ndwriting, and 
tyt'ifl'gf"ftnd, to' tra~e th.:::n to their official sources, ek. 
From the very hc;6nning, coun~el for sume of the defenn:J.nts advised that 
motion;; wO'lld be Jr.lldc Ilth.eking th") Mfc;stS RfJO the s('i'>;'.Iro of the doC'uments 
and tll1tt ap1'2iC:ltion ",QuId bc mr,dt~ fo the court seeking to :!UpPl'tlSS the el'idence 
50 obtained. 
As a matter of fact, ~s ea.rly as June 11, 19{5, I,arsell had ascertained froD; the 
bundin~ snperintfnde:1t that he had permitted agents to enter Lar5en's apartment 
without Il. ser:n:h W!l.rtftut. This did not become known to the prosecutors until 
September 28, 19·15. when Larsen filed a motioll to suppress. 
In view of the fact tha.t the Government's knowl'Odge of the existence of the 
seized documents WC5- obtained by prior illegal entri.!s !',nd seMches. it WilS inevi· 
table th2.t a court wou:d suppress all of the e...·idence seized at the timc of the 
tines!.:;; 'Il'lth the resl!!t thA.t the GO\'ermnent would be without a provable case. 
For the Supreme Conrt has held that where information has been obtained by 
the GOYCmrLlent through a previo1l5 unconstitutional searoh a.nd seizure "not 
merely the e".·idence SI) !lcqllired shall not be used before the court but ths.t it 
shall not be used at p.1I" (Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. ;$35, 
389). This quoted language has been construcd by the Supreme Court as making 
inadmissible not only the e\'idence illegally obtained, but c.Iso all eviddJ,ce deriVl~d 
from leads or clues, because they are "fruits of the poisonous tree" (Nardone v. 
United Sta/E$, 303 U. S. 338, 3'10-341). 
It is appropriate to note here that, somewhat anslogous to the question of 
unla.v..rul search a.nd seizure, certain information was in the possession of the 
Criminal Di..i~ion which had been furnished by the FBI with the admonition 
that stich "informa.~i,)n regarding the contacts made by the various principals 
and the documents ddc!! were exchanged were obt:l,ined throui?\h highly con­
fidenti!!1 means and SOllrccs of information which cam",!: be usea in evidenCE." 
(Emphasis S;lpplied.l Thi:; information wus obtained by the Bureau through the 
merhum of technical s11rH:il11l.nCe, which included the recercling of conversations 
between smne of the .:kf"nd:1.nts. 
One such conyel;;~Hoa between Jaffe: !l.nd Sen'ice, occurring in the former's 
room at the Statler Hotel, Wl\~hhlgton, D. C., on :.1a;' 8, 1945, has been widely 
publicized recently dlH~ to the fact that B. single sentence thereof found its way into 
the record of au e:<;cclIth'e session of the Sella.te COalfl1ittee. In order that this 
6ingle ser.tence might be yiewed in its setting, rather tha.n out of context, the 
Department of Justice on June 26:1 ~.)O, made a\'a.i\a.ble to the comrnittee the 
transcript of the con\"cr~aiioll rcisting to this particular statement. 
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lnformatioll of this type of course could lIa ve lIO bearing 011 the question or 
prosecution. It was furnbhed by the FBI with the explic:t Il.dmcl1ition thnt it, 
wa,; obtained through highly conr1dentir.1 meuns and sourc(:s o! information and 
eould not bc u~cd in e\·idcllcc. :'Iorco\·er, evidence ot,lained hy wire t1\l;pinj.( 
or thi'Ou~h lends or ehl~S thererrom is in>ldrni:;"ible in C0':1't (.Vardone Y. ()niled 
Stal.., 30Z ti. S. 370, ,VarJol!C Y. Ulliled S{(ll~.,. 30S U. S. 33S, and Weiss v. United 
Sta/n; 308 U. 8. 321), &.nd evidcIlce obtained by plan tinil; microphollc3 on a 
dcfcndnnt's j)fcmises cannot be u5c:d when 0. tr(':;pll.ss accoI!lpani(~s its installation. 
(S'3C nolaman v. United St{/Ie.~, 316 U, S. 129; compnre United Stflles v', Coplon, 
88 'F. Supp. £121 (SnXY).) lIence, information of thi" type could not be con­
sidered in weig;hing the po~sibility of 8ucccssful prosecution in this C!lSC. 
'I'1m GHANI) JURY PRF;SEN'l' . .\.'rION 
As previou~lJ.' indicatod, in oro.,r to forestall preliminary hcaring~ dUriB;!: which 
the Government's evideIlce wou:d be needles51y di\'l!lged while the defeIldants 
could remnin sill'nL an early pre~cntation to a grand jury was decided upon. This 
enrly prescntn.tioll was planned even though the case was not yet ready for pn.'iI­
entation and t.he analysis und tracing of the docnments had hc:cn b:lrdy !)(.'\!;UIl. 
While the 1119.tter was being presented to tl;e grand jury, somo of the ddendants 
requestenn conference with the Assistan t Attorney Gcr:.eI'tll in chnrge of the 
Criminal Division. These requests wen: received on June 21, Hl-l5, the first day 
of the grand jury presentation ann on the dR.Ys immediately fol\0wing, It was 
suggested to couI1se! for the defendants that if they would agree to a postponement 
of the preliminary hearing:; the Go\'ernment would a.!Tord the defendants an 
opportunity to confer with the Criminal Diyisioll. Defense counsel ,\greed. to a 
'postponement of the prelilllinu.ry hellrings, requesttng I'.n opportunity for a flllthel' 
discussion of the case. 
Thus the llocessity for an early indktment W/l.S averted, sitlee the GO\'erllllH'nt 
was no !olll;or faced with revealing its evid'3I.ce in a pr()\ill1inl.ry he:;ring. The 
FB! WI"'S, of COI:rse, still enl;ag(';1 in the lahorious t~,sk of pro()essing the hundreds 
oLdoClIn1t'lltS that Il!ld be'em rei zed. 
A conference was held 011 June 27, 1945. Coul1sd for the dufelldnnts Mitchell 
and Gn.vn representeri that their clients were not gUilty of II criminal offense and 
that what they did W,\S bcillf~ dene by evcry newspaper reporter, I'OIHmllilS~, 
Cotr<.!spondcnt., a.nu writot in Xew York ILncI Washingtoll. 
During this confcr(;ncc, it was hrought out that the current grand jury wO'Jld 
go out of existence in a. few d!l.Ys and a discussion W!li> had as to wheLher the 
Governmcllt would apply to the court to extend the term of the grand jury then 
in session or represent the matter to the new grand jury, The Criminal Division 
reprc!!entativ('s stated that they werc inclined to extend the grand jury for 
another month but that they would review the whole case subsequent to the 
conference. . .. 
Immedintely after the conference was concluded, Kat{; l\Iitche1\'s attoruey 
otr~red to have her appear before the grand jury, ",aive immunity, and answcr 
every question put to her. This offer \\a3 particularly favorable to the Govem­
ment, For, in addition to enahling the Government to make out II stronger case 
against d'Jfendants thnn could be otherwi:;e established, the defendallts' defensive 
evidence is obtained and the witness leaves himself open to a charge of perjury 
in the eyent he makes a false statement in his sworn testimony before the grand 
jury, 
Thereafter, the attorneys for Jaffe, Gayn, alld Service also made this same 
unusual offer in writing although Jaffe later failed to appear and testify. The 
Government agreed to the appearance of the defendants before the· grand jury 
a.nd coupled the acceptance with a demand that such df'fendallts also submit 
thums.clvcs to examination by the Government prosecutors prior to their IlP­
penrall(;e befom the p:rand jury. Another condition imposed I;y the GOYcrumcnt 
wa;j that the Xe\\' York defendants, in the event of their indictment, would 
not contest their removal from Xc\\' York to \Yashington. These conditions 
were agreed to by the defendants. 
With the case in the pv,iLion outlined, it was d('cided, subject, to the grand 
iurors' consent, to withdmw the ease from thn expiring grand jury whieh had 
.(Jnly heard 1 day's testimoay and re-present the evidence to tl. new grand jury. 
This decision was bU3ed on lb" following co!,;;idt'rations and no others: 
1. The e\'idcnee and, in particular, the documents seized, hundreds in 
number, wor.: not ready for presentation to the grand !ury. 
.. 
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2. The ouc:r of the deCendants to be examined by Government counsel and 
appear before tho grand jury wilhout immunity OT counsel neces~itated 8. 
more dclibemte I;\.uti time-~om;umh:g appror.ch, preparation, !lnd grand jury 
prese!ltation. . 
'rho grand jury which heard f day's te$timony on June 21, 19,15, and which was 
expirillg on July 2, 1 !H5, \';m! informed of the above consideratbns. They were 
also informcd that if they desired to retain iurisdiction in th& mnttor it would be 
nocessnry Cor the Government to get an order extending their term for a month or 
6 weeks. The grand jurors ngreed without any objection to have the c!tsewith­
drawn Cram their consideration. 
The prepn.ration of the case was continued on an intensive scale during the 
month of July 19c15. :Starting on July 23, 1945, the Government prosecutors 
£tarted the pre-gra.nd-jury examination oC tho:3e deCendants who had offered to 
waive immunity. They were cross-examined and confronted wiLh the docu­
ments, and every elTort was made to establish thcir possible cOt~plieity. A8 the 
preparation find expo;;itioll of tho case developed it became increA"ingly clear that 
Jaffe and Larsen were the main culprits. Jaffe, Larsen, and Roth did not submit 
to examination by the Goyernment prosecutor::! or appear before the gmnd jury. 
'l'he presentation of the case to the grand jury WP.5 commenced 011 July 30, 
1945, and session" were hol,1 on July 30, 31 August I, 3, 6 nnd 7, Hi45. Three 
or the defendants (Sen'ice, 1\litchell, and Gayn) and 24 6o\'ernmcllt witnesses 
including 16 FBI agents testified before the grand jury. It must be emphasized 
that each witllcss who had testified on June 21, 1945, before tho previous grand 
jury was again clllled and testified before this grand jury and all pertincllt e\-idt'nce, 
documentary or otho;rwise, supplied to the Criminai Dh'ision v;as presented to or 
made available to the grand jury for its cOllsidcratio!l. . 
On August 10, 1945, an indictment WI::.S returner! against Jaffe, Lnrscll, !l.lld 
Roth charging them, in substance, wi~h cOllspimcy to embezzle 1).lId remove 
official dOCulllent~ without pcrmi5sion. The grand jllrY refus0d to indict Service, 
Gayn, and Mitchell afi~r listening to their own testimony !lone! the Covzl'lIment's 
testimony and evidence '.,·ith rcspec~; to then·,. 
The.. grand jury, in voting for orl:'.gdu~t luc.ictm('\!~s, ,"old a~ !oUOWG: 
---.---~----.----------..,....---~-----.----
AgR!nst Indkt·For !nLH~~mc"t VIE'lt 
---_ ._---­..__ _._---_.-----­
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1'welve grand jurors must, of course, concur before 8. valid indictment can be 
returned. The vote of the grand jury was particularly signit1cant since the pro­
ceedings were ex parte and only the Government's evidence WM presented except 
for such explanations a.<; were made by the defendants who testified without the 
aid of counseL 
Many or the grand jurors who voted [or no bills. aCter listening to the testi­
mony, adopted the position that thc loose methods of handling, filillg, contrOlling, 
and releasing official papers almost im'ited the form of activity in which the 
deferldants were engaged. They also took the position that mnny other news­
papermen and writers, besides the defendants, were obtaining access to classified 
material Cor background purposes and that the remedy lay within ·the depart­
ments and agencies rather than in prosecution. 
Ko~ only was the attitude of the grand jurors indicative oC what might be 
expected of petit jUfors, but it should be borne in milld in con~idering the question 
or the disposition of the case that the remaining defendants would be repre;)ented 
by c()nn~el on their trial,and would have their own witnesses and an opportunity 
to testify themselvCil. It i~ also worthy of note, in view of the grand jury vote, 
tha.t after a 3- or 4-month trial, only one petit juror would be required to prevent 
the con\'iction of the defendant~. 
And, fi'.ally, when;as P.. grand jury may indict 1M.ely upon a showing that 
there i:5 probable call~e for believing an offense hr..s beell committed, the petit 
~ury ~allnot ("om'jet unless it is satisfied beyor:.d a reasonable doubt tbat a defendant 
JS gUilty. • . 
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In this type of cnse it is import~nt that the Government's C'lid',Jnce be clear 
and COllvincing. To lose a case of this kind is bad not only for the prosecution, 
but it could have an adverse eITect on public opinion fl.') to the real d'H)[~Cr ir,volved 
in cases of ~!us nature. In other words, the country would tend to dcprcriate the 
case and the seriousness of the consr,iracy. In this connection it i~ interesting 
to note that the Dcpnrtment of J'.l8tice, with one exception, hils not lost!!. single 
case where Communist (l,ctivity wns I.', feature of the casco It might be added there 
that ill one case, now pending, the Government has been unable to date to 
institute prosecution because the evidence obtained would not be admis.':iible in a. 
tri~J of the case. 
, As stated previously, the indictments returned charged Ja,tTc, Larsen, Ilnd 
Roth ill substance with conspiracy to embezzle and remove official documents 
witr.out permission. The Govemmcnt had abandoned the doubtful premise that 
any considerable part of the documents related to the national defense. One 
lactor to be considered in evaluating this decision then reached by the prosecutors 
is that none of the documents seized by the OSS were knowll or available to 
the prosecutors Ilt that time. 
SpeC'iliC' documents which appeared to relate to the national deff;IlSe were made 
the object of special study by D(}partmcnt attorneys and FBI representatives 
with n view to making out pos:>ible substantive charges of espionage against one 
or more of the defendants. However, this study revealed in each instance that 
proof of some vital element was larkin,!;" In additior:, an indictmellt citarging 
bribery was prepared with respect to Larsen and JatTe, but IIll nn.oJys!s of the facts 
B,vailable established that such a charge could not be sllstained be~ause the mOlley 
paid by JatTe to Larsen's wife was ostensibly fOf typing copies of Larsen's personal 
records and not for the pnrpose of influC'ncing the official conduct or action 
of I,arsen. 
'1'he indictment, as drawn, did not require the Goverurn(.nt to prO'll;! that the 
documents reb,ted to the national deft)n;;c--only that they were official documents. 
The indictment returned was ba~()d on th~ same con"lpiracy section of the Criminal 
Code as ~he compillint. Thus it is clear that the defendants were subject to the 
same punis:ullent '011 either theory. The oniy result in the chnnge bet,ween what 
the complaint chaq.;ed alld what th..; illciictmellt charged wail to lessen the burden 
of proof for the Government. 
In this connection, it is interesting to note that th~ House subcommittee which 
later reviewed this case :>tated, after examining all the documente, "Few, if Il,ny, of 
the identifiable classified doct!ments involved in this case hr,d any real importll.nC'3 
in our 'nationa! defense or our war effort." 
In addition, the subcommittee also made the foilowing observations with respect 
to the nature and content.s of the documents involved: 
(1) Many had already been given wide publicity. ' 
(2) Many of the idtntifiable documents might have had their evid~ntlal 
value destroyed by reason of the court's sustaining the defendants' motions 
attacking the warrants of arrest. 
(3) Most of the "classified" items in question were copies. There were 
lew, if any, original documents. 
(4) The bulk of the e')cuments were not of recent date. Some were 
da.ted as early as 1936, were innocuous in content, and were and could have 
, been generally known to anyone interested in the information they contained. 
(5) Most of the items seized at Jaffe's office were type"..ritten copies. 
Some of such copies were proved to ha'le been typed in one of the Govern­
ment departments, It may be fairly inferred that the originals of such 
copies were neyer remo ved but that copies were made a.t the department or 
agency where the orig;inals reposed. 
(6) Most of the items dealt with personalities or political aspects in 
countries in the Far East. 
(7) * * * there Wa!! no evidence that My of the documents or copies 
were eyer put to any use harmful to the war efrort. 
(8) Many "clD.55ified" Goyernment documents or copies were found In 
the posses5ion of some of them, the greater Pllrt of the documents pertaining 
to politic!>l matters in Jap:m, China, India, and Asia. 
After the return of the indictment, Jaffe, Roth, and Larsen pleader! not guilty 
and attorN'Y;; for Larsen aad Roth indicated, thet they would contest the case 
very vigorvusly and would not plead guilty. On the other hand, Jaffe's counsel 
indicated the possibility of a p!f~a in the e'-ent that no sentence of imprisonment 
were jrnpo~ed. 
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Since Jalic, Roth, Ilnd Lar:;en were eh'lrgcu toget.her ill 1\ single indictment I\S 
codefcnd:lllts, the normal and desirable procedure woukl be II joint trial of all 
three, It was for this ren~()n tbat the Government did not at first regard these 
ovcrture~ (ayor.:.bly, 
A'l~ACK UPON THE GOVER~~IE~n's PI:OO~' 
While the c:',sc was in this status in the lnst week of September HH5, several 
thing.~ happenC'd which thre!ltened to destroy the Government's casco 
It develop('d that sometime ~hol'tly after I,:lrsen was rclea"ec! on boud following 
his arre:,t he contacted E. H. Sager, the manager of hi" apartment house in which 
he Ih'ed, alld told him that he, Larsen, knl'\\' that someOll(' had been in his apart­
ment. He inquired whether Sager had let the pcr:;OtlS into his apartment. It 
appe/\fi; that Sager admitted that he had given the FBI (\gent.~ the keys to Larsen's 
apartment. 
Thereafter. and on September 2·~, 19~ 5, Larscn telephoned Sager and stat.ed, 
"you remember you told me you let th05e mell into my apart.ment." To this 
Sager replied "\ cs." Lnr~en thercllpon informed Mr. Sager that his attorney 
w!:!'; dc::"irous of obtaining fin afIiel:.wit from Sager, set.tillg forth the facts of the 
situation. 
The fnets were tlmt the ageat~ had predo\lsly entered the apartment of tarscn 
twice ,,-ithout a search warrant, onc(~ on April 6, 19.J.5, to inventory nnd photostat 
the documents on the premise:> and to take typewriting speeirllens and once to 
install a microphone in an apartmcnt ill the ~amc building into which Larsen was 
to mO\'e on JUlle 1, H).15. 
0:1 September 28, 1945, the Criminal Diyision was informed that Larsen's 
attorney wa~ about to file a demurrer, motion to quash the indictment and an 
application to Sllppr!)S5 the e\'idellce obtained from the sea'!'ch of Larsen's 
apartment. . 
neprc~entati\'Cs of the Cri=ninal lJivision cotlferred with FlU officials on the 
IUorlllng of September 28, 19-1;,), an.-I it wit!! generally agreed that the CIlSP. was in 
serions jeopard;l. Annmbr:r of s\lr;~estions were made_ and rliRcard"d, The 
possibility of offerir.g to SHl'prc-;.~ \·i.lnntarily all of the t1ocumt:lHs scL.cd from 
Larsen at the tilile of his llaest, and then attempt to establish the case against 
Larsen 011 the basis of documents found in the pos;:e.osion of Jaffe, was discussed. 
However, the most seriou.~ prc1b:rlll was that J!'Jle wOllld le3.rtl of Larsen's Illotion 
and tile II sim:lar moti'Jn, in which eVl;nt the entire case would be destroyed. Aud 
. if Jaffc'~ motion to supprr.;;s were granted, the supprr'ssed evidence not only wOI.!ld 
not b" ad:nis~ible against Jaffe, but would also be inadmis3ible ag:\in~" I.arsen 
and Roth on a joint trial of all three. Sec Goldslein v. Uniled Siaies (316 U. S. 
114,119-120); McDonald v. Uniled Slat~8 (335 U. S. 451, 456, ·157, 461). In view 
or the imminence of I,arson's motion, Hme was of the eS3enee and immediate action 
bad to be taken, if the prosecution of Jaffe W~.il to be snlvaged. 
The fir3t as"ist:l.llt thereupon cl1t:ed JafTe's counsel and t1i5cu~sed his previolls 
suggestions with respect. tn Il. piNt of guilty and a conference waB arranged for thp 
cnrl~' afternoon, that same day, September 28, 19·15. 
While waiting for Jaffe's \Ya~hington couh;;eJ to appear, Larseu's motion to 
qunsh the indict ment and ~lIppress the evidence was served upon the Department. 
Immediately after the motion papers 'l\'ere served, Jaffe's attorney appeared 
(or the conference. Before admitting him, inquiry was made of the clerk of the 
district court as to whether :\[r. Larsen's attorney had filed the motion to quash. 
The clerk stated thnt the motion had just been filed and had already been reviewed 
by the press. 
_ ..The motion as filed nl1('ged briefly that the evidence obtained by the Go\'ern­
Inent had been obtainE'd by illegal ~earches and sei7.Ures, by wire tapping and by 
the me>;;ll detention of the defendant. Larsen supported the application by a. 
detailed 13-pa!;c afTida\it ill "'hieh he swore that at the time of hi;') arrest at his 
apartment the np:ents bt'tray€'d a prior knowledge and familiarity with his personal 
effects which ther could not hr.v(; acquired by [C'gallllcnns. He also set forth the 
building ml1nager'~ arlmbi'ioll thllt he had pernlittcd the ap:ents to have access to 
his apartment in the ahsence of LarscH and prior to his arrest. 
JAFFE'S PLEA OP GUlL1'Y 
It W!'i~ realized that when Jaffe's lawyer eOllcll1d,!d his conference with the 
DcpMtn.cnt, he would learn of IAH5en's motion frNIl the new~parer acconnts, and 
would thcr"after in all probability initiate D. ~illlilar motion on beh(!.1f of his O'\\'ll 
client, It. was thout:lht impcrath'e to do wh5tenr po:;~ible to salvar,e the case 
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ag~in~t Jr.!!e. To this end an effort wn~ nl~,ue to oulnin au immediate and firm 
commnment from Jaffe's attorney that Joffe would plead guilty. 
During ti:<: disCUS5i;)11" the p:utieil to tlliJ con(erc,nrc spc;cul::lt,:-d Oil thc nature 
of the l!'·.)n(C!1ce which the cou:,t would be likely to illlpo5e. The Criminal Division 
advised Jafi",,',, !!.ttom,,}, that the jucl:'cs of the DL,trict of Cnlumub did not ordi­
Ilarily n"k f.)r or req 1le5t nlly rc('ommondation and that we were not in a positicn 
to Olll.kc any commit ment with respect to sentence. After some discussion, it 
was finally e.grced that J:l.fIe would plead gUilty and the Governtn~'nt 'Would, if 
permiLteci, recomm,)ltr! the impodition of a subst:wtial finc. Thc maximum finc 
was 810,000 nnd it w:,s umlcr3tood that such a fine Y;Quld be paid by JafTe ill the 
event it was imposNl. f]O\\'cvcr, Jc\ffc's COllllsel conditioned his commitment 
upon the premise that the court would conscnt to he::lr a recommendation from 
the Gcv,~rr.lIlent. After Jaffe's counsel was firmly committed to pleading his 
client guilty, inquiry was m:ldc as to the earliest time iu which the plea of guilty 
could he entrred. In,!7c's counsel staled that the plen, would be entcrcd whenever 
the GO\'erumcnt could arrange for it. 
This conference took pl::lce on F'riday afternoon, September 28, 1945. 
'lhe Criminal Divi:"ion W,,1~ nnxious to di<iposi? of JaITe's case before hc would 
reconsider (:h he had done before) or file a motion to suppress t!le e\'idence 
obtained ffi.JUl his pr.:miscs. Upon inquiry it wa.s leftrneri that Judge Proctor 
would be holding court on Saturd:lY morning, Scptcmb:lr 29. 1\)·15. Judbe 
Proctor W:.l$ asked to take Jf\lTc's plea and agreed to do so. Judge Proctor nlso 
ad\'ised tht(t he would consent to hear the recommendation of Gon:rnment and 
defense counsel a~ to ;;clltencc Ilrter a plea of gllnty wus entered by Jane. 
On Sn.turd.1Y morning, September 29, 1915, .JnlTe pte"ded guilt.y to the felony 
dwrgc. Judge Pl'odor heard the vit'ws of Jaflu's ~oljn'l::;1 and GovcrlLment coun­
sel. GO\'cr!ltncnt cOlm~c1 recommended th!l.t a substantial fine bl) imposed. After 
bearing counsel for beth parti"s, Judge Proctor imposed a fine of S2,50n, ",hidl 
was paid. There had !lot heell any prescntence confercncc or con;;ultl1tion of allY 
kind 'with the court before the cnse came on for pica and sentence. 
DISF OSnlaN AS '1'0 RE~L\l:\lNG DE<'!;::SI>.~~rs 
With the case of In!7e safely dispo~cd of ill what \n\S considered a lllRI,ller salis­
("ctery un(!,:]' the cireullbtances, tlte Dvp:l.lt mrnt was still cQ;;[n)[lV:d with thl) 
motion to sUl'~m:ss fi!'.d by L:.1rscn. A IIInnlx;1' QC cod"renrcs wcre held with tlJf' 
. attorllcys for I.!l.rSCIl snd Roth in an effort to obtain pleCls of guiity but withollt 
8uccess. Lar,en's nUe:-!:t}' at fir3L took t he po~ition he would not consider a plea 
until hi$ modon to suppre5~ Wtl~ dccid"d. 
The tilll(, for filing the Government'!!; rCopO!l:!e to the motion to suppres'l wus 
deferred. In response to the motion, the Gon:rnmcnt would have been obliged to 
admit the illegality of the search and ~dl!lrc, Howe\,er, the necessity for muking 
this arlmi~sion was ayer~ed when J.ar~en's CO\lIl~e1 finally offered to plead his client 
nolo contendere if he cO'Jld receive some .!l3SUmnCe that oniy a moderli.te fine would 
be imposed. He poin~t:d out that I.arslJll had been imp03ed upon by JalTe, that, 
he had lost W, Govt:r;,ment po;;ition which he had held for 10 years, that he was 
unemployed and pcnnn~ss, and that ho had a wife and family dependent upon him, 
The Government w!?,s aware of these facts and finally Ilgrecd, if consulted by 
the court, to recommend a fine of S500. This p03itinn was taken largely because 
of the abo\'e factors but also hecatlse we realizcd that Jaffe was the main culprit, 
that he had corrnpted Lar:;clI and was r('spollsible (or his plight, and that it 
would be manife5t1y unjust for LRrsen to receive a sentence greatcr or even equal 
to that impost~d upon Jaffe, Larsen entered a pIca of nolo contendere on Novem­
ber 2, 1'H5 and was fined S300, as recommended by the Government. 
Only the case against Roth now re'l\£Iined. This case W£I$ \'ery weak and 
depended on several Pt\"Cil or handwritin£; and typewriting (identified as Roth's) 
of what appeared to be official docu;ncnt", •..• 
]n view of the stto.te of the e\'idence above outlined, the decision was reached 
that the c!!~e egain~t Roth could not be sueec:,sful1y pro~ecuted. After several 
postponement., of he.lrin.~~. on motiolls br!>ught by Rot~'s ~ttor,~eys, e.~d after 
an unsucces~rul eff(lrt '\\':15 made to pl!!'ce It on the pending maC·.l',"C dOCKet, the 
Go....ernment wus !orc~d to nolle pross;; the ce.~c agnbst bi:n on February 15, 1946. 
This repr.·:t i3 not intl".nded to qt;a:if{' the s"riou~n.~s3 .or gravity of. this c!'~~e. 
The FBL, p:ompt end vigorollil actIOn III face of a. 6ItU'.(\OIl alr<.:~.dy tainted With 
Dle;;ll.lity W~~ of bestimable service to this country. This report only dell!s with 
the difffcutti~s of succt)s5ful prosecution and the bases for tbe decisions Dlllde. 
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t'!il~in~ Co~:~:itte~Repo::~, pp. 123-133. The memorandu1Tl 18 
prj.nted in full except for one cmission--before the penultimate 
paragraph--of details of the evidence against Roth, against 
"Ihom charges "fere droppel1. The appendix "lhieh follm<red this 
memora.l1dum is e, technical legal discussion of precedents and 
Supreme Court decisions, under the fotlrth and fifth amendments, 
which the Department of Justice believed to be controlling. 
For reasons of space, it is not reproduced. It can be found 
at ~ICR, pp. 133-136.) 
Among the yarious investigations of the Amerasia case, I have 
mentioned. the Federal grand jury in Nerd York. This was a "run9.1.;aytl 
grand jury. FoJ~o\<ring Sene.tor McCarthy f s mu~h-publicized charges 
(similar to those made here by Dr. Kubek), this grand jury, "acting 
on its ov.'l1 authol'ity" and utilizing its subpoena pOt-leI') ma.de an in­
dependent investigation. If Dr. Kubek would like to suggest bias 
on the part of the Den:ocratic majority of the Tydings CommIttee 
(Senators Tydings, McMahon, and Green), he can h::u'dly level such 
an accusation against the grand jtu'Y. It l.s interesting; therefore, 
to note that its presentment, datE":d Jtme 15, 1950, included the 
·foll01·;ing concl.usions: 
The grand jury also found no evidence to indicate that the 
Department of Justice vias remiss in :its prosecution of the 
case. 
The grand jury believes that the American people have been 
poorly sex,yed by the compounding of confusion t.hrough dis­
closures of half-truths, cohtradictory statements, etc., in 
this and similar Cases. (TCR, pp. 136-137) 
There is, then, no great mystery about the way the case "as 
handled. liThe tainted nature of the original sea1:'ch by OSS agents 
infected the entire investigatory process vihich follovlcd. II The 
illegal entries having become known to one of the defendants (Larsen), 
the prosecu~ion moved quickly to salvage what it could of the case 
by accepting a guilty plea from Jaffe with a moderate fine and no 
demand for a j ail sentence. Si:nila:r:lY , it Was agreed that Lar sen 
would plead nolo contendere and pay a fine of $500. The Tydings 
Corr:nittec came to the conclusion: 
'l'he fact that SO:1e of the .defendants did not receive the plli'1ish­
ment vhioh '·.'C teda:,-' feel they deserved. or v:hieh vie i-lOuld liY..e 
to have seen them receive is the result of certain ::i.ncidents 
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of the case which have been here-tofore di.scussed and not the 
result of dereliction on the pari:. of the prosecuting officials. 
Under all of the circumstances of the case, we are constrained 
to suggest that the Department viaS fortunate in securing the 
punishm.ent that was meted cut. (TCR, p. 11~0) 
\: OtIT inquiry has been thorough and designed to develop 
every logical source through i-Ihich informe.tion of relevance 
to the case might be obtainGcl.• 
This case has nm., been considered (1) hy the Hobbs Cormnittee 
of the House of Representatives in 19116; (2) by a special grand 
jury in Nevl York in J950; and (3) by this subcommittee. In 
each instance the conslusion is the same--indeed, the only con­
clusion vthich the facts vrill support--that no agency of our 
government was derelict in any way in the handling of the 
Amerasia case, (TCR, p. 144) 
Parenthetically, this matter of illegal entry and search did 
not enter into and could not have affected the grand jury considera­
tion of my case and its decision agai.nst an indictment. In any event, 
there ',las no entry of my temporary residence, and I had no 
government documents in my possession. 
stnce Dr. Kubek has some 41j. footnote references to the Tydings 
tnmscript, one must assume that he is familiar vlith this record. 
If he is not, he certainly should be. But in his effort to convince 
his readers that my role in the" strange ll 'case i,'as "centraJ., If there 
is much that he chooses to omit. He notes, for instance, that the 
grand jury voted 20-0 against my indictment (one seems to feel that 
this in itself is meant to be evidence that there 'Has something 
strange about the case: it has, as a matter of fact, already been 
so considered. by at least one writer in Taiwan). But he fails to 
mention that I "laived immunity and appeared voluntarily before the 
grand jury. He repeats (without source) the statement (made by 
Senator Joseph 1.IcCarthy) that the FBI gave assurances that the evidence 
was "airtight." But he ignores the letter in the record from J. Edgar 
Hoover denying that such assurance was eVer given. He repeats (vlith­
out source) the accusation (again from Sene.tor McCe.rthy) that Under 
Secretary of State Grevi v:as forced to resign as a result of my clearance. 
But he fails to see the clear evidence--including a letter from Mr. 
Gr(;'.·J--th9.t this vi'as not true, 
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He refers to the OSS re.id on Amerasia on r·1al'ch 11, 1945, a.'I1d 
the finding there of "hU!ldreo.s" of cJ_E~S sified govermnent document s, 
but fails to note (as mentioned in the Tydings Report, 'p. 91) that 
this clearly indicated that Jiffierasia'lS source of government documents 
was ~lready fully developed before I arrived jn the United States 
on April 12, 191~5. 1,ike,,!ise, he fails to note the record that the 
FBI indicated to the Departments of state and Navy on April 18-­
before I had ever met Jaffe, Larsen, Mitchell, or GaJ~--that it 
was ready to present the case for prosecutive action. In other 
words, even before I was first sought out by the Amerasia group, 
the FBI was satisfied that the source of Ameras:i.a's documents was 
kn01VD and the case solved. 
Dr. Kubek also chooses to ignore some very direct refuta­
tions of his allegation that I had any ce!ltral role in tl:e Amerasia 
'lase: 
:'tr. McINJo..'RNEY. The evidence on Service was thin. They said 

tbere ,\-las in Jaffe's office, as I recall j.t, copies of his 

confidential report s. \'lhen ive arre sted, or made the searches, 

'we-found c()pies of his l'eport. He· irrLcrvlevled I~ars(:n, and l,a1'so11 

admitted that he had given Service's copies to Jaffe, ano. Service 

had. not given them.. Service was very sUl'prised that Jaffe had 

that report. It we.s on that thin allegation that v.'e a'.lthol'ized 

on Service ...... (Testimony of Mr. James McInerney, Assistant 

Attorney General in charge of the Criminal DiVision, Department 

of Justice, before the Hobbs committee in 1946. TT, p. 2289) 

MY. }'!ORGAIr. You sa"l all the evidence I assume, available in 

connection idth JOhi1 Service. 

fil'x. McINERl'JEY. Yes, sir. You mean-­

Mr. MORGAN. At that time. 

Mr. McINr~NEY. I, personally? 

:'tr. MORGAN. I mean, at the time of the prosecution, were you 

cognizant and familiar 'Nith the evidence against l·tr. Service? 

fill'. McINERNEY. Ye s, sir. 

Vx. MORGAN. An1, on the basi s of your knOi.Jledgeof such evidence, 

did you feel that prosecution of him i·:as '\-iarranted? 

Mr. McINERNEY. No, sir. (TT, p. 998) 

To sU!!Il1.:w:-ize. After laying a fOU'ldation of assertion that a 
hillldred-odd stolen government documents written by me were found 
in Amerasia, Dr. Kubek goes on to "assume" that many of these docu­
ments '\-fere delivered by me to Jaffe, and that I had a central role 
ina. strange case \-lhicli was not p:co::,e:::uted honestly and vigorously, 
but instead effectively buried. I submit that,. by any definition, 
this is ciear an(l serious defamation. 
The Amerasia case, after all, involved the criminal charge of 
"conspiracy to embezzle, steal, and purloin Pl'Ope:rty, records, and 
valuable things of the records and property of the United states." 
To this charge, one mall. pleaded guilty and another, nolo contendere. 
Punishable crimes, agaj.nst the United states and during a time of 
war, ,,'ere obviously therefore committed. For Dr. Kubek to say the.t 
I had a "central role" in such a case cannot be anything other than 
saying that I also i'las guilty. 
In other words, Dr. Kubek, without being able to offer the 
slightest scintilla of new evidence or information, blandly denies 
the validity (good faith? honesty?) ofa whole series of decisions 
conscientiously reached over the years by numbers of boards, grand 
juries, committees, and individuals, who had before them the whole 
record: 
a) the grand jUl'y, which voted unanimously against my indictment, 
b) the state Dcp(1.:rtml'mt, under Secretary B"jrne.s, whl ch cleared 
me and returned me to duty in August, 1945, 
c) 	 the Loyalty Security Board, under General Snow, and the 
responsible security and personnel officers of the Depart­
ment of state, under Secretaries ~furshall and Acheson, 
who cleared me in some seven investigations and hearings 
between 1946 and 1951, 
d) 	 the T".fdings Subcommittee, including Senator Lodge, "lhich 
found Senator McCarthy's charges--similar to those here 
;revived by Dr. Kubek--to be unfounded, 
e) 	 the State Department, under Secretary Dulles, "lhich accepted 
my return to duty (after the Supreme Court had ruled unan­
imously that r:ly discharge was illegal) and which, under 
Secretary Herter, restored my security clearance in 1959 
after another full investigation. 
* * * * 
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'1'here is lr.ilc1'1 more th'l.t might, but nee:d not, be said about 
~~:E'::"~~~ Pa~~.EE' 14y chief concern here is to poj.!~t out the 
fraudulent representation thf.t a hundred-odd reports of mine .lere 
found in Amerasia, and the defamation in the statements that I 
delivered r.;any o.oCU'lients to J~.ffe and had a ce~lt1'al role in the 
Amerasia caSE:. 
Dr~ Kubek's other errors -of fact in the Introduction and in 
his editorial comments are of many categories--major, minor, and 
ludicrous--and too numerous to be dealt ''lith adequately here. 
Dr. Kubek js, of course, free to form hi S ovm opinion of my 
reporting f'rom China. I am content to leave to the scholars in 
the field the evaluation of this reporting (and the editor I s 
analysis of it). Although I dislike the packaging provided by 
Dr. Kubek, I .relcome the publication of my reports: I wish, 
indeed, that it had not been so long delayed. IV.w OvID personal 
copies were deposited with the Offlce of Chinese Affairs in 1945 
and subsequently lost. In 1950, in IT.;}" hearings befm'e the IJoyalty 
-Security Board and the Tydings Coromi ttee, 1: had considered that 
my he st defen se against some of. the accuse.tiol: s vlot,ld be -:he actual 
texts of my reports from Yenan. Despite strenuous efforts, it Vias 
never possible to assemble anything like a complete set. Little 
did I and my couJlsel suspect that the "evidence" needed fOl' my 
defense vlaS there all the time, locked up by the Department of 
Justice in the form of retained copies of my personal papers. 
Scholars will perhaps find the documentary materials useful 
for research into that period. They may find Dr. Kubek's contri­
butions less useful in some other "rays. Chinese names are one problem. 
It may be hard, for instance, to ~\.now that Dr. Hsi-jo is really 
Dr. Chang (p. 1162). Or that Dr. Hu Shih, the scholar-philosopher 
and former an,bassador to the United States, is generally (but not 
a.hrays) listed in the index under Shih. The editor's notes are not 
uniformly he~.I'f'nl: as, for instance, when h:- informs the reader that 
flCC Clique" means "Chinese Com'l!unist.. Clique in Kuomintang politics"
. (p. 527). And it may be a good idea to check footnote citations. 
Professor Harold M. Vinacke may be surprised, for example, to find 
Chiang Kai-shek's vie\-/s put into his mouth (footnote 29, p. 21). 
* * '* * 
Vnlat', one 'Ivonders, is the purpose of this ponderous, maladroit 
effort to raise the ghost of Senator McCarthy. 
Soon after the appea~~a.nce of The Amerasia Pap~~, Dr. Kubek 
commenced \1hat seems, from the nei.,rs repox·ts> to have been something 
of a td_ulilphal tour of Tail-Ian. The Free China vleekl;y:, of March 29, 
1970, headlined a featured intervievr with him: HAHSAvl TALKS HURT 
AUJIES. 'l'hi s '....ould probably not be the fir st time that the Internal 
Security Committee has demonstrated an interest in external affairs. 
It is al so true that the Committee has been \-laging a feud vlith 
the Department of State for a number of years over the employment 
of Mr. otto Otepka. But it is nO\-l more than eight year s since I 
retlred from the State Department; and, in any case, any relevance 
or connection of my case to Otepka's seems obscure. 
Dr. Kubek a_lso rnakes a somewhat obscure statement about my 
employment since retirement . 
• • . eventually fiervic!7 found a convenient cockpit for f'urthel' 
poss:ible propagandizing of .the beatitudes of the Corllmunist 
rct;ime. This VIas on the library staff of the Cent€::r for Chinese 
Studies at the BerY.eley campus of the University of California ..•. 
(p. 70) 
Since I have neither writ ......en, spoken, nor taught any courses dealing 
"d_th the government and politics 'of modern China, Dr. Kubek can hardly 
knO\v my c'urrent vievis. Presumably, then, it must be the mere fact 
of my employment that he wishes to call attention to. 
Finally, there is a statement in the Foreword that the Amerasia 
story should be a lesson "especially for all the officials in our 
Government, whether or not in the diplomatic service .rr 
But none of these clues really casts much light on why I, per­
sonally, should have been picked as the prime target of Dr. Kubek' s 
monuncntal 'dork. To use one of hi s mm favor i te vlords, I find it 
very II st!'2.nge" • 
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